정부조직개편에 대한 제도 - 선택적 분석 ; 국민의 정부 조직개편을 중심으로 = Institutional - Choice Analysis of Organizational Change in Korea Government : With Special Reference to the Kim Daejoong Government

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper deals with organizational change in Korean government from the perspective of institutional-choice. According to the institutional-choice theory of Terry Moe, decisions on organizational change in government are made under the influence of various self-interested political forces, and thus the altered organization of the government reflects the interests of those political forces. With reference to the institutional-choice theory, two case studies from the years of 1998 and 1999 presented in this paper show three characteristics of organizational change in Korean government as follows. (1) The main actors determining organizational change in Korean government are the President, the ruling party and the opposition party, (2) Organization is not overburdened with specific rules and regulations by the ruling party, since the ruling party does not expect that the organization wile be abused by the opposition party in the future. (3) Organizational structure (or power) is divided between the President the ruling party (on the one side) and the opposition party (on the other side) in the process of political compromise. As a result the author has come to realize that the pattern of organizational change in Korean government resembles that of European countries with parliamentary systems, as well as that of the U.S. The pattern of organizational change in Korean government is similar to that of European countries in terms of the first two characteristics mentioned. However, the third characteristic holds a similarity with that of the U.S. In short, Korea seems to be a hybrid of European countries and the U.S. in its pattern of organizational change in government.