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    環境稅制에 關한 法經濟學的 硏究 : 게임이론의 메카니즘 접근법을 중심으로

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T8546778

    • 저자
    • 발행사항

      [서울]: 慶熙大學校 大學院, 2002

    • 학위논문사항

      학위논문(박사) -- 慶熙大學校 大學院 法學科 , 租稅法 , 2002

    • 발행연도

      2002

    • 작성언어

      한국어

    • 주제어
    • KDC

      329.000

    • 발행국(도시)

      대한민국

    • 형태사항

      vi, 211 p..

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    There leave a variety of ways dealing with environmental problems, such as command and control driven by the government, private negotiation, and private law litigation. It is, however, not the right solution for preserving the nature mother because those steps are not curing the causes but just settling down the brawl between the two parties.
    Nowadays, the governments, at home and abroad, use a wide spectrum of policy mechanism to curb the environmental degradation and set up a new plan for giving penalties against the source of pollution. Carbon tax, energy tax, sulphur tax, emission charge and waste charge are typical examples of green tax or environmental tax ,at this juncture.
    The purpose of this article is to analyze the landscape of environmental tax system from the viewpoint of game theoretic mechanism, ie. a part of law and economics approach which stress the importance and the relationship between law and nonlegal mechanism of cooperation.
    Law and economics approach is a and of interdisciplinary studies to see the legal problems tackling with the economic solution. The growth area in the recent torts literature has been the inclusion of friction in the standard accdent models either by relaxing the assumptions of perfect information or by making the legal system costly and/or unpredictable. Laws are not just arcane technical arguments; they are instruments for achieving important social goals.Inorder to know the effects of laws, judges and other lawmakers must have a method of evaluating laws' effects on important social values. Economics predicts the effects of policies on efficiency. Law is an obligation backed by a state sanction and economics provide a scientific theory to predict the effects of legal sanxtions on behavior. In a sense of game theory, tax system is a combined game of arbitration and signalling game and it suggests that formal contract is more effective than multilateral consensus. To reflect the moving situation of technological developments and dynamic policy target, evolutionary mechanism is to be scrutinized.
    From mechanism concept oriented view, so called, environmental tax in a broad sense, leaves loopholes in information symmetry. Environmental tax system does not provide a true signal reporting incentive mechanism by signal senders. It is just giving penalties against polluters now knowing the exact level of polluter's economic benefit by polluting the environment. As time goes, under this kind of tax system, companies have no incentive to preserve or to improve the environment technology and just they have incentives to evade the penalties or to hide their true information of pollution.
    Therefore, it requires a series of considerations in building and operating environmental tax system. First, a part of environmental surtax should reinvest in improving environment and in continuing education program. Second, evolution mechanism is need to recognize the more favorable incentive of true reporting rather than that of false reporting. Third, Green budget reform is also required to set up the environmental tax system, revenue neutrality and double charge problem considered. And the last, TCMP(Taxpayer's Compliance Measurement Program) should be introduced in operating the environmental information system to get the reasonable penalty equivalent to the benefit from polluting the environment.

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    There leave a variety of ways dealing with environmental problems, such as command and control driven by the government, private negotiation, and private law litigation. It is, however, not the right solution for preserving the nature mother because t...

    There leave a variety of ways dealing with environmental problems, such as command and control driven by the government, private negotiation, and private law litigation. It is, however, not the right solution for preserving the nature mother because those steps are not curing the causes but just settling down the brawl between the two parties.
    Nowadays, the governments, at home and abroad, use a wide spectrum of policy mechanism to curb the environmental degradation and set up a new plan for giving penalties against the source of pollution. Carbon tax, energy tax, sulphur tax, emission charge and waste charge are typical examples of green tax or environmental tax ,at this juncture.
    The purpose of this article is to analyze the landscape of environmental tax system from the viewpoint of game theoretic mechanism, ie. a part of law and economics approach which stress the importance and the relationship between law and nonlegal mechanism of cooperation.
    Law and economics approach is a and of interdisciplinary studies to see the legal problems tackling with the economic solution. The growth area in the recent torts literature has been the inclusion of friction in the standard accdent models either by relaxing the assumptions of perfect information or by making the legal system costly and/or unpredictable. Laws are not just arcane technical arguments; they are instruments for achieving important social goals.Inorder to know the effects of laws, judges and other lawmakers must have a method of evaluating laws' effects on important social values. Economics predicts the effects of policies on efficiency. Law is an obligation backed by a state sanction and economics provide a scientific theory to predict the effects of legal sanxtions on behavior. In a sense of game theory, tax system is a combined game of arbitration and signalling game and it suggests that formal contract is more effective than multilateral consensus. To reflect the moving situation of technological developments and dynamic policy target, evolutionary mechanism is to be scrutinized.
    From mechanism concept oriented view, so called, environmental tax in a broad sense, leaves loopholes in information symmetry. Environmental tax system does not provide a true signal reporting incentive mechanism by signal senders. It is just giving penalties against polluters now knowing the exact level of polluter's economic benefit by polluting the environment. As time goes, under this kind of tax system, companies have no incentive to preserve or to improve the environment technology and just they have incentives to evade the penalties or to hide their true information of pollution.
    Therefore, it requires a series of considerations in building and operating environmental tax system. First, a part of environmental surtax should reinvest in improving environment and in continuing education program. Second, evolution mechanism is need to recognize the more favorable incentive of true reporting rather than that of false reporting. Third, Green budget reform is also required to set up the environmental tax system, revenue neutrality and double charge problem considered. And the last, TCMP(Taxpayer's Compliance Measurement Program) should be introduced in operating the environmental information system to get the reasonable penalty equivalent to the benefit from polluting the environment.

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    목차 (Table of Contents)

    • <目次>
    • 第1章 序論 = 1
    • 第1節 硏究 目的 = 1
    • 第2節 硏究 範圍와 方法 = 11
    • 第2章 環境稅에 關한 一般理論 = 15
    • <目次>
    • 第1章 序論 = 1
    • 第1節 硏究 目的 = 1
    • 第2節 硏究 範圍와 方法 = 11
    • 第2章 環境稅에 關한 一般理論 = 15
    • 第1節 環境稅의 導入背景과 根據 = 15
    • I. 環境稅의 導入背景 = 15
    • 1. 環境問題에 關한 國際的 論議 = 15
    • 2. 횐經立法上의 課題 = 21
    • 3. 環境稅 槪念의 導入 = 23
    • II. 環境稅 導入의 根據 = 25
    • 1. 피구稅(Pigouvian Taxes) = 25
    • 2. 0의 社會的 限界費用(Social Marginal Cost) 維持 = 29
    • 3. 汚染者 負擔原則의 定立 = 31
    • 第2節 環境稅의 法的槪念과 機能 = 36
    • I. 環境稅의 法的槪念 = 36
    • 1. 狹義의 環境稅와 廣義의 環境稅 = 36
    • 2. 直接的 環境稅와 間接的 環境稅 = 40
    • II. 環境稅의 機能 = 42
    • 1. 外部費用의 算定機能 = 44
    • 2. 環境保護의 誘導機能 = 45
    • 3. 租稅財政의 確保機能 = 46
    • 第3節 環境稅의 種類 = 48
    • I. 環境稅의 類型 = 48
    • 1. 環境財政稅 = 48
    • 2. 環境利用稅 = 48
    • 3. 環境調整稅 = 49
    • 4. 環境誘導稅 = 49
    • II. 狹義의 環境稅: 炭素稅(Carbon Tax)와 에너지稅(Energy Tax) = 50
    • 1. 炭素稅 및 에너지稅의 槪念 = 50
    • 2. 課稅要件 및 課稅標準 = 51
    • 3. 炭素稅와 에너지稅의 導入效果 = 52
    • III. 廣義의 環境稅 = 53
    • 1. 排出賦課金(Effluent Charge) = 53
    • 2. 負擔金制度(Charges System) = 55
    • 第4節 現行 우리나라의 環境稅制 = 64
    • I. 排出賦課金制度 = 65
    • II. 環境改善負擔金 制度 = 74
    • III. 水質改善負擔金制度 = 78
    • IV. 廢棄物 負擔金 = 80
    • 第3章 環境稅制에 關한 美國과 유럽의 立法例 = 84
    • 第1節 美國의 環境稅制 = 84
    • I. 目的稅로서 環境稅 導入事例 = 85
    • 1. 目的稅의 導入背景 = 85
    • 2. 汚染者負擔原則 事例(polluter pays principle) = 86
    • 3. 共同責任(collective responsibility)負擔의 原則 事例 = 87
    • 4. 環境改善을 위한 財源確保 = 89
    • 5. 環境資源에 대한 公共投資事例 = 90
    • 6. 環境敎育基金 確保事例 = 92
    • 7. 經濟的 誘因制度 事例 = 93
    • II. 環境親和技術 유도방안 = 94
    • 1. 新技術開發을 통한 原價節減 = 94
    • 2. 關聯稅制 등을 통한 制度的 變化 = 94
    • 3. 公害防止施設投資 = 96
    • III. 持續可能한 成長을 위한 勞力 = 97
    • 1. 事業用 에너지 稅額控除(Oregon Business Energy Tax Credit Program) = 97
    • 2. 森林育成稅(Maine Tree Growth Tax Law) = 98
    • IV. 環境基金課稅(trust fund tax) = 100
    • 1. 固體廢棄物減少基金 = 100
    • 2. 資源保護負擔金(charges) = 101
    • 第2節 유럽의 環境稅制 = 103
    • I. EU의 環境稅 政策 = 103
    • 1. EU 共同環境政策의 摸索 = 103
    • 2. EU의 環境稅 導入 = 105
    • II. 主要國의 環境稅 導入現況 = 107
    • 1. 스웨덴 = 107
    • 2. 핀란드 = 110
    • 3. 노르웨이 = 110
    • 4. 네덜란드 = 112
    • 5. 덴마크 = 114
    • 第4章 環境稅制의 法經濟學的 立法方案 = 116
    • 第1節 環境立法上의 法經濟學的 接近 = 116
    • I. 法經濟學的 分析의 基本槪念 = 116
    • 1. 法經濟學의 意義 = 116
    • 2. 하이예크(F.A. Hayek)에 있어서 法과 經濟 = 119
    • 3. 코즈(Coase)에 있어서의 法과 經濟 = 122
    • 4. 小結 = 126
    • II. 法經濟學的 接近 = 127
    • 1. 硏究分野와 硏究方法論 = 127
    • 2. 法經濟學的 硏究의 限界 = 128
    • 第2節 進化메카니즘 接近法과 環境稅制 = 130
    • I. 게임理論(Game Theory)과 環境稅制 = 130
    • 1. 신호게임(Signaling Game)으로서 租稅 = 130
    • 2. 情報構造의 槪念(Concept of Information Structure) = 133
    • II. 環境課稅制度와 情報構造 = 143
    • 1. 企業의 租稅行爲 類型 = 143
    • 2. 課稅當局의 情報構造 選擇 = 144
    • 3. 情報構造的 側面에서 본 環境稅制 = 146
    • III. 進化메카니즘(Evolutionary Mechanism) 개념의 적용 = 147
    • 1. 메카니즘의 개념(Mechanism Concept) = 147
    • 2. 進化메카니즘(Evolutionary Mechanism) 槪念의 適用 = 151
    • 3. Mechanism Design의 問題 = 153
    • 4. 참여 인센티브와 보상메카니즘(Participating Incentives & Compensation Mechanism) = 155
    • 5. 啓示 메카니즘(Revelation Mechanism) = 158
    • IV. 最適 메카니즘(Optimal Mechanism) = 161
    • 1. 最適 메카니즘의 槪念 = 161
    • 2. 兩者間 自發的 去來 메카니즘 = 161
    • 3. 自發的 去來 메카니즘과 環境稅制 = 165
    • 第5章 우리나라의 環境稅制의 問題點과 改善方案 = 166
    • 第1節 現行 環境稅制의 問題點 = 166
    • I. 情報와 情報非對稱(Information Asymmetry) 의 問題 = 166
    • 1. 情報의 效率性 問題 = 167
    • 2. 去來費用(transaction cost)의 問題 = 168
    • 3. 情報非對稱(Information Asymmetry)의 問題 = 168
    • II. 內在된 正義(Implied Justice) = 174
    • III. 汚染者 情報의 確保 = 175
    • 第2節 環境稅制에 대한 改善方案 = 177
    • I. 情報非對稱 問題에 대한 改善方案 = 177
    • II. 納稅者順應改善프로그램(TCMP)의 導入 = 178
    • 1. 納稅者順應프로그램 = 178
    • 2. 조사대상 선정방법 = 179
    • 3. 環境稅制에 納稅者順應프로그램(TCMP)의 導入 = 182
    • III. 탄력세율의 보완 필요 = 182
    • 1. 이중의 배당효과와 그 한계 = 182
    • 2. 탄력세율의 보완 = 183
    • 第3節 環境稅 導入方案 = 184
    • I. 環境稅의 導入 = 184
    • II. 環境稅 導入時의 問題와 解決方案 = 185
    • 1. 重複負擔의 問題 = 186
    • 2. 稅收中立性의 確保 = 187
    • 3. 環境稅의 逆進負擔의 問題 = 189
    • 4. 交通稅의 問題 = 190
    • 第6章 結論 = 192
    • 參考文獻 = 195
    • ABSTRACT = 209
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