조선 명종대 을묘왜변에 관한 군과 정부의 대응

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Perpetually invading the coastal regions and harming people as well as stealing properties, the Japanese invaders were considered as the main enemy to the national defense policy of Joseon. Accordingly, Joseon used the lord of Tsushima in order to subdue the invaders. However, as the Japanese invaders consisted of pirates of different nationalities, the Tsushima lord did not have absolute power or authority over them. Nevertheless, Joseon maintained a hard-line policy instead of developing more sophisticated policy based on thorough analysis of the likelihood of invasion and preparing measures against different groups.
As a result, with rigorous preparation including selection of landing site in advance, the Japanese invaders carried out Eulmyo Invasion. They used a deceptive tactic in order to induce minimal army from Joseon and secured a dominant position. Also, by dominating a major site as their foothold, they blocked assistance from other regions and destroyed the Joseon army including the regional commander during battle. This not only caused mayhem in the command system but also demoralized Joseon army.
However, despite the disadvantageous situation, the commanders in Jeollado provided soldiers based on the regional defense system, and strove to limit the invasion by the Japanese. Particularly, the Yeongamseong battle, which marked a watershed in the invasion, demonstrated the rational response of the commanders who succeeded in preventing the Japanese invaders from expanding their domain. Later, the regional commanders were recognized for their achievement by being granted honor.
Meanwhile, during Eulmyo Invasion, the central government failed to operate effectively. Especially, it did not provide adequate military force and supplies, causing difficulties to the regional army. Furthermore, during the invasion, the central government officials of Joseon failed to take practical measures and only used the invasion as a pretext to expand their political authority. Therefore, it is necessary to reevaluate Eulmyo Invasion based on the efficient response provided in the battle, as opposed to unsuccessful diplomatic policy and strategically inadequate measures provided by the central government.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 1. 머리말
• 2. 조선의 對倭政策과 왜구의 전란 계획
• 3. 을묘왜변의 발발과 전투현장의 군사적 분석
• 4. 을묘왜변에 대한 중앙정부의 판단과 조치
• 5. 맺음말
• ABSTRACT

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