This study is based on the hypothesis that, with the consolidation of cabinet’s role and identity in the North Korea, each organization in cabinet tends to prioritize its organizational self-interests and identity over governmental or national inter...
This study is based on the hypothesis that, with the consolidation of cabinet’s role and identity in the North Korea, each organization in cabinet tends to prioritize its organizational self-interests and identity over governmental or national interests. To test this hypothesis, it analyzes statements announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea(the Committee), and the Ministry of Defense from 2016 to 2021, using the text-mining analysis and a literature review.
The Ministry of Defense maintained its offensive posture toward South Korea, reinforcing its identity, even if the leader shifted to appeasement policy to South Korea. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs began issuing appeasement statements to the U.S., its major counterpart, following the leader's conciliatory gesture toward U.S. The Committee, however, continued its offensive political stance toward South Korea even after the 2018 inter-Korea Summit, which seems like an irrational choice. It also contrasts from the situation in 2000, when the Committee issued appeasement statements after the 2000 inter-Korea Summit.
This paper argues that this difference is resulted from the increased political responsibility of the Committee following the shift of its political position from a party-affiliated organization to the cabinet member, and the weakening of social organizations involved in inter-Korea social exchanges. The policy toward South Korea contains high risks, which even could threaten the organization’s existence. Its reorganization to the cabinet might increase this risk perception. At the same time, the weakening of social organizations has deprived the Committee's partners to share its political responsibility. These environmental changes increased the Committee’s political responsibility, making it more passive in carrying out appeasement policy. This shows that organizations in the North Korean cabinet prioritize their organizational survival and interests over the leader’s policy goal.