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    경영이사회 이사에 대한 감독이사회의 책임추궁의무 -독일 연방대법원의 ARAG/Garmenbeck 판결이 주는 의미- = Duty of the Supervisory Board`s to Enforce the Liability Claim against the Director of the Management Board - ARAG/Garmenbeck Decision of the German Federal Supreme Court(BGH)

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    According to the German Corporation Act(Aktiengesetz) the authority to enforce claims against the management is divided between the supervisory board, individual shareholders and creditors. But the role of the supervisory board ist most important. After the iconic ARAG/Garmenbeck decision 1997 of the BGH the supervisory board is bound to enforce claim against the liable director of the management board(duty to enforce). There are very narrow exceptions(discretion) for the supervisory board discretion not to enforce liability claim, only when important interests of the corporation outweigh the benefit of the enforcing the claim. This ARAG/Garmenbeck doctrine is also applicable to enforce liability claim against the member of the supervisory board.
    The ARAG/Garmenbeck decision`s implication to Korean law which often fails to address civil liability against the directors, is very large. The auditor (audit committee) must observe not only the duty of supervision in advance, but if the responsibility of the directors occurs, it is obliged to take the responsibility thoroughly afterwards.
    There is no reason for the auditor (the audit committee) to hesitate to enforce liability claim against the directors, as there are a number of devices to protect against excessive liability risk of the directors: e.g. recognition business judgement rule, D&O police, limitation of the directors` liability(Art. 400, Para. 2 Korean Commercial Code), court`s generous practice to limit liability in terms of equity. It will be also a moment to escape criticism that there is excessive use of crime of infidelity to address the wrongful doing of the directors, only when the civil liability for directors and it`s enforcement functions well. I hope that the liability of the directors in Korea will not only be the in the Code, but the in real action.
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    According to the German Corporation Act(Aktiengesetz) the authority to enforce claims against the management is divided between the supervisory board, individual shareholders and creditors. But the role of the supervisory board ist most important. Aft...

    According to the German Corporation Act(Aktiengesetz) the authority to enforce claims against the management is divided between the supervisory board, individual shareholders and creditors. But the role of the supervisory board ist most important. After the iconic ARAG/Garmenbeck decision 1997 of the BGH the supervisory board is bound to enforce claim against the liable director of the management board(duty to enforce). There are very narrow exceptions(discretion) for the supervisory board discretion not to enforce liability claim, only when important interests of the corporation outweigh the benefit of the enforcing the claim. This ARAG/Garmenbeck doctrine is also applicable to enforce liability claim against the member of the supervisory board.
    The ARAG/Garmenbeck decision`s implication to Korean law which often fails to address civil liability against the directors, is very large. The auditor (audit committee) must observe not only the duty of supervision in advance, but if the responsibility of the directors occurs, it is obliged to take the responsibility thoroughly afterwards.
    There is no reason for the auditor (the audit committee) to hesitate to enforce liability claim against the directors, as there are a number of devices to protect against excessive liability risk of the directors: e.g. recognition business judgement rule, D&O police, limitation of the directors` liability(Art. 400, Para. 2 Korean Commercial Code), court`s generous practice to limit liability in terms of equity. It will be also a moment to escape criticism that there is excessive use of crime of infidelity to address the wrongful doing of the directors, only when the civil liability for directors and it`s enforcement functions well. I hope that the liability of the directors in Korea will not only be the in the Code, but the in real action.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 이철송, "회사법강의" 박영사 2017

    2 김건식, "회사법 (제2판)" 박영사 2016

    3 Kocher, Dirk, "Zur Reichweite der Business Judgment Rule" 215-, 2009

    4 Siems, Mathias M, "Welche Auswirkung hat das neue Verfolgungsrecht der Aktionärsminderheit? - Eine rechtsvergleichende Folgenanalyse des" 148 : S376-, 2005

    5 Kindler, Peter, "Unternehmerisches Ermessen und Pflichtenbindung" 162 : 101-, 1998

    6 Rho, Hyeok-Joon, "The Derivative Action in Asia" Cambridge University Press 2011

    7 Kuntz, Thilo, "Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law" Edward Elgar 2017

    8 Seibt, Christoph H, "Rechtspflichten und Best Practices für Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandeln bei der Kapitalmarktrecht-Compliance" 93-, 2015

    9 Schnorbus, York, "Recht und Praxis der Prüfung und Verfolgung von Vorstandsfehlverhalten durch den Aufsichtsrat" 1832-, 2015

    10 Habersack, Mathias, "Organhandeln vor Schiedsgerichten" 2-, 2016

    1 이철송, "회사법강의" 박영사 2017

    2 김건식, "회사법 (제2판)" 박영사 2016

    3 Kocher, Dirk, "Zur Reichweite der Business Judgment Rule" 215-, 2009

    4 Siems, Mathias M, "Welche Auswirkung hat das neue Verfolgungsrecht der Aktionärsminderheit? - Eine rechtsvergleichende Folgenanalyse des" 148 : S376-, 2005

    5 Kindler, Peter, "Unternehmerisches Ermessen und Pflichtenbindung" 162 : 101-, 1998

    6 Rho, Hyeok-Joon, "The Derivative Action in Asia" Cambridge University Press 2011

    7 Kuntz, Thilo, "Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law" Edward Elgar 2017

    8 Seibt, Christoph H, "Rechtspflichten und Best Practices für Vorstands- und Aufsichtsratshandeln bei der Kapitalmarktrecht-Compliance" 93-, 2015

    9 Schnorbus, York, "Recht und Praxis der Prüfung und Verfolgung von Vorstandsfehlverhalten durch den Aufsichtsrat" 1832-, 2015

    10 Habersack, Mathias, "Organhandeln vor Schiedsgerichten" 2-, 2016

    11 Paefgen, Walter G, "Organhaftung : Bestandsaufnahme und Zukunftsperspektiven AG-Ein kritischer Werkstattbericht vor dem Hintergrund der Beratungen des 70. Deutschen Juristentages 2014" AG 554-, 2014

    12 Wagner, Gerhard, "Officers’and Directors’Liability Under German Law — A Potemkin Village" 16 (16): 2015

    13 Goette, Wulf, "Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2014

    14 Fleischer, Holger, "Legal Transplants im deutschen Aktienrecht" 1129-, 2004

    15 Zöllner, Wolfgang, "Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2009

    16 Spindler, Gerald, "Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz" 2015

    17 Koch, Jens, "Keine Ermessensspielräume bei der Entscheidung über die Inanspruchnahme von Vorstandsmitgliedern" 93-, 2009

    18 SONG, OK-RIAL, "Ineffective Derivative Suits and Corporate Control Market in Korea"

    19 SONG, OK-RIAL, "IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THROUGH LITIGATIONS :DERIVATIVE SUITS AND CLASS ACTIONS IN KOREA"

    20 Bachmann, Gregor, "Gutachten E zum 70. Deutschen Juristentag" 2014

    21 Grigoleit, Hans Christoph, "German and Asian Perspectives on Company Law" Mohr Siebeck 2016

    22 Reichert,Jochem, "Festschrift für Peter Hommelhoff" S907-, 2012

    23 Goette, Wulf, "Festschrift für Martin Winter" S153-, 2011

    24 Tröger, Tobias, "Durchsetzung der Vorstandshaftung" 179 : 453-, 2015

    25 Koch, Jens, "Die schleichende Erosion der Verfolgungspflicht nach ARAG/Garmenbeck" 934-, 2014

    26 Götz, Heinrich, "Die Pflicht des Aufsichtsrats zur Haftbarmachung von Vorstandsmitgliedern-Besprechung des ARAG–Urteils des BGH" 153-, 1997

    27 Hasselbach, Kai, "Die Freistellung von Vorstandsmitgliedern und leitenden Angestellten von der Haftung für Kartellrechtsverstöße" 770-, 2008

    28 Mayer, Bernd R, "Die Aktienrechtliche Organhaftung - Reform durch juristische Methodik oder gesetzgeberisches Handeln" 1208-, 2014

    29 Semler, "Arbeitshandbuch für Aufsichtsratsmitglieder" 2013

    30 Hüffer, Uwe, "Aktiengesetz, Kommentar" 2016

    31 Hölters, Wolfgang, "Aktiengesetz, Kommentar" 2014

    32 Habersack, Mathias, "19 Jahre ARAG/Garmenbeck - und viele Fragen offen" 321-, 2016

    33 Faßbender, Paul-Otto, "18 Jahre ARAG Garmenbeck - und alle Fragen offen" 501-, 2015

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    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.77 0.77 0.8
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    0.7 0.65 0.772 0.44
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