Modality and meaning

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = xiii
• Acknowledgements = xiii
• Sources and Abstracts = xv
• PARTⅠ MODALITY
• Chapter 1. The Trouble with Possible Worlds. = 3
• 1. Meinong vs. the Forces of Decency = 4
• 2. The Theoretical Status of Nonexistents = 6
• 3. The Real Problem = 10
• 4. Continuing Hostilities = 11
• 5. Approaches to Possibility = 14
• 6. The Meinongian Quantifier as Nonobjectual = 16
• Chapter 2. Three Conceptions of Possible Worlds. = 25
• 1. A Thumbnail History = 25
• 2. Lewis' Reversal = 27
• 3. The Independence of the Indexicality Thesis = 30
• 4. Lashed to the Masts = 34
• 5. Lewis' Argument Against Impossibilia = 39
• Chapter 3. Ersatzing for Fun and Profit. = 45
• 1. Potential World-Surrogates = 45
• 2. Combinatorialism = 47
• 3. Problems for Combinatorialism = 48
• 4. Tractarian Combinatorialism = 55
• 5. Prognosis = 58
• Chapter 4. Against Concretism. = 73
• 1. Understanding, or Not Understanding, Relentless Meinongianism = 73
• 2. Some Disadvantages of Relentless Meinongianism = 75
• 3. Mature Lewis' Modal Realism = 80
• 4. Three Further Objections to Mature Lewis = 83
• 5. Lewis Against Us Ersatzers = 87
• 6. Summing Up = 90
• Chapter 5. Essences. = 95
• 1. The Case for Haecceitism = 95
• 2. A Visit with Quine = 99
• Chapter 6. Fiction and Essence. = 109
• 1. The Conservative Line = 109
• 2. Opening Defense of the Conservative Position = 110
• 3. McMichael's Issue = 113
• 4. The Modal Properties of Fictional Individuals = 115
• 5. McMichael's Argument = 117
• 6. More on Behalf of the Conservative Position = 118
• 7. Yes, Haecceities for Nonactuals = 120
• 8. Two Further Options = 123
• 9. Geach's Puzzle about Intentional Identity = 124
• 10. Edelberg's Asymmetrical Cases = 127
• Chapter 7. The Paradox of Naming Resolved by a Kinder, Gentler Theory of Direct Reference. = 135
• 1. The Paradox and the Possibilities = 136
• 2. Plantinga's Compromise = 139
• 3. The Plantinga Problem Generalized = 140
• 4. A Paratactic Approach to Attitude Contexts = 142
• 5. A Two-Scheme Theory = 145
• 6. Abbreviation and the Spot-Check Test = 149
• 7. Direct Reference = 150
• 8. Frege's Puzzle = 152
• 9. Empty names = 156
• Chapter 8. Relative Modality = 171
• 1. Modalities in Natural Language = 172
• 2. Immediate Philosophical Returns = 178
• 3. Moral Psychology = 185
• PARTⅡ MEANING
• Chapter 9. Semantic Competence, Funny Functors, and Truth-Conditions. = 203
• 1. Logical Space = 204
• 2. Frege's Horizontal = 207
• 3. Substitutional Quantification = 211
• 4. What Is Semantical Muteness? = 217
• 5. A New Counterexample = 218
• 6. Grades of Understanding = 221
• 7. Indexicals = 223
• Chapter 10. Logical Constants and the Glory of Truth-Conditional Semantics. = 233
• 1. Davidson's Wonderful Project = 233
• 2. "Meaning Postulates" = 235
• 3. "Logical Constants" = 237
• 4. The Underlying Magnitude = 241
• 5. Meaning Postulates Reinstated = 243
• 6. The Damage = 244
• 7. Denouement = 245
• Chapter 11. Propositions and Analyticity. = 249
• 1. Quine Against Analyticity = 250
• 2. The First Unpromising Account = 251
• 3. The Second Unpromising Account = 254
• 4. Truth by Convention = 256
• Chapter 12. Stipulative Definition and Logical Truth. = 263
• 1. Stipulative Definition = 263
• 2. The Objections = 264
• 3. The Ann Arbor Defense = 273
• 4. And so what? = 279
• Chapter 13. Analogy and Lexical Semantics. = 283
• 1. Polydemy = 285
• 2. Ross' Apparatus = 288
• 3. Metaphor = 291
• 4. Two Criticisms = 294
• 5. Repercussions and Alleged Repercussions = 298
• BIBLIOGRAPHY = 305
• NAME INDEX = 327
• SUBJECT INDEX = 333