KEDO 사례의 교훈 = Lessons of the KEDO Case

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In January 2006, the KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) light-water reactor (LWR) project in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) 11 years after the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework went into effect and 8 year after the construction work started, and 2 years after the site work was frozen. The LWR issue was resurrected, however, when the 6-party members agreed in the Joint Statement "to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of light water reactor to the DPRK." Then, can the LWR construction be resumed as the 6-party talks make progress? Answers can be found in lessons learned from the failure of the KEDO LWR project.
This paper locates four groups of obstacles to the KEDO LWR project: North Korea's failure to implement agreements and contracts, continued political support of sponsors to the project, North Korea's own preparation to receive the LWR and its full implementation of nonproliferation obligations. Unless all of these four obstacles are cleared, the LWR project cannot make much progress. This position contradicts, however, North Korea's position of "the LWR first."
In conclusion, this paper argues that unless North Korea becomes a 'normal and responsible' country in international society, the LWR may not be delivered, much less completed. These and above four conditions apply equally to the future LWR project. In order to avoid making another aborted LWR project, North Korea should change and learn to abide by international norms first.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. 서론 1
• II. KEDO 경수로사업 배경과 의의 2
• 1. 북한의 경수로 요구 2
• 2. 한국의 경수로사업 참여 4
• 3. 경수로사업의 의의 5
• III. 경수로사업의 장애물 7
• 1. 북한의 합의서와 계약서 이행문제 8
• 2. 사업에 대한 정치적지지 유치 8
• 3. 북한의 경수로 수용능력 9
• 4. 핵비확산 의무 이행 10
• 5. 소결론 11
• IV. 결론 12
• Abstract 15