RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색

인기 검색어

    다국어 입력

    http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

    변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

    예시)
    • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
    • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
    닫기
    KCI등재

    정치정보, 정당, 선거제도와 소득불평등 = Political Information, Political Parties, Electoral Rules, and Income Inequality

    한글로보기

    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A82637392

    • 0

      상세조회
    • 0

      다운로드
    서지정보 열기
    • 내보내기
    • 내책장담기
    • 공유하기
      • URL 복사
    • 오류접수
    인용문이 복사되었습니다.

    부가정보

    국문 초록 (Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    본 논문은 인물투표를 촉진시키는 선거제도가 소득불평등을 심화시킨다는 주장에 대한 이론적ㆍ경험적 근거를 제시한다. 본 논문의 주장에 의하면, 저소득층 유권자들은 고소득층 유권자들에 비해서 후보의 비정책적인 요소들에 의해 쉽게 흔들리기 때문에 개인표를 던질 가능성이 높다. 따라서 저소득자들이 자신의 이해를 대변하지 않는 후보에게 투표할 가능성은 고소득자보다 높고, 저소득자들의 이러한 투표결정은 우파후보에게 유리하게 작동한다. 인물투표를 촉진시키는 선거 제도는 또한 후보와 소수의 특정 지지자들 간의 후원관계를 통한 자원분배 가능성을 높여, 정치인들의 소득불평등 해소정책 산출 동기를 억제한다. 본 논문은 인물투표를 촉진하는 선거제도가 우파 정당들의 득표율을 높이고 동시에 소득불평등을 심화시킨다는 가설을 뒷받침하는 경험분석 결과를 제시한다. 본 논문의 이러한 발견의 정책적 함의는 정당투표를 촉진시키는 선거제도가 소득불평등을 줄이는 효과가 있다는 것이다.
    번역하기

    본 논문은 인물투표를 촉진시키는 선거제도가 소득불평등을 심화시킨다는 주장에 대한 이론적ㆍ경험적 근거를 제시한다. 본 논문의 주장에 의하면, 저소득층 유권자들은 고소득층 유권자...

    본 논문은 인물투표를 촉진시키는 선거제도가 소득불평등을 심화시킨다는 주장에 대한 이론적ㆍ경험적 근거를 제시한다. 본 논문의 주장에 의하면, 저소득층 유권자들은 고소득층 유권자들에 비해서 후보의 비정책적인 요소들에 의해 쉽게 흔들리기 때문에 개인표를 던질 가능성이 높다. 따라서 저소득자들이 자신의 이해를 대변하지 않는 후보에게 투표할 가능성은 고소득자보다 높고, 저소득자들의 이러한 투표결정은 우파후보에게 유리하게 작동한다. 인물투표를 촉진시키는 선거 제도는 또한 후보와 소수의 특정 지지자들 간의 후원관계를 통한 자원분배 가능성을 높여, 정치인들의 소득불평등 해소정책 산출 동기를 억제한다. 본 논문은 인물투표를 촉진하는 선거제도가 우파 정당들의 득표율을 높이고 동시에 소득불평등을 심화시킨다는 가설을 뒷받침하는 경험분석 결과를 제시한다. 본 논문의 이러한 발견의 정책적 함의는 정당투표를 촉진시키는 선거제도가 소득불평등을 줄이는 효과가 있다는 것이다.

    더보기

    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    This article proposes theoretical and empirical grounds for the argument that electoral rules cultivating personal votes intensify income inequality. According to the argument of this article, poor voters are more likely than rich voters to cast personal votes since they are more likely to be swayed by candidates’valences. Thus, the poor are more likely to vote for candidates who do not represent their interests and such voting decision works favorably to rightist candidates. The particularistic electoral rules also discourage politicians from producing policies for reducing income inequality by increasing the probability of distributing resources through the clientelistic relationship between candidates and a small number of supporters. This article offers empirical results supporting the hypotheses that the particularistic electoral rules are advantageous to rightist parties and intensify income inequality. The policy implication of this finding is that electoral rules encouraging party voting have an effect of reducing income inequality.
    번역하기

    This article proposes theoretical and empirical grounds for the argument that electoral rules cultivating personal votes intensify income inequality. According to the argument of this article, poor voters are more likely than rich voters to cast perso...

    This article proposes theoretical and empirical grounds for the argument that electoral rules cultivating personal votes intensify income inequality. According to the argument of this article, poor voters are more likely than rich voters to cast personal votes since they are more likely to be swayed by candidates’valences. Thus, the poor are more likely to vote for candidates who do not represent their interests and such voting decision works favorably to rightist candidates. The particularistic electoral rules also discourage politicians from producing policies for reducing income inequality by increasing the probability of distributing resources through the clientelistic relationship between candidates and a small number of supporters. This article offers empirical results supporting the hypotheses that the particularistic electoral rules are advantageous to rightist parties and intensify income inequality. The policy implication of this finding is that electoral rules encouraging party voting have an effect of reducing income inequality.

    더보기

    목차 (Table of Contents)

    • 논문요약
    • Ⅰ. 서론
    • Ⅱ. 선행연구
    • Ⅲ. 이론적 논의 및 가설 도출
    • Ⅳ. 분석모형과 변수측정
    • 논문요약
    • Ⅰ. 서론
    • Ⅱ. 선행연구
    • Ⅲ. 이론적 논의 및 가설 도출
    • Ⅳ. 분석모형과 변수측정
    • Ⅴ. 분석결과
    • Ⅵ. 결론과 함의
    • 〈참고문헌〉
    더보기

    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 문우진, "정치정보, 정치참여와 민주주의" 한국정치학회 43 (43): 327-349, 2009

    2 "http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.htm"

    3 Aldrich,John H, "Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America" Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1995

    4 Wolfinger, Raymond E, "Who Votes" New Haven: Yale University 1980

    5 Wolfson, M.C, "When inequalities diverge" 84 : 353-358, 1994

    6 Beck, Nathaniel, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-series crosssection Data" 89 : 634-647, 1995

    7 Ravallion, Martin, "What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty" 11 (11): 357-382, 1997

    8 Korpi, Walter, "Welfare State Regress in Western Europe: Politics, Institutions, Globalization, and Europeanization" 29 : 589-609, 2003

    9 Wallerstein,Michael, "Wage-setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies" 43 (43): 649-680, 1999

    10 Rueda, David, "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism" 52 : 350-383, 2000

    1 문우진, "정치정보, 정치참여와 민주주의" 한국정치학회 43 (43): 327-349, 2009

    2 "http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.htm"

    3 Aldrich,John H, "Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America" Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1995

    4 Wolfinger, Raymond E, "Who Votes" New Haven: Yale University 1980

    5 Wolfson, M.C, "When inequalities diverge" 84 : 353-358, 1994

    6 Beck, Nathaniel, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-series crosssection Data" 89 : 634-647, 1995

    7 Ravallion, Martin, "What Can New Survey Data Tell Us about Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty" 11 (11): 357-382, 1997

    8 Korpi, Walter, "Welfare State Regress in Western Europe: Politics, Institutions, Globalization, and Europeanization" 29 : 589-609, 2003

    9 Wallerstein,Michael, "Wage-setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies" 43 (43): 649-680, 1999

    10 Rueda, David, "Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism" 52 : 350-383, 2000

    11 Lijphart,Arendt, "Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma" 91 : 1-14, 1997

    12 Dollar, David, "Trade, Growth, and Poverty" 114 : F22-F49, 2004

    13 Persson, Torsten, "The size and scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians" 43 : 699-735, 1999

    14 Esping-Andersen,Gosta, "The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism" Princeton, Princeton The University Press 1990

    15 Lundberg, Mattias, "The Simultaneous Evolution of Growth and Inequality" 113 : 326-344, 2003

    16 Tonelson,Alan, "The Race to the Bottom: Why a Worldwide Worker Surplus and Uncontrolled Free Trade are Sinking American Living Standards" Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2000

    17 Swank, Duane, "The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies" 46 : 642-655, 2002

    18 Kiewiet, D. R, "The Logic of Delegation" Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991

    19 Cox, Gary W., "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes In: Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy" New York: Cambridge University Press 21-63, 2001

    20 Bennett, Stephen E, "The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the United States" 34 (34): 771-802, 1990

    21 Castles,Francis, "The Impact of Parties on Public Expenditure In: The Impact of Parties" Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 21-96, 1982

    22 Birchfield, Vicki, "The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collecitive and Competitive Veto Points on Income Equality in Industrialized Democracies" 34 : 175-200, 1998

    23 Cameron, David R, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis" 72 : 1243-1261, 1978

    24 Dixit, Abinash, "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics" 58 (58): 1132-1155, 1996

    25 Lupia, Arthur, "The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know" New York: Cambridge University Press 2003

    26 Aranson, Peter H, "Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections In: Probability Models of Collective Decision Making" Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Co 298-331, 1972

    27 Leighley, Jan E., "Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964-1988: The Voters Remain the Same" 86 (86): 725-736, 1992

    28 Austen-Smith,David, "Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation" 108 (108): 1235-1269, 2002

    29 Verba, Sidney, "Race, Ethnicity and political Resources Participation in the United States" 23 (23): 453-497, 1993

    30 Stolper, Wolfgang, "Protection and Real Wages" 9 : 58-73, 1941

    31 Ferejohn, John, "Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968" Stanford: Stanford University Press 1974

    32 Allan James P, "Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies" 48 (48): 496-512, 2004

    33 Hibbs,Douglas, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy" 70 : 1033-1058, 1976

    34 Bhagwati,Jagdish, "Play it Again, Sam: A New Look at Trade and Wages" Columbia University. Department of Economics 1997

    35 Lijphart,Arendt, "Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries" New Haven: Yale University Press 1999

    36 Moon,Woojin, "Party activists, campaign resources and candidate position taking: Theory, tests and applications" CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS 34 (34): 611-633, 2004

    37 Garrett, Geoffrey, "Partisan Politics in the Global Economy" New York: Cambridge University Press 1998

    38 Grenzke,Janet M, "PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex" 33 (33): 1-24, 1989

    39 Enelow, James M, "Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition" 44 (44): 115-130, 1982

    40 Beck, Thorsten, "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions" 15 (15): 165-176, 2001

    41 Korpi, Walter, "New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975-1995" 97 : 425-446, 2003

    42 Cox, Gary W., "Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan" 50 (50): 447-474, 1998

    43 Cox, Gary W., "Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House" Berkeley: University of California Press 1993

    44 Burtless,Gary, "International Trade and the Rise in Earnings Inequality" 33 (33): 800-816, 1995

    45 Gilens,Martin, "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness" 69 (69): 778-796, 2005

    46 Feld, Scott L, "Incumbency Advantage, Voter Loyalty and the Benefit of the Doubt" 3 : 115-137, 1991

    47 Carey, John M, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas" 14 (14): 417-439, 1995

    48 Timmer,Peter, "How well do the Poor Connect to the Growth Process? CAER II Discussion Paper" Harvard Institute for International Development 1997

    49 Fiorina, Morris P, "Home Style and Washington Work: Studies of Congressional Politics" Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 1989

    50 Fenno,Richard F.JR, "Home Style : House Members in Their Districts" New York: Harper Collins Publishers 1978

    51 Dreher, Axel, "Has Globalization Increased Inequality" KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich 2006

    52 Rodrik,Dani, "Has Globalization Gone Too Far" Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 1997

    53 HeeMin Kim, "Government Partisanship in Western Democracies, 1945- 1998" 41 : 165-184, 2002

    54 kinson, Anthony B, "Globalization and the European Welfare State at the Opening and the Closing of the Twentieth Century In: Europe and Globalization" New York: Palgrave-MacMillan 249-273, 2002

    55 Swank,Duane, "Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States" New York: Cambridge University Press 2002

    56 Sylwester, Kevin, "Foreign Direct Investment, Growth and Income Inequality in Less Developed Cuntries" 19 (19): 289-300, 2005

    57 Leamer,Edward E, "Factor-Supply Differences as a Source of Comparative Advantage" 83 (83): 436-439, 1993

    58 hler, Vincent A, "Exploring the Subnational Dimension of Income Inequality: An Analysis of the Relationship between Inequality and Electoral Turnout in the Developed Countries" 46 : 117-142, 2002

    59 Higgins, Matthew, "Explaining Inequality the World Round: Cohort Size, Kuznets Curves and Openness" National Bureau of Economic Research 1999

    60 Galbraith, James K, "Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set" 51 (51): 115-143, 2005

    61 Swank, Duane, "Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2006: A Database" Marquiette University

    62 Iversen, Torben, "Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others" 100 (100): 165-187, 2006

    63 Verardi, Vincenzo, "Electoral Systems and Income Inequality" 86 : 7-12, 2005

    64 Powell,G.B.Jr, "Elections as Instruments of Democracy" New Haven: Yale University Press 2000

    65 Johnson, Joel W, "Elecotral Systems and the Personal Vote: Update of database from‘ Particularism Around the World"

    66 Reuveny, Rafael, "Economic Openness, Democracy and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis" 36 (36): 575-601, 2003

    67 Kuznets,Simon, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality" 45 (45): 1-28, 1955

    68 Mahler,Vincent A., "Economic Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Income Inequality in the Developed Countries" 37 (37): 1025-1053, 2004

    69 Brady, David, "Economic Globalization and the Welfare State in Affluent Democracies, 1975-2001" 70 (70): 921-994, 2001

    70 Edwards, Martin S, "District Magnitude, Personal Votes, and Government Expenditures" 26 : 338-345, 2007

    71 Huber, Evelyne, "Development and Crisis of the Welfare State" Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2001

    72 Dixon, William, "Dependency, Disarticulation, and Denominator Effects: Another Look at Foreign Capital Penetration" 102 : 543-562, 1996

    73 Moon, Woojin, "Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Benefits" 11 (11): 579-599, 2005

    74 Visser, Jelle, "Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS)" Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam

    75 Wright,John R, "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives" 84 : 417-438, 1990

    76 Fiorina,Morris P, "Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment" New Heaven: Yale University Press 1989

    77 Armingeon, Klaus, "Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2008" Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2010

    78 Garrett, Geoffrey, "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy In: Internationalization of Domestic Politics" New York: Cambridge University Press 1996

    79 Griffin, John, "Are Voters Better Represented" 67 (67): 1206-1227, 2005

    80 Downs,Anthony, "An Economic Theory of Democracy" New York: Harper and Row 1957

    81 Adams, James F., "A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors" New York: Cambridge University Press 2005

    82 Groseclose,Tim, "A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage" 45 (45): 862-886, 2001

    더보기

    동일학술지(권/호) 다른 논문

    동일학술지 더보기

    더보기

    분석정보

    View

    상세정보조회

    0

    Usage

    원문다운로드

    0

    대출신청

    0

    복사신청

    0

    EDDS신청

    0

    동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

    더보기

    주제

    연도별 연구동향

    연도별 활용동향

    연관논문

    연구자 네트워크맵

    공동연구자 (7)

    유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

    인용정보 인용지수 설명보기

    학술지 이력

    학술지 이력
    연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
    2020 평가 계속평가 신청대상 (등재유지)
    2015-01-01 등재 우수등재학술지 선정 (계속평가)
    2011-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2009-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2007-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2005-01-01 등재 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
    2002-01-01 등재 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
    1999-07-01 등재 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
    더보기

    학술지 인용정보

    학술지 인용정보
    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.98 0.98 1.06
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    1.08 1.03 1.653 0.27
    더보기

    이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

    나만을 위한 추천자료

    해외이동버튼