1930년대 관동군의 공세 결정 분석 : 작전 주도자, 파벌, 집단 응집력을 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes the offensive decision-making of the Japanese Kwantung Army in the 1930s and explains the mechanism through which the Kwantung Army repeatedly pursued offensive operations. The Manchurian invasion(1931–1932), the Rehe operation(1933), and the Nomonhan Incident(1939) were cases in which the Kwantung Army unilaterally decided and executed offensive actions despite restraint or opposition from the Army General Staff and the Japanese government, revealing the structural limitations of Japan’s imperial military strategy and policy decision-making.
Existing studies have explained Japan’s overexpansion primarily through imperialist and militarist ideologies and military-centered structural problems, but such explanations are insufficient to account for why the Kwantung Army consistently adopted more aggressive and deviant offensive decisions than other military organizations.
This study therefore focuses on the intervening mechanism through which structural and cultural conditions were transformed into concrete offensive decisions within the Kwantung Army. This study argues that the Kwantung Army’s offensive decisions resulted from the interaction between expansionistic operational leaders and a high level of group cohesiveness. The imperialist and militarist climate and the structural characteristics of the military facilitated faction-based power within the Kwantung Army, enabling elite staff officers to exercise de facto authority, while their expansionistic judgments were transformed into collective outcomes through strong group cohesiveness.
Across the Manchurian invasion, the Rehe operation, and the Nomonhan Incident, individual expansionistic judgments were repeatedly amplified into organizational decisions, resulting in deviant offensive actions that ignored central restraint. These findings demonstrate that the Kwantung Army’s offensive behavior was not simply a product of structural constraints or military culture, but rather the outcome of factional power, individual orientation, and group cohesiveness interacting within the organization.
By treating the Kwantung Army as a distinct decision-making unit, this study offers an organizational explanation for Japan’s overexpansion and contributes to a reassessment of imperial Japan’s military expansion.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. 서론 1
• 1. 연구 문제 및 연구 목적 1
• 2. 연구 방법 및 구성 5
• II. 선행 연구 검토 9
• 1. 관동군의 배경 및 문화 9
• 2. 관동군의 공세 결정에 관한 연구 15
• III. 이론적 논의 18
• 1. 스나이더의 과대팽창 논의 18
• 2. 파벌과 개인, 집단 응집력 21
• IV. 세 가지 군사 작전에서의 파벌과 주도 행위자 27
• V. 일본 관동군의 공세 결정 분석 35
• 1. 만주침략(1931-1932) 37
• 2. 러허작전(1933) 45
• 3. 노몬한전투(1939) 50
• 4. 소결 58
• VI. 결론 62