RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
다국어 입력

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      KCI등재

      Audit Opinions and Legal Environments:International Evidence

      한글로보기

      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A106230713

      • 0

        상세조회
      • 0

        다운로드
      서지정보 열기
      • 내보내기
      • 내책장담기
      • 공유하기
      • 오류접수

      부가정보

      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      [Purpose]This study investigates the joint effect of auditor size and legal environments on audit opinion, a proxy for audit quality, in a cross-country setting.
      [Methodology]By using an international sample with 284,374 firm-year observations from 28 countries for the period of 1990-2017, we conduct multiple regression analyses of audit opinion on auditor size and the indexes of legal environments.
      [Findings]We find that both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue non-clean opinions as the investor protection law becomes more strict. We also find that Big 4 auditors provide relatively more conservative audit than non-Big 4 auditors in the treatment of their respective clienteles when moving from weak to strong investor protection countries. Our evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors, in particular, provide higher quality audit in stronger legal environments where threats of litigation are higher. Moreover, result also suggests that strong legal environments need to be established as a necessary or complementary condition for the enhancement of audit quality.
      [Policy Implications]We add new evidence on the joint effect of auditor size and legal environments on audit quality by suggesting that auditor size and legal environments are complementary, rather than substitutive, for the issuance of non-clean audit opinion (i.e. high quality audit). Our findings may provide an important policy implication that accounting regulators need to strengthen investor protection law as the complementary environments, not as a substitutive mechanism, for high quality audit.
      번역하기

      [Purpose]This study investigates the joint effect of auditor size and legal environments on audit opinion, a proxy for audit quality, in a cross-country setting. [Methodology]By using an international sample with 284,374 firm-year observations fr...

      [Purpose]This study investigates the joint effect of auditor size and legal environments on audit opinion, a proxy for audit quality, in a cross-country setting.
      [Methodology]By using an international sample with 284,374 firm-year observations from 28 countries for the period of 1990-2017, we conduct multiple regression analyses of audit opinion on auditor size and the indexes of legal environments.
      [Findings]We find that both Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue non-clean opinions as the investor protection law becomes more strict. We also find that Big 4 auditors provide relatively more conservative audit than non-Big 4 auditors in the treatment of their respective clienteles when moving from weak to strong investor protection countries. Our evidence suggests that Big 4 auditors, in particular, provide higher quality audit in stronger legal environments where threats of litigation are higher. Moreover, result also suggests that strong legal environments need to be established as a necessary or complementary condition for the enhancement of audit quality.
      [Policy Implications]We add new evidence on the joint effect of auditor size and legal environments on audit quality by suggesting that auditor size and legal environments are complementary, rather than substitutive, for the issuance of non-clean audit opinion (i.e. high quality audit). Our findings may provide an important policy implication that accounting regulators need to strengthen investor protection law as the complementary environments, not as a substitutive mechanism, for high quality audit.

      더보기

      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 RAFAEL LA PORTA, "What Works in Securities Laws?" Wiley 61 (61): 1-32, 2006

      2 D. Paul Newman, "The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection" American Accounting Association 80 (80): 289-313, 2005

      3 Dan A. Simunic, "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" JSTOR 18 (18): 161-190, 1980

      4 Jere R. Francis, "The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on Earnings Quality around the World" Wiley 25 (25): 157-191, 2008

      5 Simunic, D. A., "The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit Pricing :A Review of The Economics and the Evidence" 15 (15): 119-134, 1996

      6 DeFond, M. L., "The Geography of Auditor Independence and SEC Enforcement"

      7 CONNIE L. BECKER, "The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management" Wiley 15 (15): 1-24, 1998

      8 Watts, R. L., "Positive Accounting Theory. Contemporary Topics in Accounting Series" Prentice-Hall 1986

      9 Teoh, S. H., "Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient" 68 (68): 346-366, 1993

      10 Ramgopal Venkataraman, "Litigation Risk, Audit Quality, and Audit Fees: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings" American Accounting Association 83 (83): 1315-1345, 2008

      1 RAFAEL LA PORTA, "What Works in Securities Laws?" Wiley 61 (61): 1-32, 2006

      2 D. Paul Newman, "The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection" American Accounting Association 80 (80): 289-313, 2005

      3 Dan A. Simunic, "The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence" JSTOR 18 (18): 161-190, 1980

      4 Jere R. Francis, "The Joint Effect of Investor Protection and Big 4 Audits on Earnings Quality around the World" Wiley 25 (25): 157-191, 2008

      5 Simunic, D. A., "The Impact of Litigation Risk on Audit Pricing :A Review of The Economics and the Evidence" 15 (15): 119-134, 1996

      6 DeFond, M. L., "The Geography of Auditor Independence and SEC Enforcement"

      7 CONNIE L. BECKER, "The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management" Wiley 15 (15): 1-24, 1998

      8 Watts, R. L., "Positive Accounting Theory. Contemporary Topics in Accounting Series" Prentice-Hall 1986

      9 Teoh, S. H., "Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response Coefficient" 68 (68): 346-366, 1993

      10 Ramgopal Venkataraman, "Litigation Risk, Audit Quality, and Audit Fees: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings" American Accounting Association 83 (83): 1315-1345, 2008

      11 Inder K. Khurana, "Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility of Big 4 versus Non‐Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo‐American Countries" American Accounting Association 79 (79): 473-495, 2004

      12 Ole-Kristian Hope, "Impact of Excess Auditor Remuneration on the Cost of Equity Capital around the World" SAGE Publications 24 (24): 177-210, 2009

      13 Edward I. Altman, "FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY" Wiley 23 (23): 589-609, 1968

      14 Petersen, M. A., "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets:Comparing Approaches" 22 (22): 435-480, 2009

      15 Christian Leuz, "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison" Elsevier BV 69 (69): 505-527, 2003

      16 J.Kenneth Reynolds, "Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions" Elsevier BV 30 (30): 375-400, 2000

      17 JOSEPH P. H. FAN, "Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia" Wiley 43 (43): 35-72, 2005

      18 Michel L. Magnan, "Discussion of "Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence"" Wiley 25 (25): 101-108, 2008

      19 Jere R. Francis, "Big 4 Office Size and Audit Quality" American Accounting Association 84 (84): 1521-1552, 2009

      20 Jong-Hag Choi, "Auditors' Governance Functions and Legal Environments: An International Investigation" Wiley 24 (24): 13-46, 2007

      21 Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, "Auditor size and audit quality" Elsevier BV 3 (3): 183-199, 1981

      22 Ole‐Kristian Hope, "Auditor Independence in a Private Firm and Low Litigation Risk Setting" American Accounting Association 85 (85): 573-605, 2010

      23 Clive Lennox, "Audit quality and executive officers’ affiliations with CPA firms" Elsevier BV 39 (39): 201-231, 2005

      24 Jong-Hag Choi, "Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence" Wiley 25 (25): 55-99, 2008

      25 Palmrose, Z. V., "An Analysis of Auditor Litigation and Audit Service Quality" 63 (63): 55-73, 1988

      26 Mark DeFond, "A review of archival auditing research" Elsevier BV 58 (58): 275-326, 2014

      더보기

      동일학술지(권/호) 다른 논문

      분석정보

      View

      상세정보조회

      0

      Usage

      원문다운로드

      0

      대출신청

      0

      복사신청

      0

      EDDS신청

      0

      동일 주제 내 활용도 TOP

      더보기

      주제

      연도별 연구동향

      연도별 활용동향

      연관논문

      연구자 네트워크맵

      공동연구자 (7)

      유사연구자 (20) 활용도상위20명

      인용정보 인용지수 설명보기

      학술지 이력

      학술지 이력
      연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
      2026 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
      2020-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
      2019-11-12 학회명변경 한글명 : 대한회계학회 -> 한국회계정책학회
      영문명 : KOREAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF ACCOUNTING -> Korean Association for Accounting and Policy
      KCI등재
      2018-11-30 학술지명변경 한글명 : 회계연구 -> 회계와 정책연구
      외국어명 : Korean Academic Society of Accounting -> Review of Accounting and Policy Studies
      KCI등재
      2017-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2016-12-01 평가 등재후보로 하락 (계속평가) KCI등재후보
      2012-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
      2009-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
      2008-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
      2007-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 FAIL (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
      2005-01-01 평가 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
      더보기

      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.98 0.98 1.21
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      1.19 1.13 2.034 0.21
      더보기

      이 자료와 함께 이용한 RISS 자료

      나만을 위한 추천자료

      해외이동버튼