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    게임모델을 이용한 정부협상 분석 및 사회적 의미 = Social Implications from the Analysis on the Government Negotiation by Using Game Model

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104032951

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    How can we understand the phenomenon that resulted from the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008? This study analyzes the strategy and payoffs of the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008 using game model, as well as the conflict between the Korean government and the public using Bayesian game. According to the analysis, the Korean government could have molded a more proactive game circumstance with more bargaining options if the beef negotiation had not been linked to the FTA. Also, the Korean government could have prevented the public outrage that ensued if the negotiator had attended the negotiation table with clear judgment and strategies based on exact knowledge of the public’s preferences.
    This study offers two suggestions for future negotiations. First, the Korean government needs to minimize the external effects and set tactics focusing on the negotiation itself. In the game between Korea and U.S., the government made wrong strategic choices when it considered only the payoffs for the government and not the payoffs of the entire society. Secondly, in a game between the government and the public, different result were shown depending on whether the government knew the people's opinion or not. Thus the government should have better communication with the public and be sensitive to its opinion before important negotiations.
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    How can we understand the phenomenon that resulted from the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008? This study analyzes the strategy and payoffs of the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008 using game model, as well as the conflict between the Korean gover...

    How can we understand the phenomenon that resulted from the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008? This study analyzes the strategy and payoffs of the Korea-U.S. beef negotiation in 2008 using game model, as well as the conflict between the Korean government and the public using Bayesian game. According to the analysis, the Korean government could have molded a more proactive game circumstance with more bargaining options if the beef negotiation had not been linked to the FTA. Also, the Korean government could have prevented the public outrage that ensued if the negotiator had attended the negotiation table with clear judgment and strategies based on exact knowledge of the public’s preferences.
    This study offers two suggestions for future negotiations. First, the Korean government needs to minimize the external effects and set tactics focusing on the negotiation itself. In the game between Korea and U.S., the government made wrong strategic choices when it considered only the payoffs for the government and not the payoffs of the entire society. Secondly, in a game between the government and the public, different result were shown depending on whether the government knew the people's opinion or not. Thus the government should have better communication with the public and be sensitive to its opinion before important negotiations.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 이달곤, "협상론:협상의 과정,구조 그리고 전략" 법문사 2000

    2 "한국육류수출입협회"

    3 "한겨레신문"

    4 "조선일보"

    5 이명석, "정책분석에서의 게임이론의 활용: 제도분석틀의 관점" 한국행정학회 30 (30): 49-63, 1996

    6 "외교통상부 통상교섭본부"

    7 김삼룡, "샤프의 협상시스템으로서의 정책네트워크모형" 정부학연구소 11 (11): 86-122, 2005

    8 "미국 농무부"

    9 "농수산물유통공사"

    10 "농림수산식품부"

    1 이달곤, "협상론:협상의 과정,구조 그리고 전략" 법문사 2000

    2 "한국육류수출입협회"

    3 "한겨레신문"

    4 "조선일보"

    5 이명석, "정책분석에서의 게임이론의 활용: 제도분석틀의 관점" 한국행정학회 30 (30): 49-63, 1996

    6 "외교통상부 통상교섭본부"

    7 김삼룡, "샤프의 협상시스템으로서의 정책네트워크모형" 정부학연구소 11 (11): 86-122, 2005

    8 "미국 농무부"

    9 "농수산물유통공사"

    10 "농림수산식품부"

    11 박종수, "국제통상정책" 백산출판사 2007

    12 "국제수역사무국(OIE)"

    13 "국정조사회의록, 국정 감사회의록, 청문회회의록"

    14 "국민일보"

    15 "국립수의과학검역원"

    16 신성휘, "게임이론 길라잡이" 박영사 2003

    17 왕규호, "게임이론" 박영사 2004

    18 Von Neumann,John, "The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" Wiley 1944

    19 Doron,Gideon, "Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process" SAGE Publications 2001

    20 Scharpf.W.Fritz, "Game Real Actors Play: Actor-Centerd Institutionalism in Policy Research" Westview Press 1997

    21 "CBS"

    22 Coddington,Alan, "A Theory of the Bargaining Process: Comment Reply" 56 (56): 1966

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    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2021 평가 신규평가 신청대상 (신규평가)
    2020-12-01 등재 등재후보 탈락 (계속평가)
    2018-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
    2017-12-01 등재 등재후보 탈락 (계속평가)
    2016-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재후보
    2015-12-01 등재 등재후보로 하락 (기타) KCI등재후보
    2011-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
    2010-01-01 등재 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
    2009-01-01 등재 신청제한 (등재후보1차)
    2008-01-01 등재 등재후보 1차 FAIL (등재후보2차) KCI등재후보
    2007-01-01 등재 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
    2005-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
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    학술지 인용정보

    학술지 인용정보
    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.26 0.26 0.25
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    0.41 0.6 0.642 0.13
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