Logical empiricism and naturalism : Neurath and Carnap's metatheory of science

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• 1 Naturalism and the Vienna Circle = 1
• 1.1 What Is Epistemological Naturalism? = 1
• 1.1.1 What Epistemological Naturalism Opposes = 2
• 1.1.2 Distinctions Within Epistemological Naturalism = 3
• 1.1.3 Epistemological Commitments of Replacement and
• Cooperative Naturalism = 4
• 1.2 Naturalism in the Vienna Circle = 9
• 1.2.1 The Wings of the Vienna Circle = 9
• 1.2.2 Schlick and the Right Wing 11
• 1.2.3 Neurath’s Naturalism = 15
• 1.3 Carnap and Naturalism = 26
• 1.3.1 Carnap’s Convergence with Neurath = 27
• 1.3.2 Carnap’s Approval of Neurath’s Naturalism = 30
• 1.4 The Cooperation of Neurath and Carnap : The Bipartite Metatheory = 32
• 2 Neurath’s Epistemology of Science = 37
• 2.1 Neurath’s Empiricism = 37
• 2.1.1 Empiricism and Verificationism = 37
• 2.1.2 Science and Pseudo-Rationalism = 40
• 2.2 Language, Knowledge, and Science = 42
• 2.2.1 Science as a Social Instrument = 42
• 2.2.2 The Indispensability of Public Language = 43
• 2.2.3 Physicalism = 44
• 2.2.4 The Encyclopedia and Encyclopedism = 47
• 2.3 Decisionism = 49
• 2.3.1 Underdetermination and Decisions = 49
• 2.3.2 Auxiliary Motives and Decision Procedures = 51
• 2.3.3 Auxiliary Motives, Values, and Theoretical Virtues = 53
• 2.3.4 Decisions and Theory-Choice = 55
• 2.4 Methodological Constructivism and the Behaviouristics of Science = 59
• 2.4.1 Methodological Constructivism = 59
• 2.4.2 Behaviouristics of Scholars = 62
• 2.5 Neurath’s Epistemic Agent = 64
• 3 Neurath’s Conception of Protocol Statements = 67
• 3.1 The Protocol Sentence Debates = 67
• 3.2 What Is a Protocol Statement? = 69
• 3.3 The Structure of Neurath’s Protocol Statements = 76
• 3.4 The Four Conditions for Testimony Acceptance = 82
• 3.5 The Pragmatic Condition = 88
• 3.6 Utilising Testimony : Extraction = 91
• 3.7 Utilising Testimony : Abduction = 93
• 3.8 Conclusion = 95
• 4 Carnapian Explication = 97
• 4.1 Explication and the Bipartite Metatheory = 97
• 4.2 Carnapian Explication = 98
• 4.2.1 Explication : Process and Goals = 98
• 4.2.2 Criteria for Explication = 102
• 4.2.3 Explication as Naturalism = 104
• 4.3 Carnap’s Critics = 105
• 5 Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity = 113
• 5.1 The Development of Quine’s Thinking About Analyticity = 113
• 5.1.1 Initial Enthusiasm = 114
• 5.1.2 Growing Concerns = 115
• 5.1.3 Quine’s Break with Carnap = 116
• 5.2 What Is Carnap’s Notion of Analyticity? = 119
• 5.3 Which of Quine’s Arguments Pose a Problem For Carnap? = 122
• 5.3.1 “Analyticity” Is Unclear = 122
• 5.3.2 Natural vs Formal Languages = 126
• 5.3.3 Quine’s Observation = 126
• 5.3.4 Factual vs Non-factual Truth = 128
• 5.3.5 Holism, Revisability and Analyticity = 132
• 5.3.6 Changing Beliefs vs Changing Language = 136
• 5.3.7 The Significance of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction = 141
• 5.3.8 Semantics and Epistemology = 145
• 5.4 Divergent Conceptions of Empiricism? = 146
• 5.5 Conclusion = 149
• 6 Challenges to the Bipartite Metatheory Interpretation = 151
• 6.1 Analyticity = 151
• 6.2 Ballungen and Explication = 152
• 6.3 Conceptions of Protocol Statements = 154
• 6.3.1 Carnap’s Changing Conception = 155
• 6.3.2 Mature Positions, Apparent Disagreement = 157
• 6.3.3 Carnap’s Formal Objection = 158
• 6.3.4 Carnap’s Context Objection = 159
• 6.4 Physicalism and Private Languages = 161
• 6.5 Truth and Semantics = 163
• 6.5.1 Carnap on Truth and Semantics = 164
• 6.5.2 Neurath on Truth = 166
• 6.5.3 Deflationary Truth = 169
• 6.5.4 Mormann’s Defence of Neurath = 171
• 6.6 Conceptions of Unity = 174
• 6.6.1 Linguistic Unity of Science = 175
• 6.6.2 Carnap and Neurath on the Unity of Science = 176
• 6.6.3 Different Conceptions or Difference of Emphasis? = 178
• 6.7 Conclucions = 180
• 7 Bipartite Metatheory in Application = 181
• 7.1 The Bipartite Dialectic = 181
• 7.2 Decisionism, Conventionalism and Constructivism = 185
• 7.2.1 The Pragmatic and the Formal = 185
• 7.2.2 Methodological Constructivism = 188
• 7.3 Self-Reflexivity and Self-Direction = 190
• 7.3.1 Self-Reflexivity and Pseudo-Rationalism = 190
• 7.3.2 Neurath’s Anti-Totalitarianism : Mosaics and Orchestration = 192
• 7.4 Conclusion = 197
• References = 199