Discourse, beliefs and intentions : semantic defaults and propositional attitude ascription

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = xi
• List of Abbreviations and Symbols = xv
• Introduction = xvii
• 1 Semantic Ambiguities and Semantic Underspecification = 1
• 1.1 Ambiguous Discourse? = 2
• 1.2 Highlights from the Ambiguity Debates = 5
• 1.2.1 Logical Form and Propositional Representation = 5
• 1.2.2 Ambiguity Tests = 9
• 1.2.3 Ambiguity of if then? = 11
• 1.2.4 Ambiguity of Negation? = 13
• 1.2.5 Ambiguity of and? = 18
• 1.2.6 Ambiguity of Number Terms? = 20
• 1.2.7 Ambiguity of Definite Noun Phrases? = 23
• 1.2.8 Ambiguity of Indefinite Noun Phrases? = 24
• 1.2.9 Ambiguity of Propositional Attitude Sentences? = 26
• 1.2.10 Interim Conclusions = 26
• 1.3 What Is Said = 27
• 1.4 Towards Delimiting Implicatures = 37
• 1.4.1 Neo-Griceans and Ineradicable Conventions = 37
• 1.4.2 Relevance Theory and Frames = 42
• 1.5 Conclusions = 44
• 2 Semantic Defaults = 47
• 2.1 Setting the Scene = 48
• 2.2 Intentions in Communication = 49
• 2.3 The Primary Intention Principle and Definite Descriptions = 51
• 2.4 The Principle of the Parsimony of Levels = 56
• 2.5 Default Semantics? = 58
• 2.5.1 Default Reasoning = 58
• 2.5.2 Defeasible Knowledge = 60
• 2.5.3 Defaults for Definite Descriptions : Interaction of Intentions = 62
• 2.5.4 Defaults for Indefinite Descriptions = 65
• 2.6 Other Applications = 66
• 2.6.1 On Semantic Representation and Negation Again = 66
• 2.6.2 And, or, and if = 67
• 2.6.3 Number Terms = 68
• 2.7 Defaults in Dynamic Semantics = 70
• 2.8 Interim Conclusions = 75
• 2.9 The Doubly-Dynamic Approach : Assumption Recovery or Creation? = 76
• 2.10 Conclusions = 85
• 3 Intentionality and Propositional Attitudes = 87
• 3.1 'Directedness' of Acts of Consciousness : The Phenomenological Tradition = 88
• 3.2 Intentional Relation and Defaults = 92
• 3.3 Intentionality and Voluntariness = 94
• 3.4 Intentions and Intentionality = 96
• 3.5 De Re, De Dicto, and the Horizons = 99
• 3.6 Speech Acts : Double Level of Intentionality? = 104
• 3.7 Are Intentions in the Head? = 111
• 3.8 Intentionality and Ambiguity : Concluding Remarks = 119
• 4 The Default De Re Principle = 121
• 4.1 Propositional Attitudes : A Close-Up = 122
• 4.1.1 Propositional Attitudes, Attitude Sentences, and Attitude Reports = 122
• 4.1.2 The 'Ortcutt Puzzle' and Its Interpretations = 124
• 4.1.3 Factives and Non-Factives = 130
• 4.1.4 The Object of Belief = 131
• 4.1.5 Defaults for Belief Reports or Defaults for Referring Expressions? = 133
• 4.1.6 Varieties of De Re and De Dicto = 135
• 4.1.7 Substitutivity? = 137
• 4.2 Whose Meaning? On Sense and Mode of Presentation = 142
• 4.2.1 In Defence of Speaker-Dependent Senses = 142
• 4.2.2 Types of Modes of Presentation and Default Semantics = 147
• 4.2.3 The Persistence of Sense = 158
• 4.2.4 Sense-Based Semantics? = 161
• 4.3 De Re, De Dictol, and De Dicto Proper = 166
• 4.4 Red Giants and White Dwarfs : Context-Dependence of Attitude Ascription = 176
• 4.5 Default De Re = 183
• 4.6 Interim Conclusions = 192
• 4.7 Loose Ends : Context and Presupposition Projection = 194
• 5 The Lexicon and the Power of Referring = 203
• 5.1 An Overview = 204
• 5.2 Redefining Referring Expressions = 205
• 5.3 Proper Names and Modes of Presentation = 211
• 5.4 Degrees of Referring : A Unified Approach = 215
• 5.5 Referring by Indexicals = 216
• 5.6 Referent Accessibility and the Strength of Referring = 223
• 5.6.1 The Givenness Hierarchy = 223
• 5.6.2 Accessibility Theory = 227
• 5.6.3 Classification and Explanation = 230
• 5.6.4 Intentions Again = 232
• 5.7 Conclusions = 234
• 6 Vehicles of Thought in Attitude Ascription = 237
• 6.1 Thoughts and Acts of Thought = 238
• 6.2 Vehicles of Thought = 244
• 6.3 Vehicles and Attitudes = 249
• 6.3.1 Beyond Language = 249
• 6.3.2 Language : The First Vehicle and the Identification of the Referent = 251
• 6.3.3 Concepts and the First Vehicle = 256
• 6.3.4 Mental Images : The Second Vehicle = 262
• 6.3.5 Actions : The Third Vehicle = 267
• 6.4 Default Interpretations = 271
• 6.5 The Core of Meaning = 272
• 6.6 Summary = 274
• 7 Discourse Representation Theory and Propositional Attitudes = 277
• 7.1 Semantics and Pragmatics Revisited = 278
• 7.2 Context = 280
• 7.3 Belief Expressions and Belief Reports in DRT = 284
• 7.4 DRT and Intentions = 296
• 7.5 Concluding Remarks = 298
• 8 Belief Reports in a Contrastive Perspective = 301
• 8.1 Belief, Culture, and Translation = 302
• 8.2 Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics = 306
• 8.3 Context and Markedness = 310
• 8.4 Complementizer That in Contrast = 306
• 8.4.1 English and Polish : A Surface Overview = 311
• 8.4.2 Degree of Clausiness = 311
• 8.4.3 A Lambda-Categorial Language and Sensitivity to Structure = 320
• 8.4.4 The Application : Defaults and Clausiness = 324
• 8.5 Final Remarks : What Languages Reveal and Hide = 332
• 9 D$$\acute e$$nouement : Double Occam's Razor = 335
• 9.1 The Semantics of Common Sense = 336
• 9.2 Beyond Propositional Attitudes = 337
• 9.3 Final Remarks = 338
• Bibliography = 341
• Index = 357