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1 Cooter, Robert, "Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution" 73 (73): 1-51, 1985
2 Cartwright, Walter, "Timber Stumpage Values vs. Mill Delivered Prices"
3 Fuller, Lon L., "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" 46 (46): 52-96, 1936
4 Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, "The Relevance of Law and Economics for the Development of Judge Made Rules: Examples from German Case-Law" 40 (40): 989-998, 1996
5 Eisenberg, Melvin A., "The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale" 80 (80): 563-613, 1992
6 Gillette, Clayton P., "Tacit Agreement and Relationship–Specific Investment" 88 (88): 128-169, 2013
7 Ayers, Ian, "Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules" 101 (101): 729-774, 1992
8 Johnston, Jason Scott, "Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules" 100 (100): 615-664, 1990
9 Kim, Iljoong, "Rethinking the Economic Characteristics of the Major Contractual Damage Measures" 170 (170): 599-615, 2014
10 Muehlheusser, Gerd, "Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts" 163 (163): 531-551, 2007
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16 Cooter, Robert, "Law and Economics" Prentice Hall 2011
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19 Shavell, Steven, "Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law" Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2004
20 Ayers, Ian, "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rule" 99 (99): 87-130, 1989
21 Ben-Shahar, Omri, "Causation and Foreseeability, "in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest(eds. ), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, "Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Vol. 2" Edward Elgar 644-668, 2000
22 Posner, Richard A., "Economic Analysis of Law" Aspen Publishers 2011
23 van Wijck, Peter, "Contract Law and Economics (in the series of Encyclopedia of Law and Economics Vol. 6" Edward Elgar 225-237, 2011
24 Quillen, Gwyn D., "Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization" 61 : 1125-1141, 1988
25 Diamond, Thomas A., "Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale" 63 (63): 665-714, 1994
26 Perloff, Jeffrey M., "Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale" 10 (10): 39-63, 1981
27 Epstein, Richard, "Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract" 18 (18): 105-138, 1989
28 Scott, Robert E., "A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts" 19 (19): 597-616, 1990