中共의 對아프리카 경제원조 : 외교수단으로써 As a diplomatic means = The PRC's Economic Policy Toward Africa

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The People's Republic of China used economic aid as an important diplomatic weapon. Chinese aid to Africa didn't in fact commence until 1956(Egypt was the first recipient) and it did not reach truly significant proportions until after 1961, peaking at $ 195 million in 1964.
From 1958 China increased the amount of aid and the number of aid recipients (125.6 million dollars to 8 countries), and established diplomatic relations with anti-Western African States in the 1960's. In 1964 China adopted eight principles of economic assistance which emphasized there are fundamental differences between China's economic aid and the economic aid of the two superpowers. In terms of purposes and terms, however, we do not see any significant difference between the two, even though there are minor differences.
And China, using all these methods, propagated the superiority of the Chinese political and economic system to African leaders and peoples so that it could eliminate Soviet and American influence and to secure the leadership position in the Third World.
From the Chinese perspective, economic relations with Africa serve an important symbolic function by establishing a Chinese international "presence", which suggests both status and power. Chna's economic "presence" has demonstrated China's real achievements and potential capabilities. Combining the real and symbolic, aside from the actual political and economic advantages to be derived from the proposed Tan-Zam railroad, China undoubtedly sees the railroad as an important symbol of China's presnce in Africa.
And Peking's individual aid commitments were in general smaller projects than those of the USSR, but the relative smallness of the Chinese aid commitments should not be taken as a sign that Peking lacked interest in Africa, or as a reflection of Africa's unimportannce in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
After all, because China's limited capacity to support African causes in straightforward power terms will not in all likelihood increase much. And China is determined to achieve its four modernizations program. Under such a circumstances, China is likely to devote its energy for its four modernization program and for the solution of crises in its surrounding, paying less attention to Africa.
If this observation is correct, China will simply give lip-service, but not any substantial aid to African countries. Consequently, China will practically withdraw from Africa. It is in this scene that studies of China's foreign assistance programs are essential for an understanding of its foreign policy.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 序論
• Ⅱ. 中共의 對아프리카 外交手段
• 1. 공식적 수단
• 2. 비공식적 수단
• Ⅱ. 中共의 對外援助의 원칙과 특징
• 1. 中共의 대외원조의 원칙
• 2. 中共의 대외원조의 특징
• Ⅳ. 中共의 對아프리카 경제원조
• 1. 史的 전개
• 가. 제1기 : 원조의 개시
• 나. 제2기 : 원조의 급성장
• 다. 제3기 : 역류와 퇴조의 시기
• 라. 제4기 : 새로운 양상
• 마. 제5기 : 실용주의 정책
• 2. 기술자 및 군사원조
• 가. 기술자 파견.
• 나. 군사원조
• 3. 中·소의 경쟁과 中共의 한계
• 가. 中·소의 원조경쟁
• 나. 中共의 對아프리카 원조의 한계
• Ⅴ. 結論