The final purpose of this study was to prevent conflicts caused by brokerage commission occurring due to the problems existing in the real estate brokerage commission system in advance, and establish a healthy order of real estate trading. Accordingly...
The final purpose of this study was to prevent conflicts caused by brokerage commission occurring due to the problems existing in the real estate brokerage commission system in advance, and establish a healthy order of real estate trading. Accordingly, it considered its background to suggest a reformation possible to be materialized through an objective, fair research, and confirmed the fact relevance of problem in the system by analyzing regulations regarding the present brokage commission system and surveying cases, precedents, documents, etc, in relation with brokerage commission being practiced in the actual site of real estate brokerage, and derived main problems in the real estate brokerage commission system by looking over government's answer and authoritative interpretation for questions, etc.
Most researchers claim the large increase of commission is necessary to solve the financial difficulties of real estate realtors. However, clients want to cut down it, saying that it is too high, sometime, realtors confess that they can not take commissions properly in reality.
But in the objective view, the financial difficulties of real estate realtor is mainly caused by excessive competitions, that so many crowed realtors carry out regardless of the principles of demand and supply and trading decreases and they can not take even present commission properly as the result, not by the low commission rate. A systemic mechanism is necessary to correct it.
Practically, with the trading value of rental with monthly rent, as its calculation method was dramatically changed in the 9th revision of 「Real estate brokage Act」in 2009 and it could make a balance with lease rental, in case of rental, it is a predominant view that realtors can manage business certainly, if the numbers of trading are secured properly.
Thus this study made efforts to ease the cause of conflict and achieve efficiency by suggesting a feasible, detail reformation within the range of present commission rate without people's resistance instead of focusing on the increase of commission rate to improve the system.
First, though detail contents regarding the brokerage commission of housing were delegated to be decided by the regulations of each local province and city to differentiate it for practicing a rate suitable for the characteristic of each provinces, each provincial regulation followed the rate fixed by the regulations of the Seoul Metropolis as it was, thus the intention of the delegation became absurd, and , the regulations are only creating confusion in the application as the work scope of real estate realtor reached whole territories. Accordingly, it is necessary to cancel the regulation delegating the brokage commission system to each province and to apply a same rate nationwide by the order of MLTM like the case of other trading besides housing. Second, the multi-level regressive rate system of present brokage commission needs to be changed to a fixed single rate by field for the purpose of achieving the effect to correct the maximum limit that has not been obeyed because of so many causes of conflict and submerge the conflict of right and wrong regarding fairness. Additionally, in case of high grade housings and other things except for housings, it is necessary to set up a minimum rate within the right of agreement to make commission agreed with ease. This reformation suggested to decrease the price grade to 2 grades from 4 grades for the sales, exchange and rental of housing, in case of less than 600 million won in sales and exchange, apply 0.5%, a fixed rate, for unification ( adopt the medium rate between 0.4 ~ 0.6% at present 3 grades), in case of more than 600 million won, make mutual agreement between both parties reached with ease within the range between 0.5~0.9% by fixing Maginot line, 0.5% of minimum rate, in consideration of the difficulty of commission negotiation created by the conditions that the maximum rate was 0.9% and there was no the minimum rate to be applied within the right of agreement so far. .
In addition, in case of housing rental, etc, this reformation suggested to decrease present 4 grades based on trading price to 2 grades, and apply 0.4%, a fixed rate, for less than 300 million won for unification, and set up 0.4%, the minimum rate, within the right of agreement to make an agreement between both parties reached with ease between 0.4 ~ 0.8% for more than 300million won though it had been primary designed to be decided by an agreement within 0.8%, the present maximum rate.
In case of other things except for housings, this reformation suggested to set up 0.5%, that might be the minimum level probably agreed in actual trading, to make brokage commission reach an agreement within 0.5 ~ 0.9% to narrow the range of regulation, though it had been primary designed to be decided by an agreement within 0.9%.
In addition, in case of housing rental with monthly rent, this reformation did not allow exceptional regulations at the time of low price calculation in trading price because the commission rate for a low price grade became too low
Third, though the demand of short term rental was increasing to stay only for a few months during election times, etc, there were some causes of conflict because a separate regulation for legal commission rate was not set yet , and the problem that who should pay brokage commission between lessee and lessor at the time of terminating a rental contract within the rental period occurred. In this case, this reformation suggested a concrete method calculating the level of commission in consideration of remaining months from 1 year, the standard rental period, defined that 1/2 of brokage commission should be paid at the time of making a contract based on total commission amount and remaining 1/2 at the time of paying the balance, and replaced 1/2 of amount paid at the time of making contract to commission to prevent conflicts, when the contract was terminated without responsibility of realtor.
Fourth, as it was unclear that added value tax was included in trading amount at the time to calculate brokage commission and whether realtors could take added value tax additionally except for commission, tax offices performed unfavorable actions to poor lessees in the manner to reject to grant a fixed date by including added value tax to commission, etc, because precedents and the interpretation of the Ministry of Law were different each other. Accordingly, as added value tax should not be included in commission and trading price, it was necessary to define it in law to prevent conflicts.
Fifth, as there was no regulation compensating the premium of shopping mall, conflicts occurred frequently from this problem. In general, the brokerage commission of premium paid to relators from an assigner was 3-10% out of premium amount in reality. This reformation made the assigner of shop and realtor decide the premium within this range, and defined that realtors could take the premium by applying the legal commission rate based on the amount obtained by adding rental amount and premium in consideration of the dual burdens of transferee to pay premium and make a rental contract at the same time to solve problems fairly.
Sixth, though the regulation to prohibit realtors from doing the sales of real estate as their main business might be preserved, such regulations, restrictedly allowing realtors to deal with clients directly only for actual demand and defining that realtors can not take commission from clients when they deal with clients directly, are expected to promote mutual interest and contribute to revitalize real estate trading.
We hope that commission conflict can be minimized and the healthy order of real estate trading may be established through the above solutions for various problems in the brokerage commission system.