북한 SLBM 지휘통제 분석 및 대응전략 연구: 지휘통제 무력화 방안을 중심으로 = A Study on North Korea's SLBM Command and Control System and Response Strategy: Focusing on Command and Control Neutralization Measures

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구에서는 지속적으로 발전해나가는 북한 SLBM에 대한 대응전략을 도출하기 위해 북한 SLBM이 실제로 운용되는 과정인 지휘통제에 대한 분석을 실시하였다. 핵전력 지휘통제와 관련한 이론적 틀과 북한의 정치체제를 고려하였을 때, 북한 핵전력은 김정은 1인에게 권한이 집중되는 독단적 지휘체계로 운용되며, SLBM 또한 독단적 지휘체계의 적용을 받을 것으로 분석하였다. 그러나 SLBM의 지휘통제는 잠수함 지휘통제의 특성과 맞물려, 은밀성 극대화를 위해 실시간 통신이 제한되는 등 잠수함이라는 플랫폼의 특수성에 따라 매우 특정한 상황에 한정하여 권한을 위임받을 수 있다고 보았다. 이러한 맥락에서 본 연구는 효과적인 북한 SLBM 대응을 위해 잠수함이라는 플랫폼에 대응하는 대잠전을 수행함과 동시에, 장시간이 소요되는 과정에서 잠수함이 SLBM 발사명령을 수신할 수 없도록 SLBM 지휘통제를 무력화하는 방안을 제시하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

North Korea has steadily advanced its nuclear capabilities and diversified its delivery means, including the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs). Since the first successful SLBM was launched in 2015, nearly a decade has passed, yet research on North Korea's SLBM command and control(C2) system remains limited. This study examines how SLBMs are commanded and controlled within the broader framework of North Korea's nuclear C2 structure, which is highly centralized under Kim Jong Un. While the regime adheres to an assertive command system that minimizes delegation, the unique operational characteristics of submarines, such as restricted real-time communications, and the need for survivable second-strike capability, suggest that narrow forms of conditional delegation may still exist in extreme wartime scenarios. Building on theoretical perspectives of NC2 and the technical features of submarine operations, this research analyzes the possible pathways of order transmission to North Korean SLBM platforms and evaluates their vulnerabilities. The findings indicate that North Korea is most likely to operate its SLBMs in a bastion mode near coastal waters with limited communication range, constrained by both technological and operational factors. Accordingly, this paper proposes a dual-layered response strategy: conducting anti-submarine warfare(ASW) to physically eliminate SLBM platforms, while simultaneously neutralizing their C2 system by selectively disrupting submarine communication networks through physical strikes and electronic warfare. This combined approach could delay or prevent SLBM launches, force submarines to surface, and thereby enhance the effectiveness of ASW operations.