Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing system is structurally conducive to the emergence of non-state armed groups; among them, Hezbollah has combined military, welfare, and political functions to erode the state’s governing capacity. Following the ...
Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing system is structurally conducive to the emergence of non-state armed groups; among them, Hezbollah has combined military, welfare, and political functions to erode the state’s governing capacity. Following the Gaza war, Israel’s offensive inflicted significant human/material losses on Hezbollah, and strikes on Iranian territory further weakened its patron’s capabilities.
The degradation of Hezbollah’s force—and of Iran’s power and influence—creates, in principle, an opening for Lebanon’s governance recovery. Yet full disarmament of Hezbollah is unlikely in the near term; a more realistic objective is demilitarization south of the Litani River.
Meaningful recovery will require phased, visible progress on demilitarization, capacity building of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the institutionalization of state control.