THREE ESSAYS ON IMPERFECTLY DISCRIMINATING CONTESTS

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Three Essays on Imperfectly Discriminating Contests 이 논문은 승자결정이 확률적으로 결정되는 경쟁에 관한 이론을 확장한다. 첫째 논문 “Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Outlay Functions”는 비대칭한 노력비용 함수를 도입한다. 두번째 논문 “Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Information”은 다양한 정보 상황에서 비대칭한 정보가 노력에 어떤 영향을 주는지를 다룬다. 세번째 논문 “Electoral Contests, Term Limit and Bureaucracy”는 단임제와 중임제하에 선거를 앞둔 대통령과 관료가 어떻게 영향을 주고 받으며 정책을 결정하는지를 다룬다. 첫째 논문에서는 effective prize dissipation ratio가 전통적인 prize dissipation ratio의 상한 또는 하한을 결정한다. 공공재 유치에 대한 동일 평가와 비대칭적 비용하에서, 그리고 공공재 유치에 대한 비대칭적 평가와 비대칭적 비용하에서, 공공재 유치를 위한 경쟁에서 각 지방자치단체의 인구와 effective prize dissipation ratio를 곱한 값이 같다는 사실을 보인다. 두번째 논문에서는 공개된 정보상황하에서 경기자의 기대지출성향이 양자간 비대칭적 정보상황하에서 경기자의 기대지출성향과 같다는 것을 보인다. 비대칭적 정보 상황하의 정보부재 경기자의 기대지출성향은 공개된 정보상황 하에서와 양자간 비대칭적 정보상황 하에서 기대지출성향보다 작거나 같다는 사실을 보인다. 세번째 논문에서는 한국의 단임제와 미국의 중임제 대통령제를 비교한다. 단임제하에서는 현직 대통령이 임기종료가 가까워 질수록 제도적으로 정책집행이 어려워진다. 관료나 집권당이 현직 대통령을 뒷받침해주지 않으면 파국적 결과를 낳을 수도 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This dissertation extends the theory of imperfectly discriminating contest. The first paper "Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Outlay Functions" introduces asymmetric cost-of-outlay functions. The second paper "Imperfectly Discriminating Contests under Asymmetric Information" addresses the impact of asymmetric information on the outlay level under different informational regimes. The third paper "Electoral Contests, Term Limit and Bureaucracy" analyzes the policy choice under different term limits that policy outcomes depend on which candidate wins the presidency as well as on how strong and different the bureaucracy compared to the president is in policy implementation.
In the first paper, after showing that "the effective prize dissipation ratio" defines the upper bound (or lower bound) of the conventional prize dissipation ratio, I prove that in a contest for a public good, the effective prize dissipation ratio in each town multiplied by its population is the same in two competing towns—under the first case, of equal valuation and asymmetric cost functions in each town, and under the second case, asymmetric valuation and asymmetric cost functions.
In the second, I show that a player's expected propensity to spend under public information is the same as his expected propensity to spend under two-sided asymmetric information. The uninformed player's expected propensity to spend under one-sided asymmetric information is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under public information and under two-sided asymmetric information.
In the third, I compared the single-term limited presidency of Korea to the two-term limited presidency of the United States. Under a one-term limited presidency, it is institutionally unreliable for the incumbent to pursue his agenda as the end of his term draws near. If the bureaucracy or the ruling party also does not support the incumbent, then the result would be still more destructive.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• ABSTRACT = ⅵ
• Table of Contents = ⅷ
• Chapter One Imperfectly Discriminating Contests with Asymmetric Outlay Functions = 1
• Abstract = 1
• 1. Introduction = 2
• 2. An Extension of the Imperfectly Discriminating Contest Model = 5
• 3. Nash Equilibrium = 9
• 3.1. The Maximization Problem for Convex Functions = 9
• 3.2. The Existence of Equilibrium = 14
• 3.3. The Concave Outlay Functions Case = 19
• 3.4. Contest Success Function and General Asymmetric Outlay Function = 21
• 3.5. The Symmetric Conditions Case and a Numerical Example = 26
• 3.6. Changing Valuations and the Single Crossing Property = 28
• 4. Comparative Statics = 30
• 5. Applications = 34
• 6. Conclusion = 42
• Appendix : The comparative statics for the probability to win and the effective prize dissipation ratio = 44
• References = 45
• Chapter Two Imperfectly Discriminating Contests under Asymmetric Information = 47
• Abstract = 47
• 1. Introduction = 48
• 2. The Basic Model = 50
• 3. Public Information = 52
• 3.1. Asymmetric Valuations and General Costs of Outlay = 52
• 3.2. Symmetric Valuations and Two Possible Costs of Outlay = 55
• 4. One-sided Asymmetric Information = 58
• 4.1. Asymmetric Valuations and Two Possible Costs of Outlay = 58
• 4.2. Symmetric Valuations and Two Possible Costs of Outlay = 61
• 5. Two-sided Asymmetric Information under Symmetric Valuations = 65
• 6. Comparison of the Propensities to Spend under Three Regimes = 69
• 6.1. Public and Two-sided Asymmetric Information = 69
• 6.2. Public and One-sided Asymmetric Information = 71
• 6.3. One-sided and Two-sided Asymmetric Information = 75
• 7. Comparisons of the Probabilities to Win and Profits under Three Regimes = 77
• 7.1. Public and Two-sided Asymmetric Information = 77
• 7.2. One-sided vs. Public and Two-sided Asymmetric Information = 79
• 7.3. Empirical Justification of Asymmetric Information = 81
• 8. Conclusion = 82
• Appendices = 84
• 1. Proof for Proposition 2.1. = 84
• 2. Proof for Proposition 2.2. = 85
• 3. Proof for other probabilities than the case of ^(θ＝(1)/(2)) in Proposition 4.2. = 86
• Chapter Three Electoral Contests, Term Limits and Bureaucracy = 88
• Abstract = 88
• 1. Introduction = 89
• 2. The Model = 94
• 3. One-Term Limit versus Two-Term Limit = 101
• 3.1. One-Term Limit without the Bureaucracy = 101
• 3.2. One-Term Limit with the Bureaucracy = 104
• 3.3. Two-Term Limit without the Bureaucracy = 110
• 3.4. Two-Term Limit with the Bureaucracy = 114
• 3.5. The Effect of Bureaucratic Power and Position on the Equilibrium = 120
• 4. Empirical Support = 122
• 4.1. Presidents Kim and Nixon = 122
• 4.2. President, Bureaucracy and Ruling Party = 123
• 4.3. The Korean Constitution of 1987 and Demand for Amendment = 126
• 4.4. Single-Term Limited Presidency of Korea = 128
• 4.5. Two-Term Limited Presidency of America = 138
• 5. Conclusions = 142
• Appendix : Voters' Expectations = 145
• References = 147