독도에 대한 실효적 지배 유지방안 : 군사적 충돌 방지와 해양군사력 우위 확보 = An effective control maintenance method about Dokdo

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Size of Dokdo is very small, but it receives national love and interest as much as it is called "pride of Korean people".
However, Korean dominium of Dokdo is not recognized unfortunately because San Francisco Treaty of Peace that Victory countries of the World War Two agreed with Japan in 1951 included unclear conclusion, so both Korea and Japan assert dominium respectively.
However, Korea with weak national power secures superiority in a dominium dispute of Dokdo because Korea directly maintains 'effective government' of Dokdo.
However, it can not be guaranteed about until when emotional superiority based on the 'effective government' continues safely.
Nonetheless, although a lot of research about a method securing dominium of Dokdo is performed, research for maintaining the 'effective government' as premise conditions is insufficient.
Thus, military factor as the realest element of conditions for maintaining the 'effective government' of Dokdo was analyzed and a method about it was suggested.
For this purpose, after historical justice capable of asserting dominium of Dokdo was examined, foreign examples about islands territory disputes was analyzed.
"Falkland war" occurred between England and Argentina, and "Paracel sea war' occurred between China and South Vietnam as examples of military collision were investigated. A 'Sengaku chain of islands' dispute occurred between China and Japan as an example of non-military collision was investigated.
As a result of analysis of each example, a conclusion that military force balance between dispute countries concerned should be not seriously collapsed was induced to prevent military collision.
Therefore, in-depth research about marine military force of Japan as an dispute opponent was progressed, and duty and military power of the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces was analyzed as a result. Contents of large reorganization of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces executed in March 2008 are reviewed in detail, and then a conclusion that the Korea Navy and Air Force should build some extent of military force to prevent military collision in Dokdo sea area were deduced.
The result is direct establishment of 'moving fleets' of the Korea Navy. The moving fleets are consisted of three moving military units, and military force are consisted of 6 KDX-3 Aegis Destroyers and 12 KDX-2 Destroyers.
A total of 9 Destroyers including 3 KDX-3 Aegis Destroyers and 6 KDX-2 Destroyers are more necessary than that of a present plan of the Korea Navy, so a total of 6 thousand billion budget are roughly needed in prices of 2008 year for this. However, there is a burden to get the budget by the Navy itself because the Navy cannot use the budget of the Army or the Air force realistically.
This writer deduced a conclusion that the Navy itself can complete the moving fleets sufficiently by readjustment of 'FFX project' with a total of 6 trillion budget that the Navy plans. Therefore, it was viewed that the Navy can secure a restraint for preventing military collision against Japan in all East Sea area including Dokdo, as well as maintain superiority of the Navy force in a sea area near the Korean peninsula against Japan.
Many people has vaguely thought that maritime force of Japan based on overwhelming economic force would be significantly in a higher level than that of our country, and they expected that the gap could be never narrowed.
However, it is viewed that people don't analyze the theory deeply and believe it because someone tells like that. Now, I wish many people believe that our country could narrow the gap of the Navy force against Japan as well as secure superiority of the Navy force against Japan.
The dominium of Dokdo is not just given, and diplomatic efforts should be run parallel while our country maintains the 'effective government' of Dokdo. If the Korea Navy secures superiority of the Navy force in East Sea area by building the moving fleets through readjustment of the FFX project, the dominium of Dokdo will be secured more realistically.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 1
• Ⅱ. 독도 영유권 분쟁 3
• 제1절. 독도 영유권 분쟁 개관 3
• 1. 실효적 지배의 국제법적 요소 3
• 2. 독도의 역사 5
• 3. 일본의 독도침탈 시작 7
• 제2절. 한·일 간 군사적 충돌 없었던 요인 11
• 1. 경제적 요인 11
• 2. 군사·외교적 요인 13
• Ⅲ. 도서 영토분쟁에 대한 해외사례 15
• 제1절. 포클랜드 전쟁 15
• 1. 전쟁의 배경 15
• 2. 전쟁개요 17
• 3. 전쟁결과 18
• 4. 분석 19
• 제2절. 파라셀해전 20
• 1. 분쟁의 배경 20
• 2. 해전의 개요 23
• 3. 분석 25
• 제3절. 센카쿠열도 분쟁 27
• 1. 분쟁의 배경 27
• 2. 분쟁의 개요 28
• 3. 분석 29
• 제4절. 해외사례의 교훈 31
• Ⅳ. 한·일 간의 해양 군사력과 대응방안 35
• 제1절. 일본 해양군사력 36
• 1. 일본 방위정책의 기본원칙과 변화 36
• 2. 해상자위대의 임무 41
• 3. 해상자위대 主戰力 分析 43
• 4. 해상자위대 2008年 大改編 48
• 5. 해상자위대 항공전력과 항공자위대의 해상전력 53
• 6. 독도에 영향을 미칠 일본 해양군사력 총평 56
• 제2절. 한국 해양군사력 57
• 1. 한국해군의 개요 57
• 2. 한국해군 전력 분석 60
• 3. 한국해군의 항공전력과 공군의 해상전력 62
• 4. 한국군 해양군사력 총평 65
• 제3절. 무력분쟁 억제력과 해양군사력 우위 확보 방안 68
• 1. 기동함대의 건설 68
• 2. FFX사업의 예산을 전용 71
• Ⅴ. 결론 74
• 참고문헌 78
• Abstract 81