Competition Courts in the Digital Economy as Institutional Actors from Competition Law and Policy Perspectives|RISS 상세보기

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The rapid progress of globalisation and technology has brought notable developments of competition laws and policies. In particular, the task of competition courts has been highlighted in many competition regimes around the world. In effect, the court, as one of the official or institutional actors, has influenced the development of overall competition policies. For example, the US antitrust regime has shown meaningful developments of case law by adopting the economic theories of the Chicago School, and the US courts have played an essential role in developing competition policies by providing clearer guidance to competition law institutions and private entities, as shown in the case law of vertical agreements. The case law of vertical restraints indicates its change of formalistic doctrine to economic effects.
Furthermore, we have observed significant evolutions of competition laws in other regimes, including the EU and Korea. For instance, the European Commission revised its Vertical Regulation and Guidelines, and the European Court has affirmed this approach in the recent vertical cases, and the Court has also developed its case law involving unilateral conducts, such as the Intel case and the MEO case. Likewise, the courts have appeared to be a fundamental institutional actor in competition policy-making by interpreting complex subjects. Their adoption of economic principles and theories of efficiency indicates their increasing role as a principal official actor in competition policy.
The Supreme Court of Korea has also provided crucial guidance relating to the implementations of competition law, which eventually affected the policy changes of the Korean competition authority. The competition courts’ decisions do not radically change the policies of the government, but they influence the fundamental agenda-settings of competition policy. Considering the importance of an institutional actor in public policy-making, this article aims to discuss the role of competition courts, focusing on their efficiency consideration in the digital economy.

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