Tasan Chŏng’s and Leibniz’s Concept of God Viewed in the Light of Neo-Confucian Tradition

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Leibniz may be regarded as the only major European philosopher who dealt with Chinese philosophy in an appropriate and fundamental manner, i.e. in a philosophical way. Leibniz discusses this problem thoroughly in a long letter addressed to the French nobleman de Remond (Lettre de Mons, Leibniz sur la Philosophie Chinoise àa Mons. de Remond, 1716, in the year 1716.)The possibility of rapprochement between Christianity and Chinese culture depends on the question whether there are basic concepts in which we can recognise the Christian concept of God, so that on this common basis we can conduct a dialogue. A first candidate for such a concept, of course, is lĭ., as a spiritual and immaterial substance.
“The basic principle of the Chinese is called lĭ., which is fundamental reason, on which all nature rests, a reasonable and universal substance. There is nothing greater than lĭ.. This great and universal cause is pure, tranquil, without body and without form and it can only be grasped by reason.” (Lettre 419)“Having considered all this, would one not be obliged to say the Chinese lĭ. is the sovereign substance, which we venerate by the name of God?” (Lettre 423)In opposition to this theory we find those who say that the lĭ. simply means the law of nature and therefore represents a purely materialistic philosophy.
As we know, Buddhism teaches that all phenomena of our world are void, that in this sense they don’t exist. This “destruction” of the phenomenal world constitutes a great difficulty in the reception of Buddhism by the Chinese tradition, and it constitutes the main point of attack in the polemics against Buddhism put forward by the revived Confucianism, from the 10th century onwards.
“When we understand that the Great Emptiness is the same as the visible qìi, we realise that there is no Nothingness.” (Zhang Zai)The lĭ., then, is what lifts the phenomena out of the stream of changes, and also separates them by distinguishing them. When a thing wanes it is abandoned by its lĭ.. For this reason alone the lĭ. is imperishable, it is situated beyond change, it is therefore unchanging, eternal.
“It would seem that the Ether is dependent upon lĭ. for its operation. Thus when there is a condensation of such qìi, lĭ. is also present with it. It is the qìi that has the capacity to condense and thus create, whereas lĭ. lacks volition or plan…” (Zhu Xi)Tasan recognised this problem in all its acuteness and investigated it. The Western concept of God leads him to a revision of the concepts lĭand qì(. Kim writes:“Tasan thus introduces a new idea to the debate. Faced with the alternative of lĭor qì he sides with qì), but he adds that this qìby no means is matter, but, on the contrary, something of utmost spirituality, i.e. the divine, creative force itself, which endows the lĭ)’s with reality.
One could, perhaps, say that Tasan thus successfully proceeds from taking the foundations of classical Chinese philosophy as his basis. In his case, this approach succeeds through mediation by the living, personal God of the Judaic-Christian tradition.” (Kim Shin-ja, Das philosophische Denken von Tasan Chŏg, Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2006, S. 180).

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 Leibniz, "Lettre de Mons. de Leibniz sur la philosophie chinoise à Mons. in: Epistolae ad diversos" Leipzig 1735

2 "Leibniz, Novissima Sinica"

3 E. Husserl, "Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft" Husserliana 1962

4 Kim Shin-ja, "Das philosophische Denken von Tasan Chŏng" Peter Lang Verlag 2006

5 Feng Yu-lan, "A History of Chinese Philosophy" Princeton 1953