RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색

인기 검색어

    다국어 입력

    http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

    변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

    예시)
    • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
    • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
    닫기
    KCI등재

    양면시장의 정의 및 조건 = The Definition of Two-sided Market and Its Conditions

    한글로보기

    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A82490853

    • 0

      상세조회
    • 0

      다운로드
    서지정보 열기
    • 내보내기
    • 내책장담기
    • 공유하기
    • 오류접수

    부가정보

    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    The traditional theories in industrial organization economics such as inverse elasticity pricing rule, price discrimination may not applied or should be modified when we deal with two-sided markets. This comes from the special characteristic of two-sided markets especially cross network externality between two different groups of consumers (or suppliers). For the same reason, the traditional market definition methods, market power evaluation, criteria for anti-competitive behaviors should be modified in two-sided markets. Thus if we use the traditional theories without modification when we consider issues of two-sided market, there is possibility to commit type I or type II errors. For example, the pricing under marginal cost of dominant firm is regarded as predatory pricing in one-sided market. But in two-sided market it is not anti-competitive predatory pricing but just profit maximization behavior. Therefore it is very important to clarify whether the market is one-sided or two-sided(or multi-sided). However the structure of market is just treated as a given condition when we construct a theoretical model. But in the real world, market is not a given condition but an object to be defined. But until now there is no clear definition and criteria to decide whether the market is two-sided or not. The only academic definition is the Rochet & Tirole (2004)`s definition. And the most popular conditions of two-sided market is Evans (2003), and Evans & Schmalensee (2008)`s condition. But the condition is only necessary condition for two-sided market. Thus this paper tries to introduce more clear definition and decision criteria of two-sided markets. We introduce axioms of no-side-payment, cross network externality etc to define two-sided market. And we introduce an algorithm to decide whether a market is two-sided or not.
    번역하기

    The traditional theories in industrial organization economics such as inverse elasticity pricing rule, price discrimination may not applied or should be modified when we deal with two-sided markets. This comes from the special characteristic of two-si...

    The traditional theories in industrial organization economics such as inverse elasticity pricing rule, price discrimination may not applied or should be modified when we deal with two-sided markets. This comes from the special characteristic of two-sided markets especially cross network externality between two different groups of consumers (or suppliers). For the same reason, the traditional market definition methods, market power evaluation, criteria for anti-competitive behaviors should be modified in two-sided markets. Thus if we use the traditional theories without modification when we consider issues of two-sided market, there is possibility to commit type I or type II errors. For example, the pricing under marginal cost of dominant firm is regarded as predatory pricing in one-sided market. But in two-sided market it is not anti-competitive predatory pricing but just profit maximization behavior. Therefore it is very important to clarify whether the market is one-sided or two-sided(or multi-sided). However the structure of market is just treated as a given condition when we construct a theoretical model. But in the real world, market is not a given condition but an object to be defined. But until now there is no clear definition and criteria to decide whether the market is two-sided or not. The only academic definition is the Rochet & Tirole (2004)`s definition. And the most popular conditions of two-sided market is Evans (2003), and Evans & Schmalensee (2008)`s condition. But the condition is only necessary condition for two-sided market. Thus this paper tries to introduce more clear definition and decision criteria of two-sided markets. We introduce axioms of no-side-payment, cross network externality etc to define two-sided market. And we introduce an algorithm to decide whether a market is two-sided or not.

    더보기

    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 Parker, G. G., "Unbundling in the Presence of Network Externalities" mimeo 2002

    2 Ferrando, J. A., "Two-Sided Network Effect and Competition: An Application to Media Industries" mimeo 2004

    3 Rochet, J. C., "Two-Sided Markets: A Progressive Report" 37 : 645-667, 2006

    4 Reisinger, M., "Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities" University of Munich 2004

    5 Jullien, B., "Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries" 2004

    6 Gans, J. S., "The Neutrality of the Interchange Fees in the Payment System" 3 : 2003

    7 Rysman, M., "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets" 23 (23): 125-143, 2009

    8 Wright, J., "The Determinant of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems" 52 : 1-26, 2004

    9 Evans, D. S., "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets" 20 : 325-382, 2003

    10 Farrell, J., "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation" 16 : 70-83, 1985

    1 Parker, G. G., "Unbundling in the Presence of Network Externalities" mimeo 2002

    2 Ferrando, J. A., "Two-Sided Network Effect and Competition: An Application to Media Industries" mimeo 2004

    3 Rochet, J. C., "Two-Sided Markets: A Progressive Report" 37 : 645-667, 2006

    4 Reisinger, M., "Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities" University of Munich 2004

    5 Jullien, B., "Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries" 2004

    6 Gans, J. S., "The Neutrality of the Interchange Fees in the Payment System" 3 : 2003

    7 Rysman, M., "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets" 23 (23): 125-143, 2009

    8 Wright, J., "The Determinant of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems" 52 : 1-26, 2004

    9 Evans, D. S., "The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets" 20 : 325-382, 2003

    10 Farrell, J., "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation" 16 : 70-83, 1985

    11 Katz, M. L., "Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia II, Reserve Bank of Australia"

    12 Wright, J., "Pricing in Debit and Credit Card Schemes" 80 : 305-309, 2003

    13 Kaiser, U., "Price Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from the Magazine Industry" mimeo 2004

    14 Rochet, J. C., "Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets" 1 : 990-1029, 2003

    15 Schmalensee, R., "Payment Systems and Interchange Fees" 50 : 103-122, 2002

    16 Wright, J., "Optimal Card Payment Systems" 47 : 587-612, 2003

    17 Wright, J., "One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets" National University of Singapore 2003c

    18 Katz, M. L., "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility" 75 : 424-440, 1985

    19 Evans, D. S., "Markets with Two-Sided Platforms" 1 : 2008

    20 Rochet, J. C., "Defining Two-Sided Markets" mimeo 2004

    21 Rochet, J. C., "Cooperation in Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations" 33 : 549-570, 2002

    22 Armstrong, M., "Competition in Two-Sided Markets" 37 : 668-691, 2006

    23 European Commission, "Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services" 2002

    24 David, P., "Clio and the economics of QWERTY" 75 : 332-336, 1985

    25 Caillaud, B., "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers" 24 : 309-328, 2003

    26 Baxter, W. F., "Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives" 26 : 541-588, 1983

    더보기

    동일학술지(권/호) 다른 논문

    동일학술지 더보기

    더보기

    분석정보

    View

    상세정보조회

    0

    Usage

    원문다운로드

    0

    대출신청

    0

    복사신청

    0

    EDDS신청

    0

    동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

    더보기

    주제

    연도별 연구동향

    연도별 활용동향

    연관논문

    연구자 네트워크맵

    공동연구자 (7)

    유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

    인용정보 인용지수 설명보기

    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2027 평가 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
    2021-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
    2018-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2016-01-19 학술지명변경 외국어명 : Korean Telecommunications Policy Review -> International Telecommunications Policy Review KCI등재
    2015-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2011-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2009-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2007-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2004-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
    2003-01-01 등재 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
    2002-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 유지 (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
    2000-01-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
    더보기

    학술지 인용정보

    학술지 인용정보
    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.59 0.59 0.63
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    0.55 0.47 0.859 0.5
    더보기

    이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

    나만을 위한 추천자료

    해외이동버튼