투-레벨 게임의 대안으로서의 투-페이스 게임의 모색

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Since Putnam suggested the theory of two-level games, many analysts have tried to apply the theory to international negotiations, proving that his conjecture was right. Though Putnam's two-level game theory is not a totally new one, it has attracted the attention of many scholars. As it has been proved, however, Putnam's theory has some weak points. In view of these, this article aims to reconsider Putnam's conjecture by questioning some features of the theory to expand its reliability and adaptability to the international negotiations. In doing so, this article replaces Putnam's two-level with the two-face; internal face and external face. It is because that two-level has some limits in explaining simultaneous interaction of negotiations among many actors with regard to settling the negotiation level. This article also suggests some negotiation strategies which can be derived from the two-face game. To conclude, the two-face game analysis can provide a more proper analytical framework in dealing with the simultaneous interactions of negotiations among many actors.