고립된 국가들의 핵 무기 개발과 미국의 대외전략 : 이란, 리비아, 북한의 사례를 비교하여 = Isolated States' Nuclear Programs and US National Security Strategy

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation aims to analyze the similarities and differences between three states ？ Libya, North Korea, and Iran, who either developed or are developing nuclear weapons. Adopting a joint method of agreement and difference of John Stuart Mill, it attempts to explore how their negotiations with the U.S. over their nuclear programs were influenced by several factors, such as the U.S. foreign policy, strategic concerns of each regime, their geological conditions, and their relations with neighboring states.

The similarities and difference in nuclear states can be examined at different levels of analysis. First, from the perspective of the U.S. government, nuclear states can be distinguished by strategic values, their relations with other states, affecting the degree of pressures from the U.S. government. On the other hand, these nuclear states are also distinguished by their different intentions for developing nuclear programs, political and economic conditions, and types of relations that they have with other states.

This research argues that development of nuclear weapons in those "rogue" states are significantly influenced by their asymmetrical military relations with the U.S. government. All three states have attempted to increase political stability of their regime through the development of nuclear programs, but also tried to improve their relationships with the United States. While the development of nuclear weapons may no be consistent, on its own, with economic development or the improvement of the relations with the United states, the "rogue" states seem to have believed that their nuclear programs will let them achieve these apparently conflicting objectives.

With regard to the intention of developing nuclear weapons, Libya, North Korea and Iran have similarities. In the Cold War era, these states have taken their own line, under the banner of anti-Americanism, undergone economic blockades by the U.S. and sought to develop nuclear weapons. In the case of Iran and Libya, as they have argued, the asymmetrical military relations with Israel have affected their nuclear program. In the case of North Korea, the asymmetrical relation with South Korea and the U.S. Armed Forces made it develop nuclear weapons. After the Cold War, all of them have continued their nuclear programs, while trying to break free from isolation through normalization of relations with the U.S. government.

The U.S. never recognized these states, blaming them of sponsoring international terrorism and developing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in which Washington has strategically essential interests. Under its strategical concerns, the U.S. government have taken enhanced containment- and pressure policy on these states. The U.S. has designated them as "rogue states", organized sanctions by the international society, including the United Nations, and pressured them to abandon nuclear programs. Libya, however, eventually, decided to cooperate in trials on terrorist crimes like the Lockerbie case and promised material compensation for the victims, assisted the U.S. government's anti-terrorism efforts. Libya, in consequence, was able to change its position from a dangerous country or an enemy to a collaborator. In this respect, Libya, by giving up its nuclear programs, as able to finish its negotiation and normalized relations with the U.S. government faster than other countries.

The different levels of nuclear weapon development programs by these countries also seems to have affected the U.S. negotiations with each states. Above all, the U.S. concluded negotiations with Libya which had failed to develop nuclear weapons. Even though there are other variables like the settlement over terrorist crimes and the cooperation by Libya for the war on terrorism, its failure to develop nuclear weapons seems to have affected Washington's decision on negotiations. In respect of the effectiveness of pressure policy, considering the nuclear test of North Korea in 2006 and the manifesto by Iran as a nuclear power, it is certain that U.S. pressure policy without military attacks was not effective at all in stopping their nuclear programs.

On the other hand, relationships with other states are sharply different among the three countries. In spite of economic sanctions, Europe maintained economic relations with Libya; England, the most important ally of America, has mediated between America and Libya. But North Korea and Iran, unlike Libya, have no reliable mediator like England, and this has delayed and interrupted negotiations.

My research also shows that regime types of nuclear states do not significantly affect the U.S. foreign policy. After the Cold War, the U.S. has pursued two contradictory goals in relations with other countries: first, the maximization of national interest which is rooted on neo-realism; and second, the expansion of democracy based on the ideal of democratic peace. While rehabilitating authoritarianism in Libya, the U.S. government has imposed punitive sanctions on Iran, a semi-democratic regime. It shows that the U.S. prioritizes its political and economic interest over its ideological goals. The U.S. government has normalized its relationship with Libya, which, once a rogue state, is now providing some cooperation on the war on terrorism. It has also made North Korea an negotiation partner after its nuclear experiment. All of these show that the U.S. government is not ideologically driven in making foreign policy.

Like Pakistan, Libya has normalized its relations with the U.S. through cooperation on the war on terrorism and hence strengthened the regime？s stability. In contrast, North Korea is not likely to give up its nuclear program until the U.S. government guarantees political survival of its regime through several measures, such as economic aid, the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations, and the establishment of peace agreements; The government in Iran, whuch has relatively established democratic regimes, compared to other countries in the region, would not give up its nuclear program unless it believes nuclear weapons in Israel does not threat its political stability of its regime.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제 1 장 서론 = 1
• 제 1 절 분석의 대상 = 1
• 제 2 절 분석방법 = 5
• 제 2 장 미국의 대외전략과 핵 정책 = 10
• 제 1 절 냉전기 미국의 대외전략과 핵 정책 = 10
• 제 2 절 탈 냉전기 미국의 대외전략의 변화와 핵문제 = 13
• 제 3 절 9.11 이후 불량국가 독트린과 선제공격론의 결합 = 17
• 제 3 장 고립된 국가들의 핵 - 억지력의 유효성 = 21
• 제 4 장 리비아 사례 = 27
• 제 1 절 리비아의 혁명과 친서방정권의 붕괴 = 28
• 제 2 절 리비아의 자원민족주의 = 29
• 제 3 절 리비아의 경제개방과 주변국 = 32
• 제 4 절 리비아의 핵 프로그램과 협상의 조건 = 35
• 제 5 장 북한 사례 = 40
• 제 1 절 북한의 체제위기와 핵 프로그램 = 40
• 제 2 절 북한의 개혁·개방과 2차 핵위기 = 46
• 제 3 절 미국과 북한의 핵협상 = 50
• 제 4 절 북한의 핵 프로그램 = 53
• 제 6 장 이란 사례 = 59
• 제 1 절 이란의 혁명 = 60
• 제 2 절 페르시아만의 정치적 중요성과 이란의 석유 = 65
• 제 3 절 이란의 핵문제와 이스라엘 = 68
• 제 4 절 이란과 미국의 협상 = 73
• 제 7 장 고립된 국가들의 핵과 미국의 대외정책상의 공통점과 차이점 = 77
• 참고문헌 = 83
• 표
• 표 1. 북한의 경제성장 지표, 1993~2006 = 42
• 표 2. 리비아, 북한, 이란의 비교분석 = 77