This study conducted STRIDE-based threat modeling on the Bank of Korea's CBDC pilot environment "Hangang," identifying that approximately 27.5% of the total 120 threats fell under the privilege escalation category. To address these risks, we designed ...
This study conducted STRIDE-based threat modeling on the Bank of Korea's CBDC pilot environment "Hangang," identifying that approximately 27.5% of the total 120 threats fell under the privilege escalation category. To address these risks, we designed an R-ABAC (Role-Attribute Based Access Control) model that combines the structural simplicity of RBAC with the fine-grained attribute control of ABAC, and implemented a dual access-control mechanism incorporating both whitelisting and explicit-deny policies. The logical validity of the policy was verified using Alloy Analyzer, while its operational correctness within the execution environment was validated through OPA (Rego). Both verification processes revealed no conflicts or errors, demonstrating the feasibility and security of the R-ABAC-based policy. These findings highlight its practical applicability for future CBDC security architecture design, privacy protection policies, and anomaly detection systems.