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    M&A계약상 불가침협약과 이사의 신인의무 -미국법상 불가침협약의 준수와 신인의무 위반의 상관관계를 중심으로- = The Target Board`s Fiduciary Duties and Standstill Agreements in M&A Transactions -Focusing on the Interrelationship between the Breach of Fiduciary Duties and the Observation of Standstill Agreements

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Standstill agreements have become a common standard features of the public company sales process but, despite this prevalence, courts and academics have seemed that they have not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or whether they contribute in maximizing shareholder value. That is, despite their functions and advantages, standstill agreements can create a conflict between a target board’s duty to maximize shareholder value in a sale of control, or Revlon duty, and the board’s ability to protect an executed agreement as permitted by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Unocal and its progeny. The conflict is particularly apparent after the target has executed a merger agreement with a winning bidder and a losing bidder makes a higher offer for the target in violation of the standstill agreement. Thus, this article tries to draw a legally and practically reasonable resolution by reviewing and analyzing the U.S. related theories and case laws. In sum, although the Delaware courts have ruled that standstill agreements are not per se inadmissible, the court may consider them invalid, especially when the observance of standstill agreements conflicts with the target board’s Revlon duty. In this context, this article suggests that if deal makers continue using certain standstill agreements, then they should be paired with a fiduciary out and a termination fee so that a bidder bound by such standstill agreements should be able to request a waiver if it can set forth compelling and clearly delineated reasons that it would like to increase its bid. Through this approach, using standstill agreements could be consistent with the precedents as well as the rule of the maximization of shareholder value (Revlon duty). Moreover, in determining whether the target board may consider a third party’s higher offer in contravention of the standstill agreement, we need to consider the purpose of the board’s action under the circumstances of each case. Specifically, the board should articulate a valid value maximization purpose and is not acting to further its own self-interest, be reasonable in its decision-making regarding how many bidders submitted offers and the board considered in pre-signing stage, and the third party’s offer should be a bona fide one grounded with its real intent and ability to close the transaction. As shortly mentioned in Part Ⅰ., the M&A market is expected to extend globally and nationally in Korea in the near future and, thus, the number of M&A contracts that adopt standstill agreements and the number of disputes due to them would increase. Therefore, it is desirable and would provide us with some significant implications in construing and applying Korean law to explore and analyze the U.S. related theories and case laws in order to prepare future disputes in Korea and draw a reasonable conclusion with regard to using those standstill agreements.
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    Standstill agreements have become a common standard features of the public company sales process but, despite this prevalence, courts and academics have seemed that they have not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or whether ...

    Standstill agreements have become a common standard features of the public company sales process but, despite this prevalence, courts and academics have seemed that they have not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or whether they contribute in maximizing shareholder value. That is, despite their functions and advantages, standstill agreements can create a conflict between a target board’s duty to maximize shareholder value in a sale of control, or Revlon duty, and the board’s ability to protect an executed agreement as permitted by the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Unocal and its progeny. The conflict is particularly apparent after the target has executed a merger agreement with a winning bidder and a losing bidder makes a higher offer for the target in violation of the standstill agreement. Thus, this article tries to draw a legally and practically reasonable resolution by reviewing and analyzing the U.S. related theories and case laws. In sum, although the Delaware courts have ruled that standstill agreements are not per se inadmissible, the court may consider them invalid, especially when the observance of standstill agreements conflicts with the target board’s Revlon duty. In this context, this article suggests that if deal makers continue using certain standstill agreements, then they should be paired with a fiduciary out and a termination fee so that a bidder bound by such standstill agreements should be able to request a waiver if it can set forth compelling and clearly delineated reasons that it would like to increase its bid. Through this approach, using standstill agreements could be consistent with the precedents as well as the rule of the maximization of shareholder value (Revlon duty). Moreover, in determining whether the target board may consider a third party’s higher offer in contravention of the standstill agreement, we need to consider the purpose of the board’s action under the circumstances of each case. Specifically, the board should articulate a valid value maximization purpose and is not acting to further its own self-interest, be reasonable in its decision-making regarding how many bidders submitted offers and the board considered in pre-signing stage, and the third party’s offer should be a bona fide one grounded with its real intent and ability to close the transaction. As shortly mentioned in Part Ⅰ., the M&A market is expected to extend globally and nationally in Korea in the near future and, thus, the number of M&A contracts that adopt standstill agreements and the number of disputes due to them would increase. Therefore, it is desirable and would provide us with some significant implications in construing and applying Korean law to explore and analyze the U.S. related theories and case laws in order to prepare future disputes in Korea and draw a reasonable conclusion with regard to using those standstill agreements.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 사법연수원, "회사법연구-M&A실무-" 2010

    2 유명간, "퀀트전략, M&A 전성시대!"

    3 "수원지법 여주지원 2003.12.12., 2003카합369"

    4 "서울북부지법 2007.10.25., 2007카합1082"

    5 "상법일부개정법률안(1912002): 제안자(정부: 2014년 10월 6일), 의결일자(2015년 11월 12일: 수정가결)"

    6 이재우, "미국상장사의 인수에 대한 법률적 고찰" 국제거래법학회 20 (20): 83-109, 2011

    7 김범준, "미국법상 M&A계약의 거래보호약정(Deal Protection Measures)에 있어서 Go-Shop 조항에 관한 연구" 한국비교사법학회 16 (16): 171-204, 2009

    8 "대법원 2005.10.28., 2003다69638"

    9 김화진, "기업인수합병" 박영사 2008

    10 정영철, "기업인수 4G" 박영사 2010

    1 사법연수원, "회사법연구-M&A실무-" 2010

    2 유명간, "퀀트전략, M&A 전성시대!"

    3 "수원지법 여주지원 2003.12.12., 2003카합369"

    4 "서울북부지법 2007.10.25., 2007카합1082"

    5 "상법일부개정법률안(1912002): 제안자(정부: 2014년 10월 6일), 의결일자(2015년 11월 12일: 수정가결)"

    6 이재우, "미국상장사의 인수에 대한 법률적 고찰" 국제거래법학회 20 (20): 83-109, 2011

    7 김범준, "미국법상 M&A계약의 거래보호약정(Deal Protection Measures)에 있어서 Go-Shop 조항에 관한 연구" 한국비교사법학회 16 (16): 171-204, 2009

    8 "대법원 2005.10.28., 2003다69638"

    9 김화진, "기업인수합병" 박영사 2008

    10 정영철, "기업인수 4G" 박영사 2010

    11 최순영, "국내 M&A시장의 고성장과 재무자문 시장의 불균형" 자본시장연구원 (2015-46) : 2015

    12 윤성승, "계약에 의한 주식양도제한에 관한 검토" 한국기업법학회 26 (26): 113-134, 2012

    13 임재연, "美國會社法" 박영사 2004

    14 "Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)"

    15 "Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)"

    16 Afra Afsharipour, "Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fee" 63 : 1161-, 2010

    17 Stephen M. Bainbridge, "The Geography of Revlon-Land" 81 : 3277-, 2013

    18 Sean J. Griffith, "The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare" 29 : 599-, 2004

    19 Paul Povel, "Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders" 19 : 1399-, 2006

    20 "Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)"

    21 Christina M. Sautter, "Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties" 38 : 55-, 2010

    22 Brian JM Quinn, "Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching Rights in Control Transactions" 36 : 1011-, 2011

    23 "Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999)"

    24 "Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)"

    25 "Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)"

    26 "Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)"

    27 Lou R. Kling, "Negotiated Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions" 2010

    28 "Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989)"

    29 "Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012)"

    30 김병태, "M&A계약상 Fiduciary-Out 조항에 관한 연구" 서울대학교 금융법센터 (20) : 2006

    31 윤종훈, "M&A 전략과 실전사례" 매경출판(주) 2010

    32 김홍식, "M&A 개론" 博英社 2009

    33 Steven M. Davidoff, "Lock-Up Creep" 38 : 681-, 2013

    34 "In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation, 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007)"

    35 "In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007)"

    36 "In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011)"

    37 "In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012)"

    38 "In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012)"

    39 "In re Ancestry.com Inc. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012)"

    40 Steven M. Davidoff, "Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion" 2009

    41 Kelley D. Parker, "Doing Deals 2011: The Art of M&A Transactional Practice" PLI Corp. Law & Practice 2011

    42 Aaron D. Rachelson, "Corporate Acquisitions, Mergers & Divestitures" Thompson West 2013

    43 D. Gordon Smith, "Business Organizations: Cases, Problems and Case Studies" ASPEN Publishers 2004

    44 Guhan Subramanian, "Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses" 113 : 621-, 2003

    45 "Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)"

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