This study tries to clarify scientifically the influence of competition, performance incentives, and performance evaluation on the service quality of Social Welfare Centers. For this study, 61 Multipurpose Social Welfare Centers in 16 Wide-area Autono...
This study tries to clarify scientifically the influence of competition, performance incentives, and performance evaluation on the service quality of Social Welfare Centers. For this study, 61 Multipurpose Social Welfare Centers in 16 Wide-area Autonomous Communities were sampled.
The important findings were as follows.
First, the overall service level of Multipurpose Social Welfare Centers(MSWC) is very high. Among others, the level of the center which give performance incentives to the center showing high performance after contracting out is high.
Second, most of the centers were selected by re-contract as a private contract with the same centers. But, afterwards many centers were contracted by local governments through open competitive contracting process, therefore the number of centers selected through open competitive process will increase. But, the way of contracting out, that is, open competitive contracting out vs a private contracting out does not influence the service quality. This hints us that the negotiated contracting or the cooperative contracting will be better than the competitive contracting. Therefore "The Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, the competitive contracting out will bring about higher service quality than the private contracting out." was rejected.
Third, when the center was contracted by the local government for the service delivery, the higher the competition was, then the lower the service level was. Therefore, "The Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, the higher the competition of contracting for the service delivery of MSWC was, the higher the competition was." was rejected. This finding hints us that the competition could not be the managerial strategy for better service quality in social welfare service delivery.
Fourth, for better service quality, that the local government gives the center performance incentives significantly influences the service quality. Therefore, "The Hypothesis 3: Other things being equal, that the government gives incentives to the center results in higher service quality than that it does not." was accepted.
Fifth, after contracting out for the service delivery, the center of which the government evaluate well the performance shows higher service quality than others. Therefore, "The Hypothesis 4: Other things being equal, the better the local government evaluate the performance, the higher the level of service was." This finding hints us that performance evaluation and incentive are important as strategies for better service quality.
Sixth, the way of director selection of MSWC influences importantly the service quality. Therefore, it is desirable to recruit openly the director of MSWC for better service quality, and to include it in the enforcement rule of contracting out.
Seventh, the type and the size of the center also influence the service quality. Therefore, when contracting out, we have to consider that a foundation or a corporation shows higher quality than others, and that the middle size center shows higher quality than others.
finally, because the personal characteristics influence the quality, it required that we should consider the political attitudes, sex, education level, age, etc. as influencing factors in interpreting the result of service quality evaluation.