美國의 對中國軍事援助(1942~1944) : General Joseph W.Stillwell's war efforfs in China Joseph W.Stilwell將軍의 활동을 중심으로 = The American Military Aid to China (1942-1944)

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study is intended to deal with the different expectation between the United States and the Republic of China, especially the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W.Stilwell in the proceeding of the American military aid to China during the World War Ⅱ. In doing this, I will search for what Stiwell's reform plans of the Chinese Army were and why Chiang refused his ideas. Consequently, I will reinterpretate Stilwell's activity and his plans for the Chinese Army.
In July of 1937, as the fighting in China intensified developing in a major war, the Untied States re-sponse in China remained cautious. However, a number of Americans were helping to develop a militaty aviation in China. Chief among them was Colonel Claire L. Chennault, who retired from the American Army Air Force in 1937. The Lend-Lease Act became law in March 11, 1941, and Chennault started to organize the American Volunteer Group(AVG). The difficulties that arose in processing Chinese request of Lend-Lease arms suggested to several officers that the War De-partment take some positive action to improve the handling of Lend-Lease to China. On July 3, 1941, the American Military Mission to China was sent to China by the War Department. The head of the mission, General John Magruder reported to the Wat Department in tones of mild optimism regarding the creation of an effective Chinese Army.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese suddenly attacked the Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill created a China-Burma-India Theater, and they appointed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander of China Theater. Chiang asked that an American be sent to act as chief of his Allied staff. So President Roosevelt sent General Stilwell to China, because Gen-eral George C. Marshall recommanded Stilwell as a suitable officer to reorganize the Chinese Army. The War Department ordered to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. Stilwell was given four posts:Joint Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater;Commanding General of a U.S.task force,"U.S."Forces in China-Burma-India Theater";U.S.Representative on the Al-lied militaty council in Chungking;and Representative of the President of Lend-Lease affairs.
When Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent General Stilwell to Burma to conduct the firstBurma campaign, Stilwell was unprepared for the situation which he found there. Neither the Chinese nor the British commanders wished to sacrifice their men and material. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese quickly overran Burma and effectively isolated China. Stilwell attributed this militaty defeat in Burma to Chiang's intervention. The military debacle in Burma convinced Stiwelll that China could only play an important role on the war if its armies were thorouhgly reorganized and used to reopen Burma. When he returned to Chugking, he presented Chiang with "notes"calling for complete reorganization of the Chinese Army.
However, Chiang could not easily accept Stilwell's reform propesals, because of China's military structure and its relation to political power. The Chinese Army a coalition army, but not a uni-fied national force. The Chinese forces were in reality large bands of lightly armed and poored trained men, who were not in contact with the Japanese, and could not maintain fighting against the Japanese. The Generalissimo directly controlled only about thirty divisions, meaning that the bulk of his power rested on the skillful balancing of competing interests. He attempted to manipulate reginal com-manders by making vital funds and supplies dependent of their obedience. Furthermore, the Chinese system of conscription was neither fair nor impartial.
Stilwell believed that the Hump airlift was an emergency routes. The long term solution, he knew, was to cut off the Japanese blockade so that a supply-flow great enough to equip entire armies could begin. Burma was the logical place, and the retaking Burma became his singly-minded passion. By the end of May, 1942, Stilwell planed the detail of reconquest. Nine thousand Chinese troops had escaped from the Burma disaster, and he wished to make these the nucleus of a well-trained Chinese-American force which would strike back at the Japanese on China's flank. A military camp in Cen-tral India, called Ramgarh, was established to train these troops. At Kumning, within China, another training center would be established;here Americans would organize a thirty division Chinese force to strike down the Burma road into Burma with the Ramgarh Chinese force striking from India. A third center for training Chinese was to be established in eastern China, at Kweilin. These three forces were called respectively X, Y,and Z.
Chiang, while fully knowledgable of Stilwell's proposals, continued to delay the reforms because they would reduce his power structure. So Chiang did everything to prevent to this, and eliminate the troublesome American. On the other hand, Stilwell's attitude toward Chiang and his regime became increasingly contemptuous and impatient. Chiang soon found General Chennault as a strong rival to Stilwell.
On April 30, 1943, President Roosevelt, hearing of the disagreements between Chiang and Stilwell and realizing the damage they were causing to the war effort aganinst Japan, recalled Stilwell and Chennault to washington. Chennault's plan was to use China as a platform for mounting an air of-fensive against vitals of Japan. He described the type of aircraft he would breed to accomplish the mission. Stilwell replied, "Any increased air offensive that stung the Japs enough would bring a strong reaction that would wreck everything and put China out of war. The first step was to get a ground force capable of seizing and holding airbases, and opening communications to China from the outside world." The president endorsed to Chennault's plan because of his political support of Chiang and be-cause he believed the air program would encourage Chinese morale. The president's decision made Stilwell's plan delayed and damaged.
Stilwell started the second Burma campaign in January, of 1944. He had to deal with the three ob-stacles;the British's lack of cooperation, Chiang's refusal of using Y-force, and the Japanese strong resistance. After the Middle of May, the battle areas became a nightmare because of the monsoom weather. So the decisive victory, which Stilwell hoped, could not be obtained.
In the mean time, the strong Japanese offensive operation, known as operation Ichigo stroke the Chi-nese forces back to the interior land. The japanese also wiped out American airbases in eastern China used by the B-29's for raids of Japan. The Generalissimo appealed to the President for emergency help. Stilwell saw the moment to suggest again that Chiang should give him full commander power. He wanted full authority to conduct China's war effort and even to utilize Communist forces, which Chiang stubbornly refused. So relations between Stilwell and Chiand became beyong repair. General Patrick Hurley was sent to China as the presidential emissary to solve this crisis. Hurley finally re-quested to Roosevelt, "Stilwell should go out." Roosewelt faced a election for a fourth term in just a few weeks, and to break with Chiang, on the eve of election, might be a political risk. Therefore he chose Chiang, and recalled Stilwell.
Stilwell's recall was a major event affecting Chinese-Americam relations. In 1943, the President had a strong faith for China and the Generalissomo. But after Stilwell's recall, the President and his militaty advisors became to lose interest in a major effort to support China. The strategic situation in the Pacific and the possibility of the Soviet participation to the war against Japan also greatly lessened the possibility of the Soviet participation to the dependence of the United States on Chinese cooperation. The event of 1944 helped to formulate the Yalta agreement. After Chiang's regime collapsed in 1948, many historians argued that Stilwell's plan would be a wiser alternative to save China from the postwar internal crisis. However, in my opinion, Stilwell's reform plan was merely a military solution. Therefore Chiang's regime would not have survived for a long time, even if Stilwell's plan had been accepted by Chiang, because the political system and economic chaos in China even made the postwar situation more deteriorated.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 머릿말
• Ⅱ. 스틸웰將軍의 中國파견의 背景
• Ⅲ. 日本의 中國封鎖와 스틸웰의 中國軍 改革案
• Ⅳ. 스틸웰의 中國軍改革案과 첸놀트의 空軍戰略간의 對立
• Ⅴ. 中國戰線의 危機와 스틸웰의 소환
• Ⅵ. 맺음말