The establishment of village self-governments in China, far from terminating the party-states domination of rural villages, resulted in the development of the Xiangzhengcunzhi system that can be characterized by asymmetric possession of institutional ...
The establishment of village self-governments in China, far from terminating the party-states domination of rural villages, resulted in the development of the Xiangzhengcunzhi system that can be characterized by asymmetric possession of institutional resources between villagers' committee and township government. Under the system, the villagers' committee is compelled to implement "official affairs" (zhengwu) as well as "self-administration affairs"(cunwu) at the same time. Villagers' committee, however, hardly possess effective institutional resources to refute or rectify irrational official affairs imposed upon them by township government. On the other hand, township government, through utilization of various means, can compel villagers' committee to act as their agents. The role and limits of villagers' committee, which can be characterized as possessing limited autonomy vis-a`-vis state authority, are clearly illuminated in the process of resolving the problem of excessive peasants' burden. Whereas village self-governance showed sufficient capacity in resolving "internal peasants' burden"(neifaxing fudan) which originated from villages themselves, it hardly played any role in resolving "external peasants' burden"(waifaxing fudan) which have been forcefully imposed on villagers from superior state organs, including township governments. Through the examination of the process of solving the problems of peasants' burden, this paper aims to illuminate the role and limits of villagers' committee under Xiangzhengcunzhi system, and highlight the dualistic role of villagers' committee which stems from the asymmetric possession of institutional resources. For this purpose, field research and secondary data have been utilized.