A Game-Theoretic Explanation on the Persistence of Political Conflict

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes the persistence of political conflict in a two-party system, where political parties derive their utility from the eruption of conflict, as well as the enjoyment of cooperative political culture. Political culture is considered as a stock variable, which regenerates at a constant rate but deteriorates when conflict erupts. And the initial state is assumed to be unsustainable in that political conflict is excessive and leads to a continuous deterioration of political culture over time. This study investigates why it is so difficult to reduce political conflict to an appropriate level by the simultaneous efforts of the rival parties in the frame of war of attrition. Futhermore, we examine what mechanism works under the persistence of political conflict.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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