Language, thought, and consciousness : an essay in philosophical psychology

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = xi
• Introduction = 1
• 1 The geography of the issues = 9
• 1.1 conceptual versus natural modality = 9
• 1.2 Implications for philosophy and psycholgy = 13
• 1.3 Of wolves and wolf - children = 16
• 1.4 Stalnaker's intelligent Martians = 20
• 1.5 Anti - realist arguments = 22
• 1.6 Realism in mind = 25
• 1.7 Innateness and theory of mind = 29
• 1.8 Thinking : images or sentences? = 31
• 2 Which language do we think with? = 40
• 2.1 The evidence from scientific psychology = 40
• 2.2 The evidence of introspection : images and imaged sentences = 49
• 2.3 The scope and strength of the introspective thesis = 52
• 2.4 Objections and elucidations = 55
• 2.5 Fallible introspection and Fodor = 60
• 2.6 Individuating propositional attitudes = 62
• 2.7 Animals and infants = 65
• 2.8 Language - learning and sub - personal thought = 67
• 3 Thought - based semantics = 73
• 3.1 The argument from foreign believers = 73
• 3.2 Grice's thought - based semantics = 76
• 3.3 Two obijections = 78
• 3.4 Searle's version of thought- based semantics = 83
• 3.5 A marriage of searle and Fodor? = 85
• 3.6 Causal co-variance theories = 88
• 3.7 Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence = 91
• 3.8 The all Ss problem = 96
• 4 Holism and language = 103
• 4.1 From mental realism to Mentalese = 103
• 4.2 The demand for scientific vindication = 105
• 4.3 The problem of holism = 107
• 4.4 Between holism and atomism = 111
• 4.5 Arguments for holism = 114
• 4.6 The need for a language - based semantics = 120
• 4.7 Language - based semantics 1 : functional - role semantics = 123
• 4.8 Language - based semantics 2 : canonical acceptance conditions = 127
• 5 First steps towards theory of consciousness = 133
• 5.1 Retrospect : the need for a theory of consciousness = 133
• 5.2 Conscious versus non - conscious mental states = 135
• 5.3 Cartesian consciousness = 140
• 5.4 Why Cartesianism won't do = 143
• 5.5 What kind of theory do we want? = 147
• 5.6 Kirk : presence to central decision-making = 150
• 5.7 Higher - order discrimination and feel = 154
• 5.8 The case for higher - order thought theory = 157
• 6 Second (―order) steps towards a theory of consciousness = 164
• 6.1 Theory 1 : actual and conscious = 164
• 6.2 Theory 2 : actual and non - conscious = 166
• 6.3 Theory 3 : potential and non - conscious = 170
• 6.4 Theory 4 : Potential and conscious = 174
• 6.5 Dennett 1978 : availability to print-out = 176
• 6.6 Dennett 1991 : multiple drafts and probes = 178
• 6.7 Time and indeterminacy = 183
• 6.8 Dennett on the place of language in thought = 187
• 7 A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness = 194
• 7.1 Reflexive thinking theory = 194
• 7.2 Contrasts and advantages = 198
• 7.3 Conscious versus non - conscious thinking = 201
• 7.4 Objections and elucidations = 204
• 7.5 The problem of unity = 208
• 7.6 The problem of phenomenal feel = 212
• 7.7 A Cartesian Theatre? = 217
• 7.8 Animals and infants revisited = 220
• 8 The involvement of language in conscious thinking = 225
• 8.1 An architecture for human thinking = 225
• 8.2 An evolutionary story = 231
• 8.3 The argument from introspection revisited = 234
• 8.4 Working memory and the central executive = 245
• 8.5 The thesis of natural necessity (weak) = 251
• 8.6 Objections and elucidations = 259
• 8.7 The thesis of natural necessity (strong) = 263
• 8.8 The Scope and significance of NN = 269
• Conclusion = 277
• References = 280
• Index = 287