When networks play a central role in these settings, it is natural to question not only whether communication improves the chance of coordination but also how the benefits of coordination are distributed among individuals. In a given network, some ind...
When networks play a central role in these settings, it is natural to question not only whether communication improves the chance of coordination but also how the benefits of coordination are distributed among individuals. In a given network, some individuals may occupy locations that enable them to derive greater strategic in uence and payoffs than others. We therefore propose to explore the role of network structure on both issues of effciency and equity in the context of pre-play communication and coordination.
In order to explore the role of network structure of pre-play communication on both effciency and equity of coordination outcomes, we shall consider a four-player extension of Battle of the Sexes with conflicting preferences about how to coordinate. Prior to playing this underlying game, the four players engage in multiple rounds of cheap-talk about their intended actions in the underlying game. We experiment the above cheap talk game by varying (i) the length of pre-play communication and (ii) the network structure of pre-play communication (i.e. specifying whose past messages each player can observe at the beginning of each period).