(Comprehensive)
This paper is a study on the origin, progress and today's realities of North Korea's scientific techniques-based intensive economic growth that began in earnest in the early 1960s, like the major Eastern European socialist industrial countries. Under this research goal, the economic growth strategy utilizing industrial technology of the Kim Jong-un era and its realities were scrutinized by three perspectives: the evaluation of the level and feature of North Korea's 'Digital economy' in the Kim Jong-un era, the identification of the technological foundation of 'CNCization of the people's economy', and the analysis of the ‘On-site technical competency development’ system.
First, in order to evaluate the holistic level of North Korea's recent 'digital economy' corresponding to the 'digital economy', the ‘technological maturity evaluation’ was conducted on approximately 250 major North Korean reports related to the development and utilization of industrial technology according to the hierarchical structure and detailed technical fields of the typical digital economy. As a result, unlike advanced industrial countries where infrastructure that requires large-scale investment leads the transition to the digital economy, North Korea has relative high score in service implementation by industry, which seems to be due to the characteristics of the North Korean science and technology community that values 'selection and concentration' and rapid practical application of IT capabilities accumulated during the information revolution. However, despite the above-mentioned technological level, the poor industrial infrastructure and the delay in normalizing industrial production hinders the constitutional transformation to a 'digital economy' and simultaneously limits the creation of demand for the transition to a digital economy from the existing industries.
The second essay is a study of the policy and results of the large-scale distribution of the 'distributed control system' during the Kim Jong-un era in the viewpoint of clarifying the technical reality and foundation of North Korea's industrial technology innovation. The 'CNC control system' and related technologies, which were claimed to have been completed in 2009, not only brought about the development of CNC machine tools within the machinery industry, but also the advancement of the 'distributed control system' that utilizes the technology to monitor and control production processes or various types of industrial facilities. These accumulated operational experience and technology led to the full-scale spread of the distributed control system, which was commercialized as a general product through the national standardization process for related technologies around 2015. This was one of the technical substance of the ‘CNCization of the People’s Economy’ that North Korea had proposed since the early days of completing CNC technology, and was also a choice of the Kim Jong-un government to minimize the burden on the state and the subjects of diffusion and to distribute the entire industry in a short period of time. However, in order to secure the sustained performance of the system, on-site operational capabilities, continuous financial investment, and the efficient technical support system are essential, but the production contribution effect initially anticipated was estimated to have been limited due to the lack of capabilities and experience in the industrial field. Nevertheless, the distributed control system is estimated as the foundation for North Korea’s future industrial technology innovation using ICT technology in terms of the system.
Third, this study focused on analyzing the ‘distance education university, science and technology dissemination office, and regional electronic business research institute’, which are representative ‘national knowledge dissemination systems’ that enhance the technological capabilities and operational capabilities of industrial sites in the knowledge economy era based on the technical knowledge and core technology basis discussed in the two studies above. The 'distance education university', a representative knowledge worker training system, was found to lack the participation of field workers, who are the core education target. In addition, the 'science and technology dissemination office' is largely built and operated with the implicit participation of 'private capital', and financial interests between government authorities, local electronic business research institutes, and private capital were confirmed.
In general, the characteristics of North Korea's industrial technology innovation policy are that its technical content and development strategy are usually consistent with the national development path, and there are widespread compromises, adjustments, role division, and transfers to overcome the limitations of human and material capabilities of the country and industrial on-sites. However, in the promotion of industrial production innovation through technology dissemination centered on the science and technology elite of the Kim Jong-un era, the lack of operational capabilities and experience in the field regarding technology and knowledge was analyzed to have resulted in an imbalance that has restricted the corresponding performances.
[Thesis 1] Current Level and Feature of North Korea’s Digital Economy
The 4th Industrial Revolution or Digital Economy that emerged in the mid-2010s is a structural transformation of industrial production that collects digital data generated in industrial sites through communication infrastructure and analyzes and utilizes it with digital technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data to pursue innovation in production. Following this trend of transition based on digital technology, North Korea has also attempted to normalize and innovate the entire industry since 2016 by implementing the strategic line of “a leap forward as a socialist economic powerhouse through the realization of a knowledge economy and self-reliant economy” and the transition for ‘digits(Suza) economy’ to realize this. (Hereinafter referred to as ‘digital economy’)
This paper is a study that objectively diagnoses the overall level of North Korea’s recent ‘digital economy’ by evaluating its level using a conventional technology level assessment tool that has been verified over a long period of time and examining its characteristics and limitations. The evaluation of the level of North Korea’s ‘digital economy’ devised in this paper is a method that performs a technology maturity level(TRL) assessment widely used in South Korea by considering related news articles in North Korea as a single technology development case. Accordingly, this paper extracted 253 North Korean official media reports and research documents related to the transition to a ‘digital economy’ in North Korea since 2016.
As a result, the overall score was 5.97 points (out of 9 points), and North Korea was evaluated as being in the “core technology verification and test application stage” overall. Therefore, from the perspective of the digital economy, which involves the collection, processing, analysis, and utilization of digital data generated in industrial sites, North Korea is currently considered to be in the “before full-scale entry stage”, and accordingly, it is analyzed that it will be difficult to expect visible production normalization and industrial growth contributions in the short term.
By layer, the physical layer, which is largely divided into infrastructure for data collection and analysis, and the logical layer, which represents digital technology capabilities, recorded 5.08 points and 5.82 points, respectively, while the content layer, which represents the extent to which digital technology has been implemented in reality, was evaluated relatively high at 6.44 points. It is an unusual phenomenon in light of the advanced countries in technology, where large-scale investments are preceded by physical and logical layers, leading to the digital economy transition. It is presumed that this is because North Korea has focused on areas where a certain level of performance can be achieved with only individual researchers’ service development capabilities, while the physical and logical layers, which require large-scale digital infrastructure investments, remain at the research stage, or because it reflects the characteristics of the North Korean scientific research community, which emphasizes rapid commercialization.
Meanwhile, the characteristics of North Korea’s ‘digital economy’ promotion derived from this study are that, first of all, the digitalization achievements are ‘overlaid’ on the previous achievements since the 1990s in its composition, and this seems to reflect the characteristics of North Korea’s unique policy succession. In addition, it was possible to point out the emphasis on self-reliance and subjectivity, the orientation toward ‘one-time leap forward’, and the focus on ‘restoring control’ in terms of real economy management.
Finally, in the analysis of the mechanism through which the current North Korean ‘digital economy’ is contributing to the actual industrial innovation performance, it was analyzed that despite the certain level of ‘digital economy’ performance mentioned above, the poor economic and industrial infrastructure of the current North Korean economy and the long-term delay in normalizing existing industries are creating a vicious cycle that blocks the constitutional innovation performance of the North Korean economy’s ‘digital economy’ transformation.
Ultimately, if innovation is viewed as an attempt at technological transformation promoted on the basis of normalizing existing industrial production, the success or failure of North Korea’s ‘digital economy transformation’ seems to be that the North Korean authorities can expect the desired result of a ‘single leap’ through the ‘digital economy transformation’ that they hope for by first achieving the normalization of major industries along with continuous improvement in technological maturity.
[Thesis 2] A Research on the Current ‘CNCization’ of North Korea - Focusing on the Spread of ‘Distributed Control System’ -
This paper is a study on the policy direction of North Korea’s CNC technology, which was declared to have been domestically produced in 2009, and its achievements.
North Korea’s CNC technology is not only the development of CNC machine tools in the mechanical engineering industry, but also the spread of controller technology, which is the core of CNC technology, to various types of industries, and since the mid-2010s, the ‘distributed control system(DCS)’, which has been commercialized as a general product, has been applied to the entire industry. North Korea’s ‘distributed control system’ is different from the general concept. It refers to a technology that utilizes multiple computers separated by process and function, which was proposed in the mid-1970s to overcome the instability of the control method of the entire facility by a single computer. However, North Korea comprehensively uses the above concept as well as the function of remotely integrating and controlling large-scale equipment industries or facilities.
The spread of North Korea’s distributed control system began in the early 2010s as an individual design, construction, and operation method (construction type) for facilities in important key industries, utilizing controller technology, which is the core of CNC technology. Afterwards, based on accumulated technological prowess and operational experience, the national standardization process of related technologies was carried out around 2015 to promote ‘generalized productization (popularization)’ for small and medium-sized production facilities.
The generalized distributed control system is a kind of industrial package consisting of an operating unit, a control computer, sensors, and communication functions. It is judged that this was the only ‘option’ for the authorities who wanted to mass-produce it in various industrial fields within a short period of time while minimizing the burden of introduction for the various industrial sites.
The goal of ‘CNCization’ of the people’s economy were established during the Kim Jong-il era, but as mentioned above, it is clear that its full-scale expansion into all industries became noticeable around 2015 when the national distribution system, technological capabilities were established. In addition, the flow of technological innovation in North Korea’s industrial sites is significant in that it is identical to the trend of digitization and connectivity, convergence with core digital technologies such as artificial intelligence, and is seen in the process of technology-based industrial innovation in general countries today, despite the need to verify the level of technology, and it has laid the foundation for North Korea’s own continuous innovation.
However, in order to sustain the effect of introducing a distributed control system, a systematic technological support system and continuous post-investment are essential. Considering the level of North Korea's on-site technological support system and the financial and operational capacity of the industrial sites that have introduced it, it is highly likely that despite the rapid diffusion results in the early stages of the policy, the utilization rate in the field will gradually decrease, so it is expected that it will be difficult to achieve the desired results that the authorities expected.
[Thesis 3] A Study on the Characteristics of North Korea’s Current ‘On-site Technical Competency Development’ System
This paper examines how North Korea’s industrial sites during the Kim Jong-un era are securing and strengthening technological capabilities. In particular, in the era of the knowledge economy, the core of technological capabilities in the field is the accumulation of the ‘knowledge level’ of field workers related to production and the ‘operational capabilities and experience’ of the production site.
In order to secure the technical manpower that was absolutely insufficient for the high-accumulation industrialization that North Korea pursued after the war, it established and developed an “educational system of learning while working,” represented by “factory universities,” since the early 1960s. Afterwards, as the functional limitations of factory universities and the economic crisis passed, the Kim Jong-il era transferred the role of cultivating technical manpower in cutting-edge fields such as the information industry to general universities. The Kim Jong-un era presented a ‘knowledge economy powerhouse’ as the national vision, and made concrete and institutional progress in strategies such as the state-led development of all citizens into science and technology talents and the establishment of a national knowledge dissemination system.
This paper analyzes the changes of the Kim Jong-un era above, focusing on the ‘distance education university’ for fostering knowledge workers, and the ‘provincial, city, and county electronic business research institutes and science and technology dissemination offices’ for strengthening on-site technical capabilities.
From the position of the North Korean authorities, there was a policy need for ‘knowledge’ education for technical personnel and the use of a certain level of communication networks and technology, but the chronic problem of a lack of national resources remained. Under these circumstances, the ‘distance education university’ that has been in full swing since 2014 is a national knowledge education system targeting on-site workers that utilizes existing university educational personnel and infrastructure, with the premise of minimizing additional national financial burden. This is significant in that it has increased the level of involvement in improving the knowledge level of the country’s on-site technical personnel through the operation of the national knowledge dissemination system of major universities, thereby enabling the direct fostering of knowledge workers. However, despite the improvement of educational content, qualitative improvement of lecture infrastructure and educational management, the incentive for key workers in the field to participate was found to be insufficient.
Meanwhile, in the field, ‘Science and Technology Dissemination Offices’ were established in all enterprises and factories to play the role of the terminal of the national knowledge dissemination system distribution network. In addition, the establishment of ‘Science and Technology Dissemination Offices’ in workplaces and on-site technical support were carried out through the expansion of the functions of ‘Provincial, City, and County Electronic Business Research Institutes.’ However, due to the limitations of the capacity of enterprises and factories, ‘Science and Technology Dissemination Offices’ are largely being established and operated in the form of private capital investment formed within the information industry, and local electronic business research institutes were found to focus more on profit-seeking activities such as development and distribution of application as enterprises rather than the nature of local technical support organizations.
As a result, interactions among stakeholders were observed, the authorities completed the policy of establishing a national knowledge dissemination system in the knowledge economy era and increased financial revenue, private capital expanded and diversified the scope of profit-making activities by participating in the establishment of the Science and Technology Dissemination Office, and the local electronic business research institute focused on achieving the external goals of the organization and profit-making activities. However, such interactions in the policy of enhancing on-site technical capabilities and the North Korean authorities’ tacit acceptance of private capital participation were judged to have a high possibility of distorting the public nature of the original policy goals of ‘knowledge education for key workers’ or ‘enhancing on-site technical capabilities.’
Therefore, in order to substantiate the policy of enhancing on-site technical capabilities rather than achieving the external achievement of the policy, institutional progress such as a motivational plan to enhance the capabilities of key workers will be essential, along with the establishment of a plan to enhance the public nature through transparent and reasonable ‘compromise and adjustment’ with the participating private capital.