This article attempts to investigate the relation between philosophical hermeneutics and conceptual history. More specifically, this study lays the foundation for future work on a research model for conceptual history. Thus, this study aims to provide...
This article attempts to investigate the relation between philosophical hermeneutics and conceptual history. More specifically, this study lays the foundation for future work on a research model for conceptual history. Thus, this study aims to provide an overview of the essential feature of Gadamer`s philosophical Hermeneutics. This study is organized as follows: the first section sketches out Gadamer`s view of conceptual history; Gadamer applies his hermen- eutically attuned thought to the concept of conceptual history, claiming that the task of research of conceptual history is to fulfill as philosophy itself. For example, Socratic dialectic is an excellent model of conceptual practice. The second section deals with the importance of philosophical hermeneutics as model of conceptual history. Gadamer describes the hermeneutic task as coming into conversation with the text. He elaborates that opening a conversation cannot be mechanized, or methodized, either, and that, indeed, the function of hermeneutics is to transform a fixed assertion into conversation, and to bring the bygone and static past back into the process of history. In dialogue, as with tradition questioning is reciprocal. To open a conversation with a text means to understand the question to which the text is an answer as an open question. The third section, then, summarizes Gadamer`s detailed analysis of humanistic concepts. As Gadamer aims to seek out the experience of truth, which transcends the realm of control of scientific methodology. The human sciences merge with kinds of experience which lie beyond the natural sciences - kinds of experience which Gadamer claims cannot be verified by the methodological means of the natural sciences. Gadamer examine humanistic concepts to clarify the source of truth that can legitimate the human sciences as science. Considered together, Bildung, common sense, judgement, and taste are ways of knowing and being. He discerns the significance of the humanistic tradition behind this unity of ways of knowing and being.