증권공시기준의 국제적 통일과 그 타당성 = The Propriety of the International Uniformity in Securities Disclosure Standards

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In recent years, the world's securities regulators have been making an effort to develop a uniform set of disclosure standards to be used in all international offerings. Proponents of the harmonization approach suggest the replacement of the domestic disclosure regimes with unified disclosure standards that would be used by domestic and foreign issuers in all developed markets, because harmonization is the most efficient approach for regulating securities disclosure rules in global markets. They believe such a transformation would solve the problems that each securities regulator is facing, which would result in a more efficient securities market, a significant reduction in the cost of equity, and a higher level of investor protection worldwide.
Theoretically, the harmonization of a national securities disclosure regime could resolve the problems caused by various market failures of regulatory competition among national regulators, for instance, the cost of information, lack of mobility, managerial opportunism, race to the bottom, and externalities. However, few people would quarrel with the idea that there exist fundamental differences in a nation's market maturity, history, cultural and business conditions, and the regulatory approach taken, including the form and content of regulation. While most securities markets tend to develop similar structures, local securities markets have unique features, which may create different problems that call for unique regulatory responses.
In addition, issuers and investors who are different will prefer different regimes because they have different preferences and levels of financial sophistication, and one issuer's socially optimal level of disclosure may differ from another's. Therefore, a globally uniform disclosure regime for all issuers around the world would not enhance global welfare as much as properly apportioned regulation by national regimes or issuers themselves. Because there are important differences among issuers around the world in terms of the level of disclosure that will maximize the returns that their capital utilizing productive activities generate, the adoption of uniform disclosure standards would not be desirable.
Due to these fundamental differences in the legal, cultural, and business conditions of each jurisdiction, as well as the differences in the preference and optimal level of disclosure of each issuer, no one system is likely to work across all jurisdictions. Therefore, the harmonization or uniformity approach to designing workable international securities regulations, enforced globally by a single regulator, is not only likely to fail but is also undesirable.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 머리말
• Ⅱ. 증권공시규제의 국제적 통일
• Ⅲ. 통합 증권공시규제의 타당성
• Ⅳ. 향후 국제시장에서의 증권공시규제
• Ⅴ. 맺음말
• 참 고 문 헌
• 【ABSTRACT】

참고문헌 (Reference)

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