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    재무분석가의 인적 특성이 이익예측특성에 미치는 영향

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A100856924

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Are analysts perfect? Analysts are known to have behavior bias, even though they have considerable expertise in forecast activity(Stotz and Nitzsch 2005; Hilary and Menzly 2006). Then, it is conceivable that some portion of analysts`` forecast bias is attributable to imperfection of analysts. However, prior literature focuses on monetary incentives such as incentives to generate trading commissions to explain analysts`` forecast bias. This study attempts to address this gap. Specifically, this study examines whether analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. Then, I investigate whether an analyst that shows a tendency toward systematic bias in forecast issues less accurate forecast. Prior literature finds that analysts`` forecasts are biased and the bias is related to analysts`` incentives to appease managers to obtain investment banking business, to maintain access to firm managers who are a primary source of information flow, to generate trading commissions and so on (Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 2000; Lin, McNichols, and O`Brien 2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Jacob et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2005). The common characteristic of these literature is that they focus on monetary incentives that lead analysts to show forecast bias. However, I expect that not only monetary incentives but also imperfection of analysts could be the source of forecast bias. Beyer (2008) theoretically demonstrates that analysts who have little information or low ability in forecasts tend to forecast overoptimistically. This is because analysts with low-ability can make use of the tendency of managers for meeting or beating analysts`` forecasts. When analysts forecast earnings optimistically, managers endeavor to increase earnings to meet or beat analysts`` forecasts and this managerial behavior results in the decrease of the difference between analyst forecasts and reported earnings. Analysts that recognize managers`` tendency for meeting or beating analysts`` forecasts and have little sources for accurate forecasts find it optimal to forecast optimistically rather than pessimistically. This implies that analysts`` low ability could be a source of forecast bias. Behavior economics finds that man has behavior bias and sometimes shows irrationality. They argue that man`s irrationality could explain considerable portion of man`s behavior and this individual irrationality persists. I argue that analyst as an imperfect man also can show forecast bias persistently. In total, analysts`` low-ability and irrationality can be sources of analysts`` forecast bias. This leads to my assertion that analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. To test my conjecture, I estimate forecast-bias specific analyst fixed effects by regressing forecast bias on analyst indicator variables with other controls (Ge et al. 2009; DeJong and Ling 2009; Demerjian et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010). This regression model is designed to identify each analyst`s heterogeneity in forecast bias, controlling for firm`s time-varing and time-invariant characteristics and year effects. When forecast bias (dependent variable) is defined as reported earnings minus analyst forecst, the analyst who has significant negative (porsitive) coefficient on his indicator variable could be considered to issue optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts persistently. I call these analysts`` behaviors as systematic forecast bias, because they show forecast bias in the same direction irrespective of firms that they analyze. After estimating the coefficients of analyst indicator variables, I do F-test to jointly test the significance of the coefficients. If the coefficients of analyst indicator variables are significantly different from zero, this implies that analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. And if analysts`` low-ability and irrationality are sources of analysts`` forecast bias, I can argue that analysts who show systematic forecast bias have low
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    Are analysts perfect? Analysts are known to have behavior bias, even though they have considerable expertise in forecast activity(Stotz and Nitzsch 2005; Hilary and Menzly 2006). Then, it is conceivable that some portion of analysts`` forecast bias is...

    Are analysts perfect? Analysts are known to have behavior bias, even though they have considerable expertise in forecast activity(Stotz and Nitzsch 2005; Hilary and Menzly 2006). Then, it is conceivable that some portion of analysts`` forecast bias is attributable to imperfection of analysts. However, prior literature focuses on monetary incentives such as incentives to generate trading commissions to explain analysts`` forecast bias. This study attempts to address this gap. Specifically, this study examines whether analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. Then, I investigate whether an analyst that shows a tendency toward systematic bias in forecast issues less accurate forecast. Prior literature finds that analysts`` forecasts are biased and the bias is related to analysts`` incentives to appease managers to obtain investment banking business, to maintain access to firm managers who are a primary source of information flow, to generate trading commissions and so on (Lin and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 2000; Lin, McNichols, and O`Brien 2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Jacob et al. 2008; Lee et al. 2005). The common characteristic of these literature is that they focus on monetary incentives that lead analysts to show forecast bias. However, I expect that not only monetary incentives but also imperfection of analysts could be the source of forecast bias. Beyer (2008) theoretically demonstrates that analysts who have little information or low ability in forecasts tend to forecast overoptimistically. This is because analysts with low-ability can make use of the tendency of managers for meeting or beating analysts`` forecasts. When analysts forecast earnings optimistically, managers endeavor to increase earnings to meet or beat analysts`` forecasts and this managerial behavior results in the decrease of the difference between analyst forecasts and reported earnings. Analysts that recognize managers`` tendency for meeting or beating analysts`` forecasts and have little sources for accurate forecasts find it optimal to forecast optimistically rather than pessimistically. This implies that analysts`` low ability could be a source of forecast bias. Behavior economics finds that man has behavior bias and sometimes shows irrationality. They argue that man`s irrationality could explain considerable portion of man`s behavior and this individual irrationality persists. I argue that analyst as an imperfect man also can show forecast bias persistently. In total, analysts`` low-ability and irrationality can be sources of analysts`` forecast bias. This leads to my assertion that analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. To test my conjecture, I estimate forecast-bias specific analyst fixed effects by regressing forecast bias on analyst indicator variables with other controls (Ge et al. 2009; DeJong and Ling 2009; Demerjian et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010). This regression model is designed to identify each analyst`s heterogeneity in forecast bias, controlling for firm`s time-varing and time-invariant characteristics and year effects. When forecast bias (dependent variable) is defined as reported earnings minus analyst forecst, the analyst who has significant negative (porsitive) coefficient on his indicator variable could be considered to issue optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts persistently. I call these analysts`` behaviors as systematic forecast bias, because they show forecast bias in the same direction irrespective of firms that they analyze. After estimating the coefficients of analyst indicator variables, I do F-test to jointly test the significance of the coefficients. If the coefficients of analyst indicator variables are significantly different from zero, this implies that analyst human characteristics affect forecast bias. And if analysts`` low-ability and irrationality are sources of analysts`` forecast bias, I can argue that analysts who show systematic forecast bias have low

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 도모노 노리오, "행동경제학: 경제를 움직이는 인간 심리의 모든 것" 지형 2007

    2 안윤영, "재무분석가의 특성이 이익예측정확성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 1-23, 2006

    3 이동헌, "재무분석가의 장기이익예측 특성 및 결정요인" 한국경영학회 41 (41): 201-229, 2012

    4 안윤영, "재무분석가의 이익예측 허딩 및 허딩 결정요인" 한국경영학회 35 (35): 1241-1260, 2006

    5 정석우, "재무분석가의 분석기업 결정과 예측특성에 영향을 미치는 요인" 한국회계학회 28 (28): 61-84, 2003

    6 안윤영, "연구개발비가 재무분석가 예측정확성 및 재무분석수요에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 1-23, 2005

    7 이만용, "애널리스트의 이해상충에 관한 연구" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 173-194, 2005

    8 전규안, "기타포괄손익과 재무분석가의 이익예측오차 사이의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 141-172, 2007

    9 Dan, B., "Who herds?" 80 : 657-675, 2006

    10 Cowen, A., "Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?" 41 (41): 119-146, 2006

    1 도모노 노리오, "행동경제학: 경제를 움직이는 인간 심리의 모든 것" 지형 2007

    2 안윤영, "재무분석가의 특성이 이익예측정확성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 1-23, 2006

    3 이동헌, "재무분석가의 장기이익예측 특성 및 결정요인" 한국경영학회 41 (41): 201-229, 2012

    4 안윤영, "재무분석가의 이익예측 허딩 및 허딩 결정요인" 한국경영학회 35 (35): 1241-1260, 2006

    5 정석우, "재무분석가의 분석기업 결정과 예측특성에 영향을 미치는 요인" 한국회계학회 28 (28): 61-84, 2003

    6 안윤영, "연구개발비가 재무분석가 예측정확성 및 재무분석수요에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 1-23, 2005

    7 이만용, "애널리스트의 이해상충에 관한 연구" 한국회계학회 30 (30): 173-194, 2005

    8 전규안, "기타포괄손익과 재무분석가의 이익예측오차 사이의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 141-172, 2007

    9 Dan, B., "Who herds?" 80 : 657-675, 2006

    10 Cowen, A., "Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?" 41 (41): 119-146, 2006

    11 Lin, H., "Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations" 25 : 101-127, 1998

    12 DeChow, P., "The relation between analysts’forecasts of longterm earnings growth and stock price performance following equity offerings" 17 (17): 1-32, 2000

    13 Richardson, S., "The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts : The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives" 21 (21): 885-924, 2004

    14 Cornelissen, T., "The Stata Command felsdvreg to Fit a Linear Model with Two Highdimensional Fixed Effects" 8 : 170-89, 2008

    15 Mittendorf, B., "The Role of Biased Earnings Guidance in Creating a Healthy Tension between Managers and Analysts" 80 (80): 1193-1209, 2005

    16 Stotz, O., "The Perception of Control and the Level of Overconfidence : Evidence from Analyst Earnings Estimates and Price Targets" 6 (6): 121-128, 2005

    17 Hayes, R. M., "The Impact of Trading Commission Incentives on Analysts' Stock Coverage Decisions and Earnings Forecasts" 36 : 299-320, 1998

    18 Dyreng, S. D., "The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance" 85 (85): 1163-1189, 2010

    19 Dugar, A., "The Effect of Investment Banking Relationship on Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations" 12 : 131-160, 1995

    20 Abarbanell, J. S., "Tests of Analysts’ Overreaction/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for Anomalous Stock Price Behavior" 47 : 1181-1207, 1992

    21 Mikhail, M. B., "Security Analyst Experience and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift" 18 (18): 529-550, 2003

    22 Kahneman D, "Prospect theory : an analysis of decision under risk" 47 : 263-290, 1979

    23 Amir, E., "Overreaction and Underreaction in Analyst Forecasts" 37 : 333-347, 1998

    24 Bertrand, M., "Managing with style : The effect of managers on firm policies" The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1169-1208, 2003

    25 DeJong, D., "Managers : Their effects on accruals and firmpolicies" University of Iowa 2009

    26 Graham, J. R., "Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation" Rev. Financ. Stud. 2011

    27 Shane, R, "Investor and(Value Line)analyst underreaction to information about future earnings : The corrective role of non-earnings surprise information" 39 (39): 387-404, 2001

    28 Sam Han, "Investor Sophistication and Patterns in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts" 한국증권학회 34 (34): 195-226, 2005

    29 Easterwood, J. C., "Inefficiency in Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts : Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?" 54 : 1777-1797, 1999

    30 Beyer, A., "Financial analysts’ forecast revisions and managers’ reporting behavior" 46 (46): 334-348, 2008

    31 Petersen, M., "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets : Comparing Approaches" The Review of Financial Studies 435-480, 2009

    32 Hilary, G., "Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident?" 52 (52): 489-500, 2006

    33 Jacob, J., "Do non-investment bank analysts make better earnings forecasts?" 23 (23): 23-61, 2008

    34 DeBondt, F. M., "Do Security Analysts Overreact?" 80 : 52-57, 1990

    35 Ge, W., "Do CFOs have styles of their own? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on financial reporting practices" University of Washington 2008

    36 Michaely, R., "Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations" 4 : 653-686, 1999

    37 Behn, B. K., "Audit Quality and Properties of Analyst Earnings Forecasts" 83 (83): 327-349, 2008

    38 Call, A. C., "Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?" 14 (14): 358-391, 2009

    39 Feng, M., "Anaysts’s Incentives to Overweight Management Guidance when Revising Their Short-Term Earnings Forecasts" 85 (85): 1617-1646, 2010

    40 Krishnan. M., "Analysts' Herding Propensity : Theory and Evidence from Earnings Forecasts" 2006

    41 Lin, H., "Analyst impartiality and investment banking relationships" 4 : 623-650, 2005

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