Odd markets in Japanese history : law and economic growth

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• List of tables = xi
• Series editors' Preface = xiii
• Acknowledgments = xv
• INTRODUCTION = 1
• 1 Historical context = 1
• 2 Property rights and Japanese studies = 2
• 3 This project = 3
• 3.1 Coverage = 3
• 3.2 Caveats = 4
• 3.3 Selection criteria = 5
• 4 Law & economics and history = 6
• CHAPTER 1 LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH = 9
• Introduction = 9
• 1 The property rights paradigm = 10
• 2 Law and efficient growth in Japan = 11
• 3 Why relatively efficient law? = 16
• 3.1 General theories = 16
• 3.2 Federalism in Tokugawa Japan = 18
• 3.3 Legal efficiency in imperial Japan = 18
• 4 Conclusion = 22
• CHAPTER 2 PROPERTY: WATER AND LAND = 23
• Introduction = 73
• 1 Public order and private claims = 24
• 2 Water law in imperial Japan = 27
• 2.1 Irrigation = 28
• 2.2 Hot springs = 32
• 2.3 Holdups = 34
• 2.4 The abuse-of-rights doctrine = 36
• 2.5 Ambiguities = 39
• 3 Efficiency in water law = 41
• 4 Conclusion = 42
• CHAPTER 3 EXTERNALITIES: SMOKE AND NOISE = 43
• Introduction = 43
• 1 Law and externalities = 43
• 2 Japanese tort law = 46
• 2.1 Negligence = 46
• 2.2 Strict liability = 49
• 3 Implications = 52
• 4 Conclusion = 53
• CHAPTER 4 MARKETS: CHILDREN = 54
• Introduction = 54
• 1 The contracts = 56
• 1.1 The data = 56
• 1.2 Indentures = 56
• 1.3 Pledges = 58
• 1.4 Sales and adoptions = 60
• 2 Contractual terms = 61
• 2.1 Sales and pledges = 61
• 2.2 Contractual length = 67
• 2.3 Alternatives = 71
• 3 Infants = 73
• 4 Labor markets and family norms = 74
• 5 Conclusion = 78
• CHAPTER 5 AUTONOMY: FAMILY LAW = 80
• Introduction = 80
• 1 Scholars and patriarchy = 81
• 2 The power over residence = 82
• 2.1 The issue = 82
• 2.2 The power to expel = 84
• 2.3 The duty of support = 87
• 2.4 The desire to stay in the family = 88
• 3 The power over marriage = 92
• 4 Primogeniture = 93
• 4.1 Introduction = 93
• 4.2 Family heads = 93
• 4.3 Family members = 94
• 5 The power of husbands = 95
• 5.1 Trial marriages = 95
• 5.2 Asymmetries in divorce = 103
• 6 Conclusion = 107
• CHAPTER 6 PROMISSORY CREDIBILITY: SEX = 109
• Introduction = 109
• 1 Scholars and prostitutes = 110
• 2 The regulation of sex = 117
• 2.1 The decrees = 117
• 2.2 The courts = 118
• 3 The indenture contracts = 120
• 3.1 Geisha indentures = 121
• 3.2 Prostitute indentures = 122
• 3.3 Contractual enforcement = 123
• 3.4 Control and credit = 126
• 3.5 Credible commitments = 130
• 4 Conclusion = 134
• CHAPTER 7 CARTELS: COTTON SPINNING = 135
• Introduction = 135
• 1 The industry = 136
• 2 The cotton cartel = 138
• 2.1 Organization = 138
• 2.2 Leaks = 141
• 2.3 Temporary local gains? = 145
• 3 Cotton logic = 146
• 3.1 Efficiency wages = 147
• 3.2 The evidence of efficiency wages = 153
• 3.3 Cartels as a corporate governance mechanism = 156
• 4 Conclusion = 162
• CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS = 163
• References = 167
• Index = 187