RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      KCI등재

      A Law and Economics Analysis of Contract Law: Focus on Reliability and Foreseeability

      한글로보기

      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A108573314

      • 0

        상세조회
      • 0

        다운로드
      서지정보 열기
      • 내보내기
      • 내책장담기
      • 공유하기
      • 오류접수

      부가정보

      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      Consequential damages from reliance can be recovered only if foreseeability is warranted. The doctrine of foreseeability has been built upon the British case of Hadley v. Baxendale, but has been subject to criticisms including the difficulty in applying it in practice. We first attempt to substantiate its efficiency-driven definition especially when there is no relevant contractual stipulation. Our simple theoretic inquiry leads to the proposition that a reliance investment is more (less) likely to be considered foreseeable as its generally-known rate of returns increases (decreases) ceteris paribus. Examining an intriguing case in California reveals that our proposal could provide a workable formula applicable in courts, as an alternative to other rules, for example, making parties to excessively focus on modes of notification. Given that many jurisdictions have increasingly used the foreseeability test, this paper is expected to make a contribution to the literature by helping preserve the optimality of damage measures concerning consequential damages.
      번역하기

      Consequential damages from reliance can be recovered only if foreseeability is warranted. The doctrine of foreseeability has been built upon the British case of Hadley v. Baxendale, but has been subject to criticisms including the difficulty in applyi...

      Consequential damages from reliance can be recovered only if foreseeability is warranted. The doctrine of foreseeability has been built upon the British case of Hadley v. Baxendale, but has been subject to criticisms including the difficulty in applying it in practice. We first attempt to substantiate its efficiency-driven definition especially when there is no relevant contractual stipulation. Our simple theoretic inquiry leads to the proposition that a reliance investment is more (less) likely to be considered foreseeable as its generally-known rate of returns increases (decreases) ceteris paribus. Examining an intriguing case in California reveals that our proposal could provide a workable formula applicable in courts, as an alternative to other rules, for example, making parties to excessively focus on modes of notification. Given that many jurisdictions have increasingly used the foreseeability test, this paper is expected to make a contribution to the literature by helping preserve the optimality of damage measures concerning consequential damages.

      더보기

      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 Cooter, Robert, "Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution" 73 (73): 1-51, 1985

      2 Cartwright, Walter, "Timber Stumpage Values vs. Mill Delivered Prices"

      3 Fuller, Lon L., "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" 46 (46): 52-96, 1936

      4 Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, "The Relevance of Law and Economics for the Development of Judge Made Rules: Examples from German Case-Law" 40 (40): 989-998, 1996

      5 Eisenberg, Melvin A., "The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale" 80 (80): 563-613, 1992

      6 Gillette, Clayton P., "Tacit Agreement and Relationship–Specific Investment" 88 (88): 128-169, 2013

      7 Ayers, Ian, "Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules" 101 (101): 729-774, 1992

      8 Johnston, Jason Scott, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules" 100 (100): 615-664, 1990

      9 Kim, Iljoong, "Rethinking the Economic Characteristics of the Major Contractual Damage Measures" 170 (170): 599-615, 2014

      10 Muehlheusser, Gerd, "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts" 163 (163): 531-551, 2007

      1 Cooter, Robert, "Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution" 73 (73): 1-51, 1985

      2 Cartwright, Walter, "Timber Stumpage Values vs. Mill Delivered Prices"

      3 Fuller, Lon L., "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" 46 (46): 52-96, 1936

      4 Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, "The Relevance of Law and Economics for the Development of Judge Made Rules: Examples from German Case-Law" 40 (40): 989-998, 1996

      5 Eisenberg, Melvin A., "The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale" 80 (80): 563-613, 1992

      6 Gillette, Clayton P., "Tacit Agreement and Relationship–Specific Investment" 88 (88): 128-169, 2013

      7 Ayers, Ian, "Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules" 101 (101): 729-774, 1992

      8 Johnston, Jason Scott, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules" 100 (100): 615-664, 1990

      9 Kim, Iljoong, "Rethinking the Economic Characteristics of the Major Contractual Damage Measures" 170 (170): 599-615, 2014

      10 Muehlheusser, Gerd, "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts" 163 (163): 531-551, 2007

      11 Bar-Gill, Oren, "Quantifying Foreseeability" 33 (33): 619-649, 2006

      12 Wolcher, Louis E., "Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale" 9 : 9-31, 1989

      13 Easterbrook, Frank H., "Limited Liability and the Corporation" 52 (52): 89-117, 1985

      14 Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, "Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts" Springer 2012

      15 Verkerke, J. Hoult, "Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules" 56 (56): 899-960, 2015

      16 Cooter, Robert, "Law and Economics" Prentice Hall 2011

      17 Bebchuk, Lucian A., "Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale" 7 (7): 284-312, 1991

      18 Danzig, Richard, "Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law" 4 (4): 249-284, 1975

      19 Shavell, Steven, "Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law" Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004

      20 Ayers, Ian, "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rule" 99 (99): 87-130, 1989

      21 Ben-Shahar, Omri, "Causation and Foreseeability, "in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest(eds. ), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Vol. 2" Edward Elgar 644-668, 2000

      22 Posner, Richard A., "Economic Analysis of Law" Aspen Publishers 2011

      23 van Wijck, Peter, "Contract Law and Economics (in the series of Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Vol. 6" Edward Elgar 225-237, 2011

      24 Quillen, Gwyn D., "Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization" 61 : 1125-1141, 1988

      25 Diamond, Thomas A., "Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale" 63 (63): 665-714, 1994

      26 Perloff, Jeffrey M., "Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale" 10 (10): 39-63, 1981

      27 Epstein, Richard, "Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract" 18 (18): 105-138, 1989

      28 Scott, Robert E., "A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts" 19 (19): 597-616, 1990

      더보기

      분석정보

      View

      상세정보조회

      0

      Usage

      원문다운로드

      0

      대출신청

      0

      복사신청

      0

      EDDS신청

      0

      동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

      더보기

      주제

      연도별 연구동향

      연도별 활용동향

      연관논문

      연구자 네트워크맵

      공동연구자 (7)

      유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

      이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

      나만을 위한 추천자료

      해외이동버튼