통속 과학으로서의 인과론과 인식적 인과성 = Causation as Folk Science and Epistemic Causality

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Even though almost a century has passed since Russell denied in 1913 the notion of causality in the sciences, it still seems to remain in the practice of science until today. There may be certainly several possible alternatives for understanding the situation; but in this paper, not criticizing the other views, I simply accept the one that Russell was right in some respect and at the same time the use of the notion of cause in science may be justified in other respect. Instead, I examine two claims which are thought to be essential for establishing the view, and I show how they are complementary for each other for it. The claims to be examined are Norton`s that causation is a kind of folk science, and Williamson`s that causality is only mental in that it is posited by us ourselves, with his suggestion for what he calls epistemic causality.