의식에 대한 1인칭과 3인칭 접근법의 융합 가능성 = On the Possibility of Convergence in the First-Person and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Normally consciousness indicates waking, attentive mental states. In order to pin down the nature of consciousness, there have been two distinct methods. In the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, those two are respectively called “the first-person method” and “the third-person method.” According to Francisco Varela, phenomenological descriptive method represents the former, whereas brain science or neuroscience stands for the latter. It is noticeable that some scholars have recently proposed that those two approaches, in order for them to become a more proper study of consciousness, need to be somehow integrated. In this regard Varela puts forward the idea that the first-person and the third-person methods in consciousness studies should be combined or converged, in a way that can fulfill the condition of mutual constraints between the two methods. We can acknowledge and accept Varela’s view. But Varela’s specific claim that the way in which those two methods are integrated should be “mutual constraints” or “mutual determination” is so strong that it seems to be, rather, implausible. Concerning this matter, the author of the paper argues that the way in which convergence between the first-person and the third-person approaches to consciousness is made, particularly considering the current aspects of the developments of philosophy and sciences, should be “mutual dialogue” or “mutual growth.”

참고문헌 (Reference)

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