신제도주의 경제학 방법론에 관한 일 고찰 = Reflections on the Application of NIE to Public Institutions and Institutional Change

국문 초록 (Abstract)

신제도주의 경제학의 발전은 제도의 생성과 변화를 설명하는 유용한 분석수단을 제공한다. 이러한 분석수단은 민간의 거래관계에만 적용되지 않고 공공분야의 거래에도 적용된다. 본 연구는 신제도주의 경제학 이론의 전개과정과 방법론적 비교연구를 수행한 결과 다음과 같은 분석 방법론상의 함의를 발견할 수 있었다. 먼저, 신제도주의 경제학 방법론은 방법론적 개인주의(Methodological Individualism; MI)와 방법론의 구조(설명/이해)에 따라 구분가능하며, 신고전파와는 달리 공통적으로 경험연구가 방법론에서 중요한 지위를 차지하고 있다. 둘째, 귀납적 논리는 이론의 연역체계와 구별되며 경험연구에 따른 귀납적 논리없이 연역논리만의 정책적 함의 도출은 신고전학파의 연구방법론으로 귀결된다. 셋째, 게임이론과 같은 연역논리체계는 경험연구 결과 귀납적 논리의 내적 타당성을 검증하는 수단이며 그 자체로서 방법론적 차이를 논의하기는 어렵고, 게임의 구성요소에 대한 가정의 현실성 차이가 방법론적 차이를 가져온다. 이런 관점에서 보면 게임이론에서 직접 결론을 도출하는 연구는 신제도주의 방법론 발전과 연구지평확대와는 무관한 것이다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

New institutional Economics(NIE) provide useful tools of analysis for the emergence and change of institutions. It can be applied to the public side transactions as well as to the private transactions. We have examined NIE’s theoretical and methodological development and issues to promote institutional analysis of Korean public institutions and policies. We argued firstly sufficient empirical studies have foremost important position in the methodological perspective. Secondly, the inductive inference is distinct from the deduction in hypothetical theories. Deduction without inductive inference from empirical studies is not different with the neoclassical methodology. Thirdly, Formal deductive logic system, such as game theory, is a test instrument for the logical coherence of inductive hypothesis. Applying formal logic itself is not a touchstone of the methodological position in theories. Detailed hypothetical configuration in games results in methodological difference. In this regard, studies produce directly policy implications from game theoretic analysis, which is deductive formal logic system, degenerate into the neoclassical methodology and hard to contribute to the institutional theory building.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 신제도주의 경제학의 이론적 전개
• Ⅲ. 비교제도 분석이론과 방법
• Ⅳ. 비교제도분석 활성화를 위한 정책학 방법론적 함의
• 【참고문헌】
• ABSTRACT

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