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    Do Independent Directors Monitor Family Firms? Evidence from the Market Value of Cash Holdings

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104471492

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    Due to their significant stock ownership and control, founding families are generally immune from the disciplinary forces associated with the market for corporate control. As a result, founding families may spend cash on the pursuit of private benefits. In this paper, I examine whether independent directors protect outside shareholder rights from the risk of expropriation. In particular, I examine how board independence impacts a firm’s efficiency in utilizing cash reserves. I find evidence that the value of an extra dollar of unexpected cash holding is greater in family firms with a greater percentage of independent directors on their boards, suggesting that independent directors prevent the potential risk of value destruction that results from founding families’ pursuit of private benefits.
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    Due to their significant stock ownership and control, founding families are generally immune from the disciplinary forces associated with the market for corporate control. As a result, founding families may spend cash on the pursuit of private benefit...

    Due to their significant stock ownership and control, founding families are generally immune from the disciplinary forces associated with the market for corporate control. As a result, founding families may spend cash on the pursuit of private benefits. In this paper, I examine whether independent directors protect outside shareholder rights from the risk of expropriation. In particular, I examine how board independence impacts a firm’s efficiency in utilizing cash reserves. I find evidence that the value of an extra dollar of unexpected cash holding is greater in family firms with a greater percentage of independent directors on their boards, suggesting that independent directors prevent the potential risk of value destruction that results from founding families’ pursuit of private benefits.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 박종일, "이사회 구성과 기업가치" 한국회계정보학회 24 (24): 91-123, 2006

    2 박경진, "우리나라 상장회사 중 가족기업의 비중 및 경영성과" 한국생산성학회 27 (27): 355-385, 2013

    3 김문태, "외국인 투자자와 감사위원회 설치 및 사외이사 특성이 기업가치에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 26 (26): 65-88, 2008

    4 김문태, "감사위원회와 사외이사가 경영자의 사적소비와 자산효율성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 27 (27): 211-235, 2009

    5 박종국, "가족기업의 조세전략" 한국회계정보학회 28 (28): 435-461, 2010

    6 Bebchuk, L., "What matters in Corporate Governance?" 22 (22): 783-827, 2009

    7 Himmelberg, C., "Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance" 53 : 353-384, 1999

    8 Jensen, M., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" 3 (3): 305-360, 1976

    9 Demsetz, H., "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences" 93 (93): 1155-1177, 1985

    10 Myers, S., "The Paradox of Liquidity" 113 (113): 733-771, 1998

    1 박종일, "이사회 구성과 기업가치" 한국회계정보학회 24 (24): 91-123, 2006

    2 박경진, "우리나라 상장회사 중 가족기업의 비중 및 경영성과" 한국생산성학회 27 (27): 355-385, 2013

    3 김문태, "외국인 투자자와 감사위원회 설치 및 사외이사 특성이 기업가치에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 26 (26): 65-88, 2008

    4 김문태, "감사위원회와 사외이사가 경영자의 사적소비와 자산효율성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계정보학회 27 (27): 211-235, 2009

    5 박종국, "가족기업의 조세전략" 한국회계정보학회 28 (28): 435-461, 2010

    6 Bebchuk, L., "What matters in Corporate Governance?" 22 (22): 783-827, 2009

    7 Himmelberg, C., "Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance" 53 : 353-384, 1999

    8 Jensen, M., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" 3 (3): 305-360, 1976

    9 Demsetz, H., "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences" 93 (93): 1155-1177, 1985

    10 Myers, S., "The Paradox of Liquidity" 113 (113): 733-771, 1998

    11 Bhagat, S., "The Non-correlation between Board Independence and Long Term Firm Performance" 27 : 231-274, 2001

    12 Jensen, M., "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems" 48 (48): 831-880, 1993

    13 Palia, D., "The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm Valuation: A Solution" 14 (14): 735-764, 2001

    14 Hermalin, B., "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" 101-112, 1991

    15 Ajinkya, B., "The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts" 43 (43): 343-376, 2005

    16 Lin, S., "Stock Market Reaction to the Appointment of Outside Directors" 30 : 351-382, 2003

    17 Fama, E., "Separation of Ownership and Control" 26 (26): 301-325, 1983

    18 Barclay, M., "Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations" 25 (25): 371-395, 1989

    19 Weisbach, M., "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover" 20 : 431-460, 1988

    20 Stulz, R., "Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control" 20 : 25-54, 1988

    21 Shleifer, A., "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control" 94 (94): 461-488, 1986

    22 Fama, E., "Industry Costs of Equity" 43 (43): 153-193, 1997

    23 Villalonga, B., "How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm Value?" 80 (80): 385-417, 2006

    24 Villalonga, B., "How are US Family Firms Controlled?" 22 (22): 3047-3091, 2009

    25 Yermack, D., "Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors" 40 (40): 185-211, 1996

    26 Anderson, R., "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500" 58 (58): 1301-1327, 2003

    27 Anderson, R., "Founders, Heirs, and Corporate Opacity in the United States" 92 : 205-222, 2009

    28 Agrawal, A., "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders" 31 : 377-397, 1996

    29 Hermalin, B., "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO" 88 (88): 96-118, 1998

    30 Mace, M., "Directors: Myth and Reality" Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University 1986

    31 Dittmar, A., "Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings" 83 (83): 599-634, 2007

    32 Baysinger, B., "Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition" 1 : 101-124, 1985

    33 Faulkender, M., "Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash" 61 (61): 1957-1990, 2006

    34 Ali, A., "Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms" 44 (44): 238-286, 2007

    35 Dechow, P., "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC" 13 (13): 1-36, 1996

    36 Shivdasani, A., "Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers" 16 (16): 167-198, 1993

    37 Goh, B., "Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control" 26 (26): 549-579, 2009

    38 Klein, A., "Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management" 33 (33): 375-400, 2002

    39 Masulis, R., "Agency Problems at Dual-class Companies" 64 (64): 1697-1727, 2009

    40 McConnell, J., "Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value" 27 (27): 595-612, 1990

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    기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
    2016 0.8 0.8 0.96
    KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
    1.15 1.25 1.443 0.23
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