As socialist nations, China and North Korea have maintained a long-standing security alliance. However, this partnership has experienced periods of tension and conflict, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Notably, North Korea fac...
As socialist nations, China and North Korea have maintained a long-standing security alliance. However, this partnership has experienced periods of tension and conflict, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Notably, North Korea faced a significant dispute with China over its nuclear development after the Soviet Union's demise. Nonetheless, the alliance was ultimately restored, and socialist solidarity was bolstered with North Korea's announcement suspending nuclear tests.
This paper seeks to examine the mechanisms by which China, as the dominant ally, has managed to sustain its alliance with North Korea, a weaker nation. This investigation focuses on how both nations achieved this alliance, and also analyzes the tangible benefits of maintaining it despite historical tensions and conflicts.
From an institutional perspective, the effectiveness of the 'China-North Korea Alliance Treaty' signed by both nations is evaluated. The reasons behind the recurrent cycles of conflict and cooperation within the alliance relationship are explored, as well as the practical advantages for China in preserving this alliance amid conflicts with North Korea.
Additionally, the behavioral aspect is considered, including shifts in national identity and how these affect the perceptions and ideologies of China's top leadership regarding North Korea. China's national identity has evolved over time in response to historical changes and policy shifts since its inception. These changes in identity manifest in different foreign strategies, which are analyzed as 'independent variables'.
With this framework, the analysis is divided into two periods (2012-17 and 2018-22) during Xi Jin-ping's administration, examining China's strategic approach to North Korea. The focus is on the structural cohesion of the China-North Korea alliance and its relationship with the US-China dynamic. The concept of 'national identity' serves as an 'independent variable,' affecting on the adjustment process and dynamic changes in China's strategy towards North Korea. In essence, the policy towards North Korea is strategically adjusted based on whether the Chinese leadership under Xi Jin-ping emphasizes the 'perception of the China-North Korea alliance' or 'the strategic value of the US-China relationship and North Korea' in their interactions with North Korea. This creates a management paradigm.
During Xi Jin-ping's initial term in office, he advocated for a 'new type of major power relationship' in foreign policy and sought cooperation with the United States. Simultaneously, China emphasized its role as a 'responsible power,' aligning with its heightened international status. As Kim Jung-un assumed power, North Korea aimed to establish a cooperative relationship with China based on their alliance but also pursued its own security through its third nuclear test. China, concerned about becoming entangled in US-China cooperation, attempted to pressure North Korea, which North Korea resisted due to alliance security concerns. This ultimately deepened the conflict between the socialist allies.
Between 2014 and 2017, both nations grappled with a significant 'alliance security dilemma.' China aimed to bolster its international standing by fostering a new great power relationship with the United States, driven by its 'developing great power identity,' while North Korea sought to mitigate the 'threat of abandonment' through accelerated nuclear development. Consequently, China supported UN sanctions against North Korea, leading to extreme conflict that endangered the alliance. At this juncture, resolving the alliance security dilemma and establishing a 'guardian-warded relationship' amid intensified US-China competition became imperative for China.
During Xi Jin-ping's second term, China espoused 'great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,' promoting 'new international relations' and the 'community of human destiny' as foreign policy principles. This confluence of socialist hegemony and powerful-country identity, combined with North Korea's suspension of nuclear tests, expedited Kim Jung-un's visit to China. This revitalized the Sino-North Korean alliance, dispelled North Korea's ‘concerns of abandonment’ and strengthened China's role as North Korea's guardian during US-North Korea denuclearization negotiations.
As the second round of US-North Korea negotiations faltered, the alliance between both socialist nations appeared to grow stronger. Joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States resumed, creating a shared external threat and enhancing the alliance. China and North Korea have now successfully resolved the 'risk of involvement' and 'threat of abandonment,' demonstrating solidarity through socialist
ideological alignment.
Both China and North Korea exhibited a strong level of tactical solidarity, leveraging socialist ideology to advance their core interests despite sharp conflicts. This tactical solidarity became especially prominent amid heightened US-China tensions, culminating in a new form of mutual support against the alliance of South Korea, the United States, and Japan.
In conclusion, this research yields policy implications for North Korea's strategy during the Xi Jin-ping era. First, China's core interest in upholding the China-North Korea Alliance Treaty lies in North Korea's 'geopolitical and strategic value.' China is expected to continue leveraging North Korea's strategic significance, even in a loosely structured alliance, as part of its broader 'cooperation and conflict relationships.'
Second, North Korea perceives its nuclear development as essential for regime survival and autonomy. Consequently, North Korea is likely to intensify its nuclear security capabilities while bolstering the China-North Korea alliance and resisting Chinese demands for restrictions on autonomy.
Third, the approach to North Korea during the Xi Jin-ping era will hinge on the state of the US-China relationship. In times of friendly US-China ties, China could again increase restrictions on North Korea's autonomy. Conversely, if the US-China relationship deteriorates, North Korea's autonomy could be maximized as China strengthens the alliance while providing assurances.
Fourth, the continuation of mutual solidarity between China and North Korea, grounded in socialism, depends on North Korea's decision regarding a seventh nuclear test. China views North Korea's nuclear possession as a grave security threat to its core interests, while North Korea considers additional nuclear tests crucial for its security and autonomy. If alliance solidarity is essential, North Korea may abstain from further nuclear tests, but if China exerts strong identity and autonomy restrictions, it may provoke North Korea into conducting a seventh test thereby causing conflict.
Considering these factors, it is anticipated that China-North Korea relations will continuously aim to reinforce solidarity through their alliance, with minimal changes and without the ‘threat of abandonment’ or ‘concern of involvement.’ However, during Xi Jin-ping's third term, China is likely to prioritize strategic competition with the United States over North-Korean issues. Despite the increased importance of its strategic value to North Korea, China is expected to maintain a supportive stance toward its socialist ally while strengthening the trilateral solidarity system with Russia in countering the hostile alliance of South Korea, the United States, and Japan.