Ⅰ.
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asian Region, which spelled out the security details for the Clinton Administration's strategy of 'engagement' and 'enlargement' in the East Asian...
Ⅰ.
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense published the United States Security Strategy for the East Asian Region, which spelled out the security details for the Clinton Administration's strategy of 'engagement' and 'enlargement' in the East Asian region. The U.S. security strategy for East Asia, enumerated in the EASR, aims at maintaining the leadership role of the U.S. in the region through the four specific measures: 1) revitalizing the alliance with Japan: 2) engaging China: 3) consolidating the alliance with South Korea: and 4) combining bilateralism with multilateralism. The primary means for this strategy is the forward-deployed U.S. forces of about 100,000 in the region.
Under the strategic framework, it. is important whether the interests of the U.S. and of Korea converge with each other. One important area where the interests coincide is one in which Korea, for the purpose of survival and the U.S. in order to protect its leadership, need an equilibrium within the region where Korea is located. An hegemonic order in Northeast Asia would threaten the U.S. leadership position as well as the political independence of Korea. Since the equilibrium most conducive to Korea's political autonomy is based on continued U.S. participation in the East Asian security system, Korea will continue to prefer to manage the regional equilibrium in alliance with the U.S.
However, the convergence of interests does not always guarantee policy coordination, since Korea and the U.S. can have different policy priorities. This is shown in their North Korea policy. The first priority of the Clinton Administration's North Korea policy lies at the global level where the U.S. deals with North Korea to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to other regions. The second priority is based on the regional level in that the U.S. policy to North Korea is interconnected with its policy of' checking' China. At the level of the Korean peninsula, which is the last priority, the U.S. must reduce the tension between the two Koreas in order to prevent the outbreak of a war on the peninsula and must also seek the ways by which the sudden collapse of North Korea can be successfully managed.
On the other hand, Korea's priorities in its North Korea policy are in the reverse order. The Korean government is more concerned with how to harmonize and speed up the progress of improving the relationship of Washington-Pyongyang with that of Seoul-Pyongyang. The problem has been that North Korea has yet to start restoring trust with South Korea, though it has been vigorous in carrying out negotiations with Washington. If the U.S.-North Korea negotiations proceed abreast with the improvement of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, Korea - U.S. relations will remain smooth, but otherwise, their relations will face various complexities. In this respect, the importance of cooperation between Korea and the U.S. is emphasized.
The resolution for the priority divergence between Korea and the U.S. can be achieved through redefinition of the alliance that is to be focused on regional priorities. In other words, both countries need to put their first priority on the strategic interests in Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula. This is the way by which the global interest of the U.S. and the peninsular interest of Korea can be converged at the regional level. Thus, both countries should emphasize that the Korea-U.S. alliance, that was created to deter North Korea's military threat, will ultimately contribute to stability in Northeast Asia, and that the alliance will continue even after the threat from North Korea disappears. In addition, Korea and the U.S. should start preparing for crisis management in the case of North Korea's collapse.
As a measure of redefining the Korea-U.S. alliance, both countries need to announce the "Joint Security Declaration" as soon as Korea's new administration is inaugurated in February 1998. The Declaration will contain the following ideas: 1) The Korea-U.S. alliance is still valid in tills post-Cold War period; 2) Korea and the U.S. will continue to cooperate to induce North Korea to, conduct a gradual reform; 3) The alliance will develop into the 'regional' alliance that will take the role of promoting regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia after Korea's unification. However, both countries should not miss pointing out that Northeast Asian security structure should advance toward multilateralism, since this kind of a joint action could provoke China.
After the joint declaration is made, Korea and the U.S. will have to begin consulting each other concerning the necessary steps to transform the alliance into the regional one. A key issue that is to be put on the table will be the role and force structure of the U.S. forces in unified Korea.
Ⅱ.
Korea and the U.S. will have three options. They have to decide whether they will actually terminate the alliance by completely withdrawing American troops from Korea or preserve a reconfigurated alliance only with U.S. naval and air presence, or redefine their relationship toward an alliance for stability and interdependence with a token presence of ground forces together with the current level of naval and air forces.
The first option of a complete withdrawal of American troops runs the risk of precipitating a power vacuum which is most likely to be filled either by China or Japan, and to trigger Sino-Japanese rivalry and arms race. Should Korea be left alone in the wilderness without an ally, there will arise mounting pressure for developing nuclear weapons in Korea, which could lead to a "balance of terror."
The second option of a reconfigurated alliance with naval and air presence can provide deterrence and reassurance to Korea to a certain degree. However, an alliance without U.S. ground forces cannot guarantee automatic American involvement in the emergency situation that could happen in Korea. In this case, the very credibility of American security commitment will be severely questioned politically.
The last option of the alliance with a token U.S. ground force and naval/air forces can be a basis for deterring the rise of hegemonism in Northeast Asia and for preventing Korea from seeking a nuclear option. A small size (3000-5000) of U.S. ground forces in the southern part of Korea, far from the Chinese border, can play an effective hedge against the destabilizing forces and the uncertainty they will bring in Korea. However, this option requires a precondition, which is the Korean people's conviction that the D.S. has contributed to Korea's unification. Otherwise, the revitalizing task of the Korea-U.S. alliance will face insurmountable obstacles.