Since Kim Jong Un’s regime began in 2012, North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy has evolved through systematic developmental stages centered on the three components of nuclear deterrence (Capability, Communication, and Credibility). While purs...
Since Kim Jong Un’s regime began in 2012, North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy has evolved through systematic developmental stages centered on the three components of nuclear deterrence (Capability, Communication, and Credibility). While pursuing quantitative and qualitative advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities to maximize strategic effects under limited resources and capabilities, North Korea has adjusted its deterrence strategy in response to changes in the external environment and strategic requirements. This study systematically analyzes North Korea’s stepwise structuring process of nuclear deterrence strategy using the analytical framework of Prospect Theory.
Prospect Theory explains that an actor’s strategic choices are determined by perceptions of gains and losses based on a reference point. In particular, actors tend to make risk-accepting choices when they perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses and risk-averse choices when in the domain of gains. This analytical framework of Prospect Theory is useful in explaining North Korea’s strategic behavior in securing the components of nuclear deterrence: Capability, Communication, and Credibility.
This study analyzes North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy since 2012 by dividing it into four periods. The first period (2012-2017), characterized as a ‘risk-accepting nuclear weapons development strategy,’ focused on establishing basic nuclear capability through successive nuclear tests and ICBM test launches, with initial nuclear deterrence capability as the reference point. The second period (2018-2019), termed a ‘risk-averse Strategic State Recognition Strategy’, attempted to achieve recognition as a nuclear state and sanctions relief through negotiations with the United States by strengthening communication. The third period (2020-2022.9), defined as a ‘risk-accepting retaliatory capability securing strategy,’ pursued qualitative enhancement of capabilities through tactical nuclear development and multi-layered deterrence posture establishment, setting a new reference point for securing substantial nuclear deterrence capability after the breakdown of the Hanoi summit. Finally, the fourth period (2022.9-2024), identified as a ‘Risk-averse Nuclear State Recognition Strategy’, focuses on securing credibility, utilizing strategic opportunities in the new Cold War structure to achieve ‘de facto’ nuclear state status.
The ultimate purpose of this study is to systematically explain how North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy has been a process of securing the three components of nuclear deterrence through the analytical framework of Prospect Theory. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how reference point settings and strategic choices in each period followed a developmental process of capability building (2012-2017), communication enhancement (2018-2019), capability advancement (2020-2022.9), and credibility securing (2022.9-2024). Through this analysis, the study seeks to deepen understanding of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence strategy and derive implications for managing the Korean Peninsula’s security environment.