도시한계론의 핵심 가정에 대한 경험적 검증 = Empirical Test of the City Limits Core Assumptions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Paul E. Peterson's City Limits is one of the most influential books written on urban political economics in the U.S. Although it has been widely criticized because of its apolitical assumptions and conclusions, there is still widespread agreement with basic elements of Peterson's contention. Peterson's thesis consists of four propositions that are intimately interconnected. First, key decision makers in urban governments view development policy and redistributive policy as two separate and distinct policy domains. Second, they evaluate development policy as having a positive impact upon the local economy, and redistributive policy as having a negative impact upon the local economy. Third, local policymakers prefer development policy to redistributive policy. Fourth, when local policymakers determine their policy preferences, economic factors are given greater weight than political factors. The central aim of this paper is to subject these propositions to empirical testing, using data drawn from a questionnaire distributed to Korean local government mayors in 2009. This paper builds upon two earlier studies, carried out by Longoria in 1994 and by Saiz in 1999, each of which empirically examines whether the key assumptions outlined in City Limits are applicable to mayors in other industrialized societies. The empirical scope of these studies, however, is limited by examining only two (the first and third) of Peterson's four propositions, leaving the other two untested. This paper puts all four propositions empirically to the test. Analysis of survey data reveals that the core of Peterson's propositions fails to receive empirical support from Korean mayors. This outcome contradicts the conclusion of the studies conducted by Longoria and Saiz in western industrialized societies. This paper discusses why this gap occurs and posits the implications of the findings.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 연구는 도시한계론의 핵심 가정들이 한국에도 적용될 수 있는지를 단체장을 대상으로 실시된 설문조사를 통해 알아보았다. 연구 결과를 요약하면, 단체장들은 공공정책들의 경제적 영향을 기준으로 개발정책과 재분배정책으로 구분하고 개발정책을 재분배정책보다 선호하고 있다. 하지만, Peterson의 주장과는 달리, 개발정책 뿐만 아니라 재분배정책의 경제적 영향력을 긍정적으로 평가하고 있으며, 개발정책 뿐만 아니라 재분배정책 또한 현행보다 확대될 것을 선호하고 있다. 무엇보다 중요한 차이는 단체장의 정책선호를 설명하는 변수에 있어서의 차이이다. 한국의 단체장들은 정책을 선택하는 과정에서 공공정책이 경제성장에 미치는 영향을 중요하게 여기지 않는 대신, 공공정책에 대한 주민들의 선호를 중시하고 있다. 이는 경제성장(economic growth)이 아니라 시민통제(popular control)가 단체장들의 공공선택에 영향을 주는 핵심적 가치이며, 단체장들이 경제논리보다는 정치논리를 중요시 여기고 있음을 의미한다. 도시정부는 경제성장을 최고의 가치로 추구하며 경제논리에 입각하여 정책을 선택한다는 Peterson의 주장과 정면으로 배치되는 결과이다.

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