건전성 규제가 기업 가치에 미치는 영향 = 상장폐지요건을 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper investigates the influence of exchange imposed soundness regulations on the value of the firm. The stronger soundness regulation of the exchange will send a positive signal to the market participants and make the firm value of its listed companies increase. Korea gives us an excellent opportunity to test this argument without any confounding effects caused by the difference in political, economic, social, and cultural background arising when comparing different countries. Two exchanges in Korea, the Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) and the Kosdaq, has competitively strengthened their delisting criteria over the sample period of 1997-2005. We split the whole period into three subperiods. Before 2000 the KSE’s delisting criteria were stronger than the Kosdaq’s and during 2000-2002 the Kosdaq’s criteria were stronger than the KSE’s. And the difference of delisting criteria between the two markets has gradually disappeared afterwards. The stronger delisting requirements would have a positive influence on firm value, since they make firms endeavor to comply with stronger codes and send a positive signal to the market. Then the above mentioned delisting rule change will cause a corresponding change in the firm value of the companies listed in those exchanges. We expect that the Kosdaq firms would on average have a lower firm value than the KSE firms before 2000 and a higher firm value during 2000-2002. And the difference in firm value between the two markets is expected to disappear after 2003. Our empirical results show that Tobin’s Q values are higher at the exchange with stricter delisting requirements. In the beginning, the KSE firms had higher Tobin’s Q; in the middle, the Kosdaq firms showed higher Tobin’s Q; and there were no difference in the Tobin’s Q during the last subperiod. The results are obtained after controlling for the factors that can potentially affect the value of the firm. Therefore, we can conclude that the stronger soundness regulations lead to an additional improvement of firm value. An additional hypothesis is that those firms which issued depository receipts in the foreign exchanges will have a higher firm value. Foreign markets impose a stronger soundness regulation than Korean markets. Firms with relatively better corporate governance system in place may have an incentive to list in the foreign markets or issue depository receipts in order to increase the firm value. The value of the firm will increase by sending a positive signal to investors when firms substitute a weak domestic regulation on investor protection with a strong foreign exchange rules. The results show that firms issuing depository receipts have a higher Tobin’s Q consistent with the above argument.