What is this thing called philosophy of language?

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• List of figures and tables = xiii
• Preface = xiv
• Introduction = 1
• AN OUTLINE OF WHAT'S AHEAD = 3
• EIGHT PREPARATORY NOTES = 4
• COGNITIVE MEANING AND EXPRESSIVE MEANING = 7
• MEANING AND FORCE = 7
• CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE = 9
• THE ROLES OF PROPOSITIONS = 10
• COMPOSITIONALITY, STRUCTURE AND UNDERSTANDING = 11
• 1 Naïve semantics and the language of logic = 14
• NAÏVE THEORY : SINGULAR TERMS, PREDICATES AND REFERENCE = 14
• TRUTH AND MEANING FOR ATOMIC SENTENCES = 20
• LOGICAL SYNTAX AND LOGICAL OPERATORS = 21
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 24
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 25
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 25
• PRIMARY READING = 26
• NOTES = 26
• 2 Fregean semantics = 27
• TWO PROBLEMS FOR NAÏVE SEMANTICS = 27
• THE SENSE–REFERENCE DISTINCTION = 29
• THE DISTINCTION EXTENDED = 31
• COMPOSITIONALITY AGAIN : THE REFERENCE OF A SENTENCE = 32
• APPLYING THE THEORY = 33
• SUBSTITUTIVITY AND EXTENSIONALITY = 35
• THE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 37
• THE OBJECTIVITY OF SENSE = 38
• PREDICATE REFERENCE AND THE CONCEPT HORSE PROBLEM = 40
• FURTHER DISCUSSION : THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE = 42
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 43
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 44
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 46
• PRIMARY READING = 47
• SECONDARY READING = 47
• NOTES = 47
• 3 Russellian semantics = 49
• THE TASK FOR RUSSELL = 49
• THE THEORY OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS = 50
• APPLYING THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS = 54
• NAMES AS DISGUISED DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS = 56
• KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION = 57
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 60
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 61
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 62
• PRIMARY READING = 62
• SECONDARY READING = 62
• NOTES = 62
• 4 Russell's theory of judgement, the early Wittgenstein and logical positivism = 64
• PROPOSITIONS, FACTS AND RUSSELL'S THEORY OF JUDGEMENT = 65
• THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS = 68
• VERIFICATIONISM Ⅰ : AYER = 73
• VERIFICATIONISM Ⅱ : CARNAP'S LOGICAL EMPIRICISM = 77
• THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND THE PROTOCOL DEBATE = 80
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 83
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 84
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 86
• PRIMARY READING = 87
• SECONDARY READING = 87
• NOTES = 87
• 5 Kripke on naming and necessity = 88
• NECESSITY, POSSIBILITY AND POSSIBLE WORLDS : A PRIMER = 88
• THE DESCRIPTIVIST PARADIGM = 90
• KRIPKE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE DESCRIPTIVIST THEORY OF PROPER NAMES = 91
• RIGID DESIGNATION = 93
• FIXING THE REFERENCE Ⅰ : CAUSAL CHAINS = 95
• FIXING THE REFERENCE Ⅱ : DESCRIPTIONS = 95
• LINGERING ISSUES FROM RUSSELL AND FREGE = 97
• FURTHER DISCUSSION : INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS = 98
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 99
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 100
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 101
• PRIMARY READING = 102
• NOTES = 102
• 6 Context-dependence, indexicality and natural kinds = 104
• INDEXICALS AND DEMONSTRATIVES = 104
• PUTNAM ON NATURAL KIND TERMS AND ESSENCE = 106
• IS MEANING IN THE HEAD? = 108
• THE ACTUAL WORLD AS A CONTEXT = 108
• TWO-DIMENSIONALISM : CONTEXT OF UTTERANCE VERSUS CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVALUATION = 110
• FURTHER DISCUSSION : RIGID DESIGNATION AGAIN = 112
• THE INDISPENSABILITY OF INDEXICALS = 114
• INDEXICALS AND FREGEAN SENSE = 115
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 116
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 116
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 118
• PRIMARY READING = 119
• NOTES = 119
• 7 Pragmatics = 120
• MOOD AND FORCE REVISITED = 120
• SPEECH-ACT THEORY = 121
• IMPLICATURE = 124
• SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF IMPLICATURE = 126
• PRESUPPOSITION : STRAWSON'S AND DONNELLAN'S OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS = 128
• METAPHOR = 130
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 132
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 133
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 134
• PRIMARY READING = 135
• SECONDARY READING 135
• NOTES = 135
• 8 The propositional attitudes = 136
• EXTENSIONALITY REVISITED = 136
• REFERENTIAL OPACITY AND FREGE ON THE ATTITUDES = 137
• FURTHER DISCUSSION : MULTIPLE HYPER-INTENSIONAL EMBEDDING = 139
• DE RE AND DE DICTO NECESSITY = 140
• DE RE AND DE DICTO BELIEF = 141
• RALPH'S PREDICAMENT = 142
• BELIEF ATTRIBUTIONS AND EXPLICIT INDEXICALS : BELIEF DE SE = 145
• AN IMPLICIT INDEXICAL ELEMENT = 146
• DIRECT REFERENCE, THE ATTITUDES AND THE SEMANTIC DE RE = 147
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 149
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 150
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 151
• PRIMARY READING = 152
• NOTES = 153
• 9 Davidson's philosophy of language = 154
• METHODOLOGY = 155
• THE GENERAL FORM OF A THEORY OF MEANING = 155
• THE EXACT FORM OF A THEORY OF MEANING = 159
• THE EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION OF A THEORY OF MEANING : RADICAL INTERPRETATION = 160
• THE PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY AND THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF BELIEF AND MEANING = 162
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 164
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 165
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 166
• PRIMARY READING = 166
• SECONDARY READING = 167
• NOTE = 167
• 10 Quine's philosophy of language = 168
• QUINE'S NATURALISM = 168
• THE JUNGLE LINGUIST = 169
• INDETERMINACY = 172
• MEANING AND ANALYTIC TRUTH = 173
• THE ARGUMENT OF 'TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM' = 174
• QUINE PROPOSES REPLACEMENT, NOT ANALYSIS = 176
• THE PLACE OF NATURALISM = 177
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 178
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 179
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 180
• PRIMARY READING = 180
• SECONDARY READING = 180
• 11 The late Wittgenstein = 181
• LANGUAGE GAMES = 181
• FAMILY RESEMBLANCE, TOOLS AND CITIES = 183
• TO FOLLOW A RULE Ⅰ = 185
• TO FOLLOW A RULE Ⅱ = 187
• PRIVATE LANGUAGE = 188
• HISTORICAL NOTES = 189
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 190
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 190
• PRIMARY READING = 191
• SECONDARY READING = 191
• 12 Modern directions = 192
• ASSERTION = 192
• CONTEXT-RELATIVITY = 195
• FICTIONAL OBJECTS = 199
• INFERENTIALISM = 202
• SLURS = 203
• CHAPTER SUMMARY = 206
• STUDY QUESTIONS = 208
• PRIMARY READING = 209
• SECONDARY READING = 209
• NOTES = 210
• Glossary = 212
• Bibliography = 229
• Index = 234