Harmless naturalism : the limits of science and the nature of philosophy

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = xi
• Introduction = 1
• 1 The Replacement Thesis = 9
• 1.1 Quine's Argument = 11
• 1.2 The Charge of Internal Inconsistency = 13
• 1.3 The Sosa Reply = 16
• 1.4 The Argument from "The Scandal of Philosophy" = 18
• 1.5 The "Philosophy Is Science" Argument = 20
• 1.6 Analysis of the Lycan Argument = 24
• 1.7 The Disappearance Argument on Traditional Epistemology = 31
• 1.8 Critique of the Disappearance Argument = 31
• A. Putnam's Objection = 33
• B. Siegel's Objection = 35
• C. The Objection from Vicious Circularity = 36
• 1.9 The Argument from Evolutionary Theory = 38
• 1.10 Response to the Argument from Evolutionary Theory = 40
• 1.11 The Argument from Cognitive Science = 42
• A. The Argument from the Falsity of Folk Psychology = 42
• B. Critique of this First Argument : Haack's Response = 44
• C. The Remaining Two Arguments = 46
• D. The Last Nail = 50
• 1.12 The Argument from the "Impossibility of Defining Justification" = 50
• A. Various Unacceptable Responses = 52
• B. Two Acceptable Responses = 59
• 1.13 The Incoherence Argument Against the Replacement Thesis = 64
• A. Two Likely Objections = 71
• 1.14 Conclusion : The Death of the Replacement Thesis = 74
• 2 The Transformational Thesis = 75
• 2.1 Introduction : Reliabilism and Naturalized Epistemology = 77
• 2.2 Causal and Reliability Analyses of Justification : A Brief Description = 81
• 2.3 Reliabilism and Goldman's Theory of Justification = 84
• 2.4 Aunt Hattie, Various Clairvoyants, and Other Counterexamples to Reliabilism = 85
• 2.5 The Reliabilist's Response = 87
• 2.6 Goldman's Arguments Against Interpersonalism = 88
• 2.7 Goldman's Arguments Examined = 90
• 2.8 The Responses Examined = 98
• 2.9 The Argument for Intrapersonalism = 111
• 2.10 Critique of the Argument for Intrapersonalism = 113
• 2.11 Six More Arguments Favoring Intrapersonalism = 114
• 2.12 Evaluation of These Six Arguments = 117
• 2.13 Other Arguments Against Reliabilism as a Theory of Justification = 123
• A. The Circularity Argument = 123
• B. The Ambiguity Argument = 125
• C. The Gettier Argument = 126
• D. The Standard Practice Argument = 127
• E. The "Reliabilism Guarantees Skepticism" Argument = 128
• F. The "Method of Establishing Reliability" Argument = 129
• 2.14 The Reliability Theory of Knowledge : Dretske's Question = 130
• 2.15 Answering Dretske's Question = 132
• 2.16 Reliabilism and the Transformational Thesis = 137
• 2.17 Conclusion : Naturalized Epistemology and Cognitive Science = 137
• 3 The Harmless Thesis and Philosophical Explanations = 141
• 3.1 Introduction = 143
• 3.2 Harmless Naturalism and Humean Empiricism = 144
• 3.3 Objections to Harmless Naturalism : The Problem of Induction and the H - D Model = 150
• 3.4 Private Knowledge = 158
• 3.5 Philosophy and Natural Science = 161
• 3.6 Philosophical Explanations : Not Explicitly, But Implicitly, Testable = 165
• 3.7 Two Examples : Aristotle on Human Intelligence and Hume's Other - Mind Solipsism = 169
• 3.8 Another Example : Scientific Realism = 173
• 3.9 Other Objections = 177
• 3.10 Conclusion = 182
• Notes = 185
• Bibliography = 219
• Index = 229