北韓의 對中·蘇 外交關係 : 韓半島에서 戰爭抑止 機能 中心으로 = Diplomatic relation of North Korea for the China and the Soviet union : deterrent function of war in Korean Peninsula

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

With the thawing current of international policies, the issue of the Korean peninsula is facing a strong signs of change.
The diplomatic challenge of North Korea aiming at ultimate communization of the whole of Korean peninsula should neither be overestimated nor underestimated.
It is our duty to look into the real pictures of North Korea's diplomatic fictitiousness and to take proper measures for materialization of advanced unification of our fatherland on the principle of national legitimacy.
Viewed from the recent development of relations amongst the Northern Triples.
1. Sino-Soviet rivalry will continue its extreme confrontation.
2. While the relation between North Korea and the Soviet Union will disclose outward conflict.
3. The relation between North Korea and china will show close adherences within and without.
Such development of relations are created by the confrontation and mutual exchanges of the Northern Triples. For the present, "Detente" forms the keynote of their diplomatic policies toward the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea takes tactful advantage of Sino-Soviet rivalry in order to receive military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union and to secure the just cause from China that supported the view that Korean issue should be solved as an inside-the-nation problem on the premise of the withdrawal of american forces from Korea.
North Korea is now stepping up the potentials of armed capabilities and policy-making to carry out self-propeled military provocations.
Soviet Union is expected to focus its energy on seizing the opportunity for advancing toward Asia and intervening regional conflicts in this area at the backdrop of substantial military strength.
It is well illustrated by the communization process of Indochina peninsula in April 1975.
In case of Korean peninsula, it is possible that the Soviet Union try to increase its influence by appearing on the stage as a coordinator of disputes it bring out as part of containment policy against China.
In future, the Soviet Union's policy toward Korean peninsula is expected.
1. to check the pro-chinese tendencies of North Korea and control the predominance of Japan and the U.S.A. and to make positive efforts in securing the peninsula as a strategically advanced base for encirclement of China as well as for the advancement toward the Asia-pacific area.
2. to maintain a series of appearsement attitude towards the Republic of Korea and to show elasticity to the balance of power politics adopted by the superpowers concerned.
The Soviet Union will exert itself to assist North Korea's foreign policy to much greater extent than China with the expansion of influence on the background of military and economic aid, but will not likely to take positive attitude on the simultaneous admission of two Koreas in U.N. China will adopt only verbal slogan of hostilities until it is equipped with sufficient potentials. It has to admit the U.S. influence in Asia to restrian the Soviet expansion.
In future, China's policy toward the Korean peninsula is summed up as follows:
1. China will permit the U.S. presence in Korea for the time being it will try to restrain Soviet advance into the peninsula and control the Japanese involvement in the same region.
2. Taking consideration of its relation with North Korea, China continues to give the cold shoulder to the Republic of Korea but the possibility of turning favorable to the Republic of Korea cannot be neglected in view of normalization of Sino-american relations.
3. China will strengthen the role of supporters for North Korea with the increased diplomatic assistance as well as the political, economic and military aid.
It is highly probably that North Korea's policy nowaday should be concentrated on the establishment of self-reliant or neutral posture for its own survival in knotty circumstances that U.S.A. Japan and China cooperate jointly under the coimnon target for restraint of the Soviet expansionism.
Furthermore, North Korea has now another burden of driving the second 7 year economic program.
Under these circumstances, North Korea's foreign policy would be developed following next line.
1. To receive economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union with the maintenance of pro-Soviet tendency.
2. To improve relations with the U.S.A. and Japan. It is somewhat favorable from the Chinese view point.
3. To maintain neutrality and secure the competitive assistance from the two communist superpowers.
North Korea would Choose to follow the third line to get out of the suppression of the two major communist nations, coupled with the Chinese-West rapprochement that pursues the progmatic line.
North Korea's doctrinist political system, including deifica tion of Kirn Il-sung is now facing serious challenges even within the communist blocs.
In terms of Korean view, which is more favorable for us to maintain peace on the peninsula, pro-Soviet or pro-chinese tendency of North Korea?
Which is the better function for deterring war on our divided country?
As long as the protective relations between China and the West continues, pro-chinese policy of North Korea would be more favorable for us to keep the peace.
As China cannot provide assistance as the Soviet Union, it would make up the shortage of aid with the third device referred above, the open door policy toward the U.S.A. and the Western nations.
In North Korea would be induced to the tables of negotiation with the Western nations following the Chinese recommendation, the realization of the Overtures proposed by president Chun of the Republic of Korea will be possible.
And if it would be so, the tension would be greatly eased, and the danger of localized Warfare between the divided halves would be eliminated.
On the other hand, if North Korea choose pro-Soviet tendency, the tensions on the peninsula are seriously deteriorated.
For soviet strategy in the 1980s aims at establishing comparative military superiority by means of emphasizing strategic and increasing military expenditures. Another Soviet Strategy set the goal of the settlement of the positive showdown postures to all the enemy nations violating soviet national interests.
Diplomatically, the Soviet Union will pursue wider and more flexible strategy putting stress on the settlement of bilateral or multilateral treaties.
In economic aspects, the Soviet Union tries to infiltrate into Asia with various political tricks including what they call "expanded assistance strategy."
For this end, it also takes direct military actions as far as circumstances permit, as well as indirect armed support.
Under these conditions, Soviet military and economic aid for North Korea will continuously increase on the basis of Soviet Infiltration stratgy.
Instigated by the tough stance of Soviet Union, North Korea would not hesitate to attempt another military venture whenever it deems the opportunity ripe.
On the other hand, China will not sit idly watching North Korea turning back on China and coming under the Soviet rule.
If the Sino-Soviet dispute finally be rushed up to mutual armed clash it would never be helpful for the Korean situation.
From our point of view, we hope North Korea, in the midst of Sino-Soviet disputes and rivalry, to adopt open door policy toward the West discarding excessive pro-soviet tendency and to improve the relations with America and Japan.
Only these peaceful circumstances surrounding Korean peninsula will guarantee the stabilization of the Korean situation and the maintenance of peace in the Far-East Asia region.
The realization of peaceful unification of our fatherland grounded on national legitimacy is the only one way that provides us all Koreans with the opportunity to deter the fratricidal war on this peninsula and to enjoy eternal peace and prosperity.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 目次
• Ⅰ. 問題 提起 = 1
• Ⅱ. 北韓의 對中蘇外交關係의 歷史的 背景 = 9
• 1. 北韓의 對中蘇外交關係 = 9
• 2. 北韓의 對中蘇外交關係의 變遷 = 14
• Ⅲ. 北韓의 中蘇關係와 中蘇의 對韓半島政策 展開 = 28
• 1. 北韓·蘇聯關係와 蘇聯의 對韓半島 政策 = 28
• 2. 北韓·中共關係와 中共의 對韓半島 政策 = 36
• Ⅳ. 中蘇對立과 北韓의 對中蘇關係 = 42
• 1. 北韓의 中蘇 三角關係의 性格 = 42
• 2. 中蘇對立과 北韓의 自主路線 = 48
• 3. 中蘇對立과 韓半島에서의 戰爭 抑止機能 = 54
• Ⅴ. 結論 = 65
• SUMMARY = 72
• 참고문헌 = 80